Efficient Methods for Empirical Tests of Behavioral Economics Theories in Laboratory and Field Experiments by Ray, Debajyoti
Efficient Methods for Empirical Tests of Behavioural Economics
Theories in Laboratory and Field Experiments.
Thesis by
Debajyoti Ray
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California
2015
(Defended 28 May 2014)
iContents
Abstract ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Behavioural Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Experimental Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Errors in Lab Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.2 Field Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.1 Submodularity and Greedy Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.2 Discrete Choice models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Findings and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs 20
2.1 A brief history of related adaptive methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Dynamic Optimal Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Bayesian Active Learning in the Noiseless Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 The Equivalence Class Determination Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.3 Noisy Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.4 A simple illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Implementation: Efficiency and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.1 Effective Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.2 Accelerated Greedy Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Design and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.1 Ground Truth Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6 Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6.1 Noise Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.7 Empirical Data and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.7.1 Distribution of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
ii
2.7.2 Interpretation of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.8 Conclusions and future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Time Preference 70
3.1 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2 Optimal Adaptive Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.1 A brief history of related adaptive methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.2 A simple illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.3 Bayesian Active Learning in the Noiseless Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.4 The Equivalence Class Determination Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.5 Noisy Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.2 Ground Truth Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4.1 Hyper-patience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.2 Distribution of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.6 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.7 Subjective Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.7.1 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.7.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4 Reference Dependence and Substitution 106
4.1 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2 Motivating Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.2.1 Behaviour of Experienced Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3 Structural Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.1 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.3.2 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4.1 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4.2 Estimation from Retail Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4.3 Effect of Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
iii
5 Discussions 124
5.1 Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.1.1 New measurements in Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.1.2 Applications of BROAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.1.3 Field experiments of Prospect Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
iv
List of Figures
2.1 Constructing Equivalence Class Graphs. (top left) An equivalence class is the set of hypotheses
that generate the same vector of outcomes. (top right) An edge joins two observation vectors
generated by hypotheses from a sequence of tests in distinct equivalence classes. (bottom) An
EC2 graph consists of all equivalence classes and the edges connecting them. . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 A stylized example of Equivalence Class Edge Cutting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 (Left) Accuracy as a function of time assuming a response time of 28 seconds (average response
time across all subjects). (Right) Accuracy as a function of logarithmic time with no response
delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.05. The asymptotic bound from
running all tests in random order is also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.10. The asymptotic bound from
running all tests in random order is also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.20. The asymptotic bound from
running all tests in random order is also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 Performance of the algorithms for individual models when probability of error,  = 0.05. The
asymptotic bounds are also shown for recovering individual models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8 The classifications for the two treatments to test for manipulability. Treatment 1 has 27 subjects,
and treatment 2 has 30 subjects. The difference between the two distributions was not found to
be statistically significant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.9 Stacked bar plot of posterior distribution over the 6 models (averaged over the final 5 rounds)
for 27 subjects in the non-manipulation condition (left) and the manipulation condition (right). 51
2.10 Performance of the algorithms for individual models when probability of error, σ = 0.86 for an
average error rate of 10%(left) and σ = 1.12 for an average error rate of 20% (right). . . . . . 52
2.11 Examples of the dynamically-estimated posterior probability over all models for two subjects.
The subject on the left is rapidly classified as EV; the one on the right is less rapidly classified
as CPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
v2.12 Stacked bar plot of posterior distribution over the 6 models (averaged over the final 5 rounds)
for 57 subjects. The subjects are ordered on the x-axis based on maximum posterior probability
into models EV, FPT, CPT, MVS, SMVS and CRRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.13 The posterior distribution of the 6 models after each round. The aggregate mean and standard
error is shown for 57 subjects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.14 The percentage of subjects whose current classification in a round, corresponds to final classifi-
cation (in round 30). Subjects trying to manipulate the algorithm might misrepresent their true
type in early rounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.15 (left) A cartoon of the hypothetical reaction times in the two treatments to test for manipulation.
We expect higher reaction times when subjects are trying to manipulate. (right) The actual
reaction times with standard error bars for the two treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.16 The “collapsed” classification of 57 subjects into the four class of theories: Prospect Theory
(PT), Moments Models (MVS), Expected Value (EV) and Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.17 Sorted values of tests for the accelerated EC2 implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1 A stylized example of Equivalence Class Edge Cutting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2 The posterior distribution of the 5 models after each round. The aggregate mean and standard
error is shown for 40 subjects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 The classification of 40 subjects to each of the 5 models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4 The posterior distribution of the 5 models after each round. The aggregate mean and standard
error is shown for 40 subjects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5 The classification of 40 subjects to each of the 5 models with expanded parameter support for
“hyper-patience”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 The calendar time and biological time evolve at different rates. Two equal intervals (0,∆)
and (s, s+ ∆) in calendar time (horizontal axis) translate into unequal intervals (t0, t∆) and
(ts, ts+∆) in biological time (vertical axis). The function F (·) depicts one possible realization
of the (stochastic) transformation from calendar to biological time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.7 (Top) No autocorrelation of biological time (ρ = 0). The discounting curve in biological time is
exponential with discount rate equal to 1. It generates the dotted discounting curve in calendar
time (“ZeroCorr”). The best exponential (“Exp”) fit in calendar time produces a discount rate
of 0.30, and the best hyperbolic fit (“Hyp”) has a discount rate equal to 2.75. (Bottom) Very
high autocorrelation of biological time (ρ = 0.97). The discounting curve in biological time is
exponential with discount rate equal to 1. It generates the dotted discounting curve in calendar
time (“HighCorr”). The best exponential (“Exp”) fit in calendar time produces a discount rate
of 0.45, and the best hyperbolic fit (“Hyp”) in calendar time has discount rate equal to 1.75. . 100
vi
3.8 Impact of increased variability onto shape of discounting under mild autocorrelation of the
biological clock (ρ = 0.3). As variability (“Var”) increased from 0.5 over 1 to 4, the discounting
function becomes more convex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.9 Time intervals generated from concavity in the mapping from calendar to biological time,
induced by decreasing the speed of the biological clock for time intervals further into the future
(γ = 0.5). The biological clock does not exhibit autocorrelation (ρ = 0). The discounting curve
in biological time is exponential with discount rate equal to 1. The dashed-dotted line depicts
the resulting discounting curve in calendar time (“Concav”). The best exponential (“Exp”) fit
in calendar time produces a discount rate of 0.40, and the best hyperbolic fit (“Hyp”) has a
discount rate equal to 2.20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1 Simulated effect of loss aversion and substitution with each point a different sample of loss aversion
parameter λ (sampled uniformly between 1 and 4). When higher selling item (black dots), goes on sale
(periods indicated by blue line), quantity increases. When sale ends, the quantities sold decrease whilst,
due to loss aversion, the relative utility of a lower selling substitute (red dots) increases. At each period the
loss aversion parameter is sampled from a distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2 A snapshot of the retailer’s website powerdrills. Consumers can easily look at the price of the item of
interest, whether it is currently at a discount, as well as the price and discount status of substitutes. . . . 109
4.3 The total sales, in log scale, of all 6039 SKUs ranked (left). The total sales made by customers in log scale,
in ranked order (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4 The total amount of discounts offered per day over 19.5 months (left). The fraction of days the items
(ordered according to sales rank) are on sale in the last 8 months (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5 (left) The effect of Discounts (day 0) and days since the last discount period for the top 1000 SKUs. (right)
The effect for “experienced” customers (red line) and “inexperienced” customers (black line). . . . . . 112
4.6 The $100 gift card has a spurt in sales during sale periods (indicated by black dots). Once the sale is
removed, the quantities sold decline whilst the substitute, $50 gift card, has a greater increase in sales. On
the right: The effect on sales since the day the last sale ended (black line). A sale ending for the substitute
(red line) has a positive effect on the substitute. The quantities and discount periods are smoothed using a
5-day window. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.7 The probability of choosing first item, P (Ci = 1), for no loss aversion, λ = 1 on left. P (Ci = 1) for
loss aversion coefficient λ = 3 on right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.8 A histogram of the estimated values of λ for all 3673 substitute pairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.9 The estimates of λ (and errorbars) for substitute and non-substitute goods among the general (left),
experienced (middle) and inexperienced customers (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.1 Response times (in milliseconds) in choosing between two delayed rewards in Risky Choice
experiment. The x-axis is a measure of differential subjective value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
vii
List of Tables
2.1 We compare 6 models of risky choice, with no parameters: Expected Value (EV), one parameter:
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), adn 3 parameters: Prospect Theory (PT), Cumulative
Prospect Theory (CPT), Mean-Variance-Skewness (MVS), Normalized Mean-Variance-Skewness 25
2.2 Summary of the experimental design methods that are compared against EC2 . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Misclassification Matrix: Percentage of samples (row) that are classified as another model
(column) using EC2 after 50 rounds. The diagonal represents correct classification. . . . . . . 46
2.4 Differences in Misclassification Matrix: Percentage of samples (row) that are classified as
another model (column) using EC2 after 50 rounds for  noise minus the Softmax noise model
for average error rate of 0.10. The diagonal represents no difference in classification accuracy. 52
2.5 The User Interface presented to the participants. The two amounts and probabilities for the 2
lotteries are shown in text on the right. The same information is displayed as a graph on the left. 60
3.1 Performance of the algorithms when there is no error,  = 0.0 (left) and when probability of
error,  = 0.05 (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2 Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.10 (left) and  = 0.20 (right). . 85
3.3 The posterior probability of the models over 50 rounds for a ”Hyperbolic” type (left) and the
choice path: amount and delay of the options selected (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4 The posterior probability of the models over 50 rounds for a ”General-Hyperbolic” type (left)
and the choice path: amount and delay of the options selected (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.1 Examples of λ values for 3 top-selling SKUs along with their substitute SKUs as well as examples of
non-substitute SKUs. The ratio of the log-Likelihood of the pair under the multinomial choice model for
the MLE λ value, and for λ = 1 is also shown; logRatio =
logL(λ∗)
logL(λ = 1)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
viii
Acknowledgements
When I started my doctoral program, I was motivated to find the right answers upon completing my thesis. I
naively believed that somehow I’d devise methods to query human nature and find interesting answers. As I
write my thesis, I realize I have so many more questions to ask and very few right answers. What I have gained
during my doctoral thesis years however, is the ability to ask good questions, seek answers with the scientific
method, and an appreciation for empirical data. I have been very fortunate to have had some amazing mentors
along the way.
During my undergraduate years, I got a taste of machine learning research and the scientific method from
Professors Richard Zemel, Radford Neal and Quaid Morris. During my MPhil, Professor Peter Dayan helped
me hone my thinking, and ask the right empirical questions.
At Caltech, I learned a lot from Professors Andreas Krause, Peter Bossaerts and Matthew Shum. My
advisor, Professor Colin Camerer, made these five years of apprenticeship a pleasurable pursuit of knowledge.
I’ve been infected by his natural intellectual curiosity, and the pursuit of answers for its own sake.
I’m grateful to Brad Feldman, and Pasadena Labs, for providing valuable data for chapter 3 of my thesis.
Brad has been a great resource and help me think through the practical aspects of my research. I thank my
committee members, Katrina Ligett and Romann Weber, for providing valuable feedback on this thesis.
I’m grateful for my friends and family in Los Angeles, and all over the world, for providing some wonderful
times. I’m thankful to Ilona, for this journey wouldn’t be as successful or enjoyable without her. Finally, my
deepest gratitude is reserved for my parents who instilled in me the values of self-expression and intellectual
curiosity, and always supported me.
ix
Abstract
In the quest for a descriptive theory of decision-making, the rational actor model in economics imposes
rather unrealistic expectations and abilities on human decision makers. The further we move from idealized
scenarios, such as perfectly competitive markets, and ambitiously extend the reach of the theory to describe
everyday decision making situations, the less sense these assumptions make. Behavioural economics has
instead proposed models based on assumptions that are more psychologically realistic, with the aim of gaining
more precision and descriptive power. Increased psychological realism, however, comes at the cost of a
greater number of parameters and model complexity. Now there are a plethora of models, based on different
assumptions, applicable in differing contextual settings, and selecting the right model to use tends to be
an ad-hoc process. In this thesis, we develop optimal experimental design methods and evaluate different
behavioral theories against evidence from lab and field experiments.
We look at evidence from controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects are presented with choices between
monetary gambles or lotteries. Different decision-making theories evaluate the choices differently and would
make distinct predictions about the subjects’ choices. Theories whose predictions are inconsistent with the
actual choices can be systematically eliminated. Behavioural theories can have multiple parameters requiring
complex experimental designs with a very large number of possible choice tests. This imposes computational
and economic constraints on using classical experimental design methods. We develop a methodology of
adaptive tests: Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs (BROAD) that sequentially chooses the “most
informative” test at each stage, and based on the response updates its posterior beliefs over the theories,
which informs the next most informative test to run. BROAD utilizes the Equivalent Class Edge Cutting
(EC2) criteria to select tests. We prove that the EC2 criteria is adaptively submodular, which allows us
to prove theoretical guarantees against the Bayes-optimal testing sequence even in the presence of noisy
responses. In simulated ground-truth experiments, we find that the EC2 criteria recovers the true hypotheses
with significantly fewer tests than more widely used criteria such as Information Gain and Generalized Binary
Search. We show, theoretically as well as experimentally, that surprisingly these popular criteria can perform
poorly in the presence of noise, or subject errors. Furthermore, we use the adaptive submodular property of
EC2 to implement an accelerated greedy version of BROAD which leads to orders of magnitude speedup over
other methods.
We use BROAD to perform two experiments. First, we compare the main classes of theories for decision-
xmaking under risk, namely: expected value, prospect theory, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and
moments models. Subjects are given an initial endowment, and sequentially presented choices between two
lotteries, with the possibility of losses. The lotteries are selected using BROAD, and 57 subjects from Caltech
and UCLA are incentivized by randomly realizing one of the lotteries chosen. Aggregate posterior probabilities
over the theories show limited evidence in favour of CRRA and moments’ models. Classifying the subjects
into types showed that most subjects are described by prospect theory, followed by expected value. Adaptive
experimental design raises the possibility that subjects could engage in strategic manipulation, i.e. subjects
could mask their true preferences and choose differently in order to obtain more favourable tests in later rounds
thereby increasing their payoffs. We pay close attention to this problem; strategic manipulation is ruled out
since it is infeasible in practice, and also since we do not find any signatures of it in our data.
In the second experiment, we compare the main theories of time preference: exponential discounting,
hyperbolic discounting, “present bias” models: quasi-hyperbolic (α, β) discounting and fixed cost discounting,
and generalized-hyperbolic discounting. 40 subjects from UCLA were given choices between 2 options:
a smaller but more immediate payoff versus a larger but later payoff. We found very limited evidence for
present bias models and hyperbolic discounting, and most subjects were classified as generalized hyperbolic
discounting types, followed by exponential discounting.
In these models the passage of time is linear. We instead consider a psychological model where the
perception of time is subjective. We prove that when the biological (subjective) time is positively dependent, it
gives rise to hyperbolic discounting and temporal choice inconsistency.
We also test the predictions of behavioral theories in the “wild”. We pay attention to prospect theory,
which emerged as the dominant theory in our lab experiments of risky choice. Loss aversion and reference
dependence predicts that consumers will behave in a uniquely distinct way than the standard rational model
predicts. Specifically, loss aversion predicts that when an item is being offered at a discount, the demand
for it will be greater than that explained by its price elasticity. Even more importantly, when the item is no
longer discounted, demand for its close substitute would increase excessively. We tested this prediction using
a discrete choice model with loss-averse utility function on data from a large eCommerce retailer. Not only
did we identify loss aversion, but we also found that the effect decreased with consumers’ experience. We
outline the policy implications that consumer loss aversion entails, and strategies for competitive pricing.
In future work, BROAD can be widely applicable for testing different behavioural models, e.g. in social
preference and game theory, and in different contextual settings. Additional measurements beyond choice data,
including biological measurements such as skin conductance, can be used to more rapidly eliminate hypothesis
and speed up model comparison. Discrete choice models also provide a framework for testing behavioural
models with field data, and encourage combined lab-field experiments.
1Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to develop rational approaches to study (possibly) irrational behaviour. Human
behaviour is studied using different approaches and techniques in several fields, including psychology,
sociology, computer science, economics and neuroscience. We’ll be investigating behaviour through the lens
of economic decision-making.
Economics is concerned with both the normative (sometimes prescriptive) and descriptive aspects of
behaviour. How should utility be maximized from limited resources? As well as hypothesis testing of models
of decision-making from data. This distinction between how an agent should act versus how people do act is
artificial, from the point of view of neoclassical economics.
The scientific movement of empirically validating economic theories was led by Friedman (1953). Theories
make predictions, and hypothesis testing should be utilized to test theories against data. But Friedman (1953)
did not question whether the axiomatic foundations or assumptions of the rational actor model, which implies
that humans are purely selfish and have unbounded computational abilities, were valid. Instead he proposed
that behaviour could be described “as-if” the assumptions held true.
There are at least two compelling arguments to entertain models with different assumptions. This is
especially true when decision making models are applied to describe behaviour in everyday situations, and
not just perfectly competitive markets. First, the computational complexity makes the application of several
solution concepts infeasible for complex tasks. Computing the Nash-equilibria is PPAD-complete in several
settings (Daskalakis et al. (2009)); even the “consumer problem” of choosing a set of indivisible goods among
multiple options with budget constraints is NP-Complete (Gilboa et al. (2009)). Second, evidence has been
piling up in behavioural economics, that the normative economic models don’t always hold up when applied to
describe human decision-making and behaviour. At the root, the objection is that the underlying assumptions
of rationality in these models are unrealistic. Alternate descriptive models have been proposed that have more
realistic assumptions of human behaviour with roots in Psychology and Cognitive Science.
2In developing the necessary tools, the position in this thesis is to follow normative principles, to the
extent feasible, of optimization under resource constraints. We develop methods for experimental design to
maximize the information gained from conducting tests, or asking questions, with limited time or budgetary
resources. We encounter the scourge of computational complexity in experimental design when responses are
noisy: the optimal sequence of tests is infeasible to compute. We develop Active-Learning methods inspired
from Computer Science and Machine Learning, and prove theoretical guarantees that the resulting solution is
near-optimal.
When studying the descriptive models, the position in this thesis with respect to the validity of neoclassical
and behavioural models is agnostic. We adopt the scientific task of testing several popular models using
empirical data from both laboratory and field experiments. In the next section, we provide some background
in behavioural and experimental economics. We summarize the key findings and contributions in section 1.4.
1.1 Behavioural Economics
A starting point for Behavioural Economics is querying the explicit, and sometimes implicit, assumptions
behind the rational actor framework in the standard model, using lab and field evidence. Based on empirical
evidence, behavioural economics increases the explanatory power and precision of economics by providing
more realistic psychological foundations (Camerer and Loewenstein (2004)).
The beliefs, values, preferences and choices in the standard model, are built on four main axioms related to
consumer preferences: Completeness, Transitivity, Reflexivity and Reveal Preference. Additionally preferences
must satisfy dominance1 and invariance (i.e. the relation of preference should not depend on the description of
the options). Furthemore agents have perfect rationality, i.e. they have all the relevant information pertaining
to a decision and the cognitive resources to process it instantly and costlessly, and update and estimate their
beliefs with Bayesian probability.
Simon (1955) introduced the term bounded rationality for the realistic cases where perfect rationality does
not hold. The most general implication is that we tend to use heuristics, that are “methods for arriving at
satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of computation” (Simon (1990)). The most significant implication
of using heuristics is that they often result in biases, i.e. systematic errors. These are factual errors in beliefs,
and also errors in terms of preferences, which may result in non-optimal choice.
Kahneman et al. (1982) also documented several studies that showed that people violate rational Bayesian
updating. For instance, people overestimate the probability of salient events like dying in plane crashes and
1Dominance states that if option X is better than option Y in one state and at least as good in all other states, then option X is dominant
over option Y and should be chosen. This is related to the reflexivitiy axiom: any bundle is at least as good as itself: (x1, x2) ≥ (x1, x2).
3winning the lottery. The representative heuristic refers to the phenomenon that generalized judgement of
a category is determined primarily by properties of a prototype (Kahneman and Tversky (1972)); Forming
stereotypes is a consequent bias.
Without perfect rationality and Bayesian updating, the revealed preferences approach does not hold up.
Behavioural economics, as a field, has documented several anomalies from the standard framework and
proposed alternate models to account for these anomalies. Unlike the neoclassical approach, however, a
dissatisfying aspect of behavioural economics (in its current state) is that it does not have a general theoretical
framework for behaviour. Instead, there are disparate theories in different domains, built from inductive
generalizations. In this thesis, we focus on decision-making under risk and on inter-temporal decisions
(delayed rewards). We provide a background of these two areas, as well as briefly summarize some other
important areas like social preferences, strategic interactions, and neuroeconomics for the sake of completeness.
Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty A number of anomalies related to the axioms and assump-
tions of expected utility theory (EUT) have been observed in both lab data, and more prominently in field data
(Camerer (2004)). Two examples predate prospect theory (PT), and were introduced by Allais (1953). In the
Allais Paradox, objective probabilities of the states of the world are known, i.e. risky situations. The Ellsberg
paradox involves ambiguity or uncertainty where objective probabilities cannot be calculated.
Prospect Theory (PT) was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and then extended to cumulative
prospect theory in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). PT models choice as a two-phase process: editing and
then evaluation. The editing phase consists of a preliminary analysis of the prospects, which yields a simpler
representation and facilitates the evaluation process for the prospects. Editing involves heuristic rules and
operations like coding, combination, segregation, cancellation, simplification and the detection of dominance2.
After the editing phase, the decision maker evaluates each of the edited prospects, and chooses the one with
the highest value. The value V of a prospect (x, p; y, q) (first outcome is x with probability p, second outcome
is y with probability q) is: V (x, p; y, q) = pi(p)v(x) + pi(q)v(y). Where v(0) = 0, pi(0) = 0, pi(1) = 1.
The first scale assigns to each outcome x a subjective value v(x)3. The valuation function v(x) depends
on four parameters: the reference point (r), coefficient for diminishing marginal sensitivity to gains (α) and to
losses (β), and a coefficient for loss-aversion (λ). The second scale pi(p), for decision-weighting involves an
inverted-S shaped curve4.
In PT, outcomes are defined relative to a reference point (i.e. a zero point of the value scale); the variable v
2
3v(x) = (x− r)α, if x ≥ r, and v(x) = (x− r)β , if x ¡ r.
4pi(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ
4measures deviations from the reference point, i.e. gains and losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) held this
assumption to be compatible with the basic principles in psychophysics of perception and judgement.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) note, “A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that
losses loom larger than gains.”. Generally, this means, v(x) < v(−x), where x > 0. In Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), the median value of the loss-aversion λ for student subjects was 2.25. This phenomenon of
loss-aversion is one of the most robust findings from behavioural economics, and has been documented in
the lab, in the field, and empirically, Camerer (2005). Loss aversion also makes sense from an evolutionary
psychological point of view. Pinker (1999) proposed that whilst gains can improve our prospects of survival
and reproduction, significant losses can take us completely ‘out of the game’.
Loss aversion can be applied to explain endowment effects: the difference between prices potential buyers
are willing to pay (WTP) for goods and prices potential sellers are willing to accept (WTA) for the same goods,
as studied in lab experiments by Kahneman et al. (1990). Disposition effect is a phenomenon in finance, where
investors tend to hold on to stocks that have lost value (relative to purchase price) for too long, while eagerly
selling stocks that have risen in price. According to EUT, people should buy or sell based on expectations of
future prices, not the past prices. A study by Odean (1998) indicated that unsold losers only yielded a return of
5% in the following year, compared with a return of 11.6% for winners that were sold later. Genesove and
Mayer (2001) reported a similar disposition effect in the housing market. Owners appear to be unwilling to
sell their properties for less than what they paid for them, and tend to hold on for too long before selling when
the market goes into a downturn.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a utility function that featured diminishing marginal sensitivity
in the domain of gains and losses, a well-known feature of the standard model. In PT, the value function for
changes of wealth is normally concave above the reference point and convex below it. This type of function
implies risk-aversion in the domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of losses.
In prospect theory, the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight. However, decision
weights do not obey the probability axioms and should not be interpreted as degrees of belief. The decision
weights, pi, of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) had the following characteristics: pi is increasing in p with
pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 1. Furthermore, pi violates the normal probability axioms in EUT: it is subadditive
(pi(rp) > rpi(p) for 0 < r < 1), subcertain (pi(p) + pi(1 − p) < 1) and subproportional, i.e. violates the
independence or substitution axiom of EUT.
Certain empirical anomalies were later observed and the revised cumulative prospective theory was
developed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The essential difference is that the principle of diminishing
returns is now applied to weighing functions as well as the utility function. Diminishing sensitivity gives rise
5to a weighing function that is concave near 0 and convex near 1. Furthermore, decision weights are assigned
cumulatively, starting with the largest gain and working downwards. Although PT is less parsimonious than
EUT (and its conventional extensions), Camerer (2004) observed in a review of PT with other theories, that
cumulative PT can not only explain the same observations that EUT can, but also the various anomalies that
cannot be explained by EUT.
Time Preference Intertemporal decision-making relates to situations where people are faced with choosing
whether to undertake an activity that involves a cost sooner and a benefit later, e.g. investment goods like
education, or leisure goods like watching TV or eating junk food. The long-term benefits in these situations
normally exceed the short-term ones, the basic trade-off is between ‘smaller-sooner’ (SS) versus ‘larger-later’
(LL). Experimental studies have shown the phenomenon of time-inconsistent preferences. Ainslie and Haslam
(1992) reported that a majority of subjects would prefer $100 certified check available immediately over $200
certified check that cannot be cashed before 2 years; yet the same people do not prefer $100 in 6 years to
a $200 in 8 years. This implies that the discounting rate used by the subjects is greater over the short time
horizon than over the long time horizon. Declining discount rates form the basis of hyperbolic discounting;
people tend to be more impatient in the short run, using a higher discount rate, and become more patient over
longer periods of time. This phenomenon is referred to as present bias.
The original hyperbolic discount function based on experimental studies with animals, was introduced
by Chung and Herrnstein (1967), and took the form D(t) = 1/t. Phelps and Pollak (1968) used a modified
version to study intergenerational altruism, called the quasi-hyperbolic function, where D(t) = βδt if t > 0
and D(t) = 1 if t = 0. This function is also called the (β, δ) model. The pure, generalized hyperbolic function
was originally introduced by Harvey (1986), and further developed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). This is
a continuous function of the form D(t) = (1 + αt)β/α. The α coefficient determines how much the function
departs from constant discounting, and in the limiting case of α→ 0 is the exponential discount function. The
primary implication of hyperbolic discounting is that time preferences will be inconsistent.
Several other models of time preference have been proposed in literature. Ho et al. (2006) illustrate the
difference between exponential discounters,“naive” and “sophisticated” hyperbolic discounters. Naive agents
think that they will use a constant discount rate in the future, but actually discount hyperbolically. Sophisticated
agents accurately predict how their preferences will change over time and pre-committ to certain courses of
action that prevent them from yielding to a preference reversal later5. The class of models discussed so far
5Ho et al. (2006) give a hypothetical example of the situation of buying and consuming potato chips. Exponential discounters may
buy a large bag to benefit from quantity discount but only consume a single serving to avoid worst health outcome. Naive hyperbolic
discounters buy a large bag believing they will only consume a single serving. However in the second period they discount hyperbolically
and end up consuming in excess. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters may choose the small bag as a commitment device, knowing that
they would be unable to resist consuming extra if they bought the large bag.
6use a subjective perception of money (as a function of time), while the perception of time is linear. Another
class of models, with roots in biology and psychology, models the subjective perception of time which leads to
inconsistencies in inter-temporal choices, e.g. Ebert and Prelec (2007), Ray and Bossaerts (2011). We present
a hyperbolic discounting theory where the subjective perception of time is not linear in Chapter 3.
Several empirical studies provide evidence for hyperbolic discounting and measure the parameter values
for (β, δ) model. While these studies were designed to test nonconstant hyperbolic discounting versus
constant exponential discounting, they did not test hyperbolic discounting against other behavioural theories.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) studied health club memberships an found that a model with β = 0.70 and
δ = 0.9995 best fit their data. Skiba and Tobacman (2008) allowed for partial naivete in modeling decisions of
borrowers of pay-day loans and found they had very high discount rates (estimated β = 0.53, b = 0.90 and
δ = 0.45).
Although this thesis looks at individual decision making, in particular risky choice and prospect theory, and
time preferences, some major developments in behavioural economics have also come from behavioural game
theory, social preference and neuroeconomics. We only provide a cursory overview here, which is necessary
for the sake of a complete introduction.
Behavioral Game theory There are four main elements of behavioural game theory (BGT) corresponding
to assumptions in the standard game-theoretic model (SGT) (Camerer (2003)): (i) Representation: Often
players perceive a game incorrectly or incompletely. (ii) In SGT, player’s beliefs about the game is correct
since they have unbounded rationality. BGT takes bounded rationality into account, either through limits
on strategic thinking (as in cognitive hierarchy theory, Camerer et al. (2004)), or by assuming players make
stochastic mistake because of ‘noise’. (iii) Learning (which is ignored in SGT) is relevant in repeated games
where players can learn from their own and other’s payoffs, other player’s strategies, and also what other
players are likely to do, Camerer (2003). (iv) Players have preferences regarding not only their payoffs but
also those of others, and the distribution of those payoffs.
Social Preference In contrast to the standard model which assumes that economic agents are motivated
purely by self-interest, behavioural economics points to a large amount of evidence that people have social
preferences. According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2005), for social preferences, not only are payoffs relevant,
but also beliefs and intentions can be valued positively or negatively. Three sylized games: ultimatum
bargaining, dictator and trust games, played in both the lab and in the field, across different cultures and
countries, and with very high and low stakes, have provided strong evidence of this phenomenon. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) proposed an inequity-aversion model, sometimes referred to as ‘envy/guilt’ model where
7fairness judgements are based around some ‘neutral’ reference point. Social psychology research, e.g. Adams
(1963), has shown that relative material payoffs affect people’s wellbeing and behaviour; A number of empirical
findings also support the hypothesis, e.g. Loewenstein et al. (1989). Reciprocity models, first introduced
formally by Rabin (1993), are based on perceived intentions that determine positive or negative reciprocity.
Neuroeconomics Neuroeconomic studies rely on brain scanning and imaging techniques, including PET
(positron emission tomography), fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), EEG (electroencephalogra-
phy) and TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation). Other simpler biological measurements also fall under the
purview of Neuroeconomics: eye-tracking and skin-conductance response. But, despite the growing evidence
and contributions, Neuroeconomics has not been without its share of controversies. Gul and Pesendorfer
(2008) are the most forceful critics who claim that if two different economic models make different predictions
regarding decisions then they can be evaluated by examining standard choice data; if the two models make
the same predictions, then economists will not be interested in distinguishing between them. To a scientist,
this argument is unsatisfying - the goal of science is to create progressively realistic models that can explain
different types of data, which only improves its out-of-sample predictive powers; there’s no need to force
restrictions. Bernheim (2008) criticizes neuroeconomics since it is a reductionist approach. Glimcher et al.
(2009) argues that the neuroscientific findings act as constraints on theories, that can be viewed as compatible
with human neuroarchitecture6.
De Martino et al. (2006a) examined the differential responses of subjects to losses and gains in gambling
tasks and found support for the existence of framing effects and reference dependence, with differences in
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and amygdala modulating behaviour. For a more causal relationship, De Martino
et al. (2010) found that patients with amygdala lesions did not exhibit loss aversion. fMRI studies have also
been used for comparing different behavioural models, e.g. exploration and exploitation in decision making
under uncertainty (Daw et al. (2006)), strategic interactions and social preferences (Xiang et al. (2012)).
A common criticism of behavioural economics is that there are too many theories, each explaining different
phenomenon under different contexts. Our aim in the thesis is to compare these theories with different types of
data. Alongside field studies and lab experiments, neuroeconomics - combining neuroscience and neurobiology
- can also provide evidence in support of a theory over others.
6Bernheim (2008) argues against a reductionist approach by saying ‘Do we really believe that good economics requires a command of
string theory?’. This isn’t a valid argument since physical laws constrain or allow the space of possible human activity, and thus constrains
economics. For example, the speed of light naturally imposes limits on certain economic activity. Were it not so, some absurd economic
realities might arise, like intergalactic arbitrage (Krugman (2010)).
81.2 Experimental Economics
Accounting for the history of experimental economics, Roth and Kagel (1995) used the example of Daniel
and Nicholas Bernoulli on the St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli (1738)). The early periods of neoclassical
economics (the orthodox approach to the subject for most of 20th century) was based on experimental research.
In launching the “marginal revolution” in economic theory, Jevons (1870) and Edgeworth (1881) based their
analysis of diminishing marginal utility on psychological findings by psychophysicists, such as Fechner (1860),
about the relationship between stimuli and sensations.
In a now classic experiment, Thurstone (1931), wanted to provide empirical grounding of the concept of
an indifference curve in economic theory. His experiment attempted to elicit individual’s indifference curves
from responses to binary choice problems. Over the next three decades, empirical experiments to test whether
the preferences postulated in theory could be elicited from actual choice data, was scant (for e.g. Allais (1953),
Davidson and Marschak (1959)). Chamberlin (1948) investigated price-determination in an experimental
market, motivated by his awareness that price theory provided no real explanation of how equilibrium was
achieved in real markets. His results showed that equilibrium would not be reached under conditions typical of
real-world markets.
Smith (1962) reported a series of experiments that refined and extended Chamberlin (1948)’s first market
experiments, to test hypotheses derived from competitive equilibrium price theory. The strategy was to create
an experimental market setting with demand and supply conditions that are known to the experimenter, and
stable over a sequence of market periods. Smith saw stable demand and supply as atypical of real markets, but
built into the laboratory experiments to test a particular economic hypothesis: that behaviour will converge to
equilibrium in a stable environment. The experiments involved sequences of market periods where buyers
and sellers could make bilateral contracts via an oral double-auction institution. Smith observed a remarkable
degree of convergence of prices, across periods, to the equilibrium prediction.
Smith et al. (1988) reported several experiments investigating experimental markets in which participants
could trade “cash” or “assets” over a series of (usually fifteen) market periods. The markets were organized as
computerized double auctions. Variations across the expeirments explored various issues, including the extent
to which “experience” level of traders affected conformity of market behaviour with predictions. The authors
reported that it was common for their markets to exhibit “bubbles”, i.e. sustained periods where assets traded
at prices significantly above their expected returns. Such bubbles were typically followed by crashes, with
prices and volume of trades collapsing near the final period. Trader’s experience also had some tendency to
attenuate bubble phenomena.
The 2002 Nobel prize awarded to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith led to a popularization of ex-
9perimental economics. It is also suggested that the emerging widespread use of experimental methods in
economics has become possible through recent developements in information technology. Some experimental
designs routinely used nowadays would be infeasible a few decades ago. Generic software, such as z-Tree
package by Fischbacher (2007) makes it easier to design and run experiments. Adaptive experiments will also
make experimental economics more accessible to a wider group of researchers by decreasing the time and
costs associated with experiments. El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993) introduced optimal endogeneous experimental
designs into experimental economics in the 1990s, which did not gain traction at the time. The time is now ripe
for a resurgence in adaptive experiments due to order of magnitude increase in computational power (Camerer
(2003)), and recent algorithmic advancements7.
External Validity Conditions in experiments are typically markedly different from those in naturally
occurring situations. This might give rise to uncertainty and even skepticism about how, or whether, the
results will generalize. Doubts about external validity are usually expressed as respects in which laboratory
experiments are “artificial”. Smith (1962) illustrates one of the key features of laboratory testing: the possibility
to control the environment to identify and manipulate the central variables of a theory. Smith (1982) outlined
a set of “precepts” that, if satisfied, would be sufficient to guarantee that the experimenter has induced the
intended set of preferences8.
The basic precepts are nonsatiation, saliency, dominance and privacy. Nonsatiation requires that subjects
prefer more than less of the reward and do not become satiated by the range of possible rewards in the
experimental setting. Saliency is the requirement that rewards are appropriately tied to decisions in the
experiment; Specifically, rewards should be monotonically increasing in the objective the experimenter is
trying to induce. Dominance requires that other costs (e.g. transaction costs) do not override the motivation
provided by the reward in the experiment. Privacy requires that a subject knows only his or her own reward, in
order to rule out interpersonal considerations such as envy or altruism9.
Our laboratory experiments satisfy all the above precepts. Subjects are paid with money (nonsatiation)
based on their decisions in the task (saliency). We pay particular attention to removing transaction costs, by
paying a show-up fee to compensate subjects for their time, and participants make decisions without any
knowledge of other’s decisions.
7Camerer notes enthusiastically in pg 42 of Camerer (2003), “Furthermore, because of increases in computing power, for the first time
in human history we can alter the experimental design in real time - while subjects are waiting, for seconds rather than days - to optimize
the amount of information collected in an experiment.”
8Experiments satisfying this induced-value methology has become a standard technique to implement particular sets of preferences in
market experiments.
9In laboratory experiments investigating social preference, the payoffs are explicitly tied, and the participants remain anonymous.
10
Incentives While the standard in experimental psychology might be to rely on subject’s intrinsic motivation to
perform a task, the norm in experimental economics is to compensate subjects for their time (opportunity cost)
as well as compensating according to performance. In our experiments, subjects’ earnings corresponds entirely
to their performance in the task based on choices made. Additionally the earnings from the experimental are
expected to be higher than the typical wage rates earned by the subjects.
An important departure between experiments in economics and other fields that study decision-making,
such as experimental psychology, is the attitude towards deception. Proponents of the use of deception argue
that deceiving subjects could be a convenient way of achieving experimental objectives (see Bonetti (1998)),
such as making subjects believe that they are in situations that would be difficult to engineer by other means.
Most economists, however, are in favour for prohibiting deception in experiments (Hertwig and Ortmann
(2001)). The case largely rests on the argument that trust between subjects and experimenters is a public good,
and even limited use of deception creates a negative externality.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the internal validity of experimental research depends on
subjects trusting the experimenters enough to believe what the experimental instructions say about the decision
environment. The position in this thesis is to avoid deception altogether in our experiments. Subjects are
clearly informed of the structure and variables in the experiment10.
1.2.1 Errors in Lab Experiments
Several frameworks for choice have emerged from behavioural economics, as noted previously, and there
haven’t been enough tests to distinguish between models. This is primarily due to economic constraints of time
and money. Models, such as prospect theory, have multiple parameters and would require a very large number
of choices to distinguish by standard experimental design and statistical techniques. This makes it infeasible to
test in practice since subjects’ time is limited11. For this reason, researchers in behavioural economics have
been enthusiastic about adaptive experimental designs12, that can test multiple theories with few choices.
There is a hypothetical possibility that subjects, when presented with adaptive tests might engage in
strategic manipulation which would bias the results, or in some way distort their actual behaviour. This
criticism could pose a hindrance in the adoption of such methods in economics, so we investigate this issue
10Since economic theories tell us almost nothing about how big incentives need to be to motivate participants, experiments must make
assumptions about the level of rewards that are necessary. We follow the suggestion of Smith: “payoff levels that are judged to be high for
the subject population”, Smith (1982).
11It is feasible to run multiple sessions, but subjects’ attention deterioriates while performing repeated tasks. And also subjects need to
be compensated for their time, and this imposes financial limitations on researchers.
12In Camerer (2003), Camerer mentions: “In many experiments, the experimenter has one more hypotheses that she can put prior
probabilities on. A crisp prior, and specification of the hypotheses, can be used to compute the information value of different experimental
design parameters. This motivates the choice of “optimally informative” design parameters... Seen this way, all previous experimental
designs are heuristic approximations to endogenously optimized designs. Information-optimized designs have rarely been used.”.
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in depth in chapter 1. To summarize, the main arguments against subjects strategically misreporting their
answers for higher rewards are: a) Subjects do not know how tests are sequentially selected b) Even if they
were aware of the method used, strategizing would be computationally infeasible c) The increased earnings of
a clairvoyant agent with boundless computational ability is barely signifcant, and d) We see no evidence for
strategizing in our data.
Hypothesis testing methods in Econometrics pay attention to sources of error in (non-experimental)
observational data. This includes structural or model specification error, measurement error and sampling error.
Because experiments are carefully designed to ontrol many of the other sources of noise in non-experimental
data, variability within and between actors’ beliefs, preferences and judgements play a more central role in the
generation of experimental data. In decision making under risk in the nonexperimental world, people operate
on their own evaluations of consequences and their own subjective estimates of risks, which vary in ways that
are hard to observe. Individual decision-making experiments, on the other hand, involve a small number of
clearly specified payoffs and use probabilities corresponding to some explicit random mechanism. Thus, the
principal component of variation in the data is likely to derive from participants themselves13. Modeling the
stochastic component, and using appropriate tests, requires us to model the nature of noise and error in human
judgement and decision making. Three different “error stories” have been popular in economics, namely the
tremble model, fechner model and the random preference model.
The tremble model captures the simplest source of error, where people have “true” preferences, but
occassionally make mistakes in reporting them due to momentary inattention, or in short a “trembling hand”.
Formally, an individual truly prefers one option, but there is some probability  that she will choose the less-
preferred option while translating preference into choice. Harless and Camerer (1994) use a trembling hand
model to facilitate a meta-analysis of studies of violations of independence. The Fechner model, originating in
psychophysics ascribes the error to imperfections in human judgement. The true net advantage of an option f
over option g is V (f, g), bu the perceived advantage at the moment of choice is given by V (f, g) + , where 
is a stochastic error term. The variance of  is often an increasing function of the magnitude of the stimuli.
Instead of supposing a single true preference function to which noise is added, the random preference approach
(Loomes and Sugden (1995)) supposes that an individual’s preferences consist of a set of such functions.
Intuitively, an individual’s perceptions and judgements are liable to vary to some extent from moment to
moment along some spectrum of “states of mind”.
Our BROAD method pays particular attention to “noisy responses” or within-subject error. Unlike
other objective criteria used in literature, our criteria is robust to some level of within-subject error, i.e. the
13Loomes and Sugden Loomes and Sugden (1998) did a study invovling 92 respondents each making 40 choices on two occassions,
where the same pair of binary choices between two lotteries was presented for a second time. Out of a total of 3680 comparisons, there
were 676 (18.4%) cases where the choice on the second occassion was different from the first.
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conclusions reached remain unaffected by some response error. Furthermore, we provide the first theoretical
guarantees of (near-)optimality for sequential experimental design in the presence of noise.
1.2.2 Field Experiments
The gold standard in field settings exploit natural experiments14 in which there is a true random assignment, or
there is a good instrumental variable (Angrist and Krueger (2001)) to achieve control. Wonderful instruments
are often created by unusual occurences in policy changes or historical accidents. In Chapter 3 we exploit
natural variation in prices, in particular a retailer’s goods being on or off-promotion, to test unique predictions
of prospect theory.
Levitt and List (2007) criticize the inability of lab experiments to generalize and argue that field experiments
are more reliable since they are superior in terms of external validity15. Camerer (2011) provides a critical
reply to Levitt and List (2007): two criticisms i) presence of moral and ethical considerations and ii) nature
and extent of scrutiny of one’s actions by others are equally valid for lab and field experiments. We see the
third criticism iii) context in which decision is embedded, as a feature of lab experiments rather than a negative
issue - understanding how context affects decisions is essential in adding psychological realism to models,
and lab experiments can control the context effectively. Two other criticisms iv) self-selection of individuals
making the decision, and v) the stakes of the game, are valid for lab experiments, and can be corrected by
experimenters taking the necessary precautions. Camerer (2011) further notes that lab-field generalizability is
the norm rather than the exception16.
We maintain the scientific view in this thesis, that all empirical studies contribute evidence about the general
way in which agents characteristics, incentives, rules, information, endowments and payoff structure influence
economic behavior. In this thesis, we find evidence for Prospect theory, especially reference dependence and
loss aversion in both our (laboratory) experiments and (natural) field settings, which contributes to the growing
evidence in literature. Phenomena that are evidenced in both lab and in the field have greater empirical validity,
and prospect theory (in particular loss aversion) has been found in both settings.
14Friedman (1953, pg 10) noted about natural experiments: “Unfortunately, we can seldom test particular predictions in the social
sciences by experiments explicitly designed to eliminate what are judged to be the most important disturbing influences. Generally, we
must rely on evidence cast up the “experiments” that happen to occur.
15Levitt and List (2007) expressed their criticm in a rather provocative way: “Yet unless considerable changes are made in the manner
in which we conduct lab experiments, our model highlights that the relevant factors will rarely converge across the lab and many field
settings”.
16Camerer (2011) finds that 20 studies confirm lab-field generalization and only 2 that disqualify.
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1.3 Methods
We have outlined the research questions and methodologies from behavioural and experimental economics
above. Here we give a brief background of the methods (primarily from Computer Science and Econometrics)
that are developed and utilized in this thesis. First we introduce the mathematical concept of submodularity,
and its properties, which is used extensively in chapters 2 and 3.
1.3.1 Submodularity and Greedy Algorithms
Submodularity is a property of set functions (function f : 2X → R) that assigns a value f(S) to each subset
S ⊂ X . V is a finite set, which could refer to locations where observations are taken, for example, in a sensor
network. f(S) is the utility obtained from taking observations at S. Submodularity can be defined in terms of
discrete derivate:
For a set function f : 2X → R, S ⊂ X , and x ∈ X , let ∆f (x|S) ≡ f(Sx)−f(S) be the discrete derivate
of f at S with respect to x.
Equivalently submodularity can be defined in terms of marginal gain:
A function f : 2X → R is submodular if for every A ⊂ B ⊂ X and x ∈ X B it holds that ∆(x|A) ≥
∆(x|B). Or equivalently f(AB) + f(AB) ≤ f(A) + f(B).
Intuitively, submodular set functions exhibit a natural diminishing returns property. An important subclass
of functions exhibit monotonicity:
A function f : 2X → R is monotone iff all its discrete derivatives are nonnegative. The subclass of
monotone submodular are characterized by the fact that for all A ⊂ B ⊂ X and x ∈ X it holds that
∆(x|A) ≥ ∆(x|B). An example of a monotone submodular function is the Shannon entropy function
H(XS) = −
∑
xS
P (xS)log2P (xS), where P (X) is a joint probability distribution over discrete random
vector X , as proved by Fujishige (1978). The mutual information: f(S) ≡ I(Y ;XS) = H(Y )−H(Y |XS),
for a joint probability distribution P (X,Y ) over two dependent random vectors, X and Y quantifies the
expected of uncertainty about Y after revealing XS . In general, f is not submodular. However, if the variables
X and Y are conditionally independent given Y (a Naive Bayes model), then f is monotone submodular (?)).
There are many natural connections between submodular, concave and convex functions (explored by
Lova´sz (1983)). For a function g : N → R, the set function f(S) = g(|S|) is submodular if and only if
g is concave. Similar to convex functions, which can be minimized efficiently, submodular minimization
is possible in (strongly) polynomial time (Schrijver (2003)). Furthermore, submodularity is closed under
nonnegative linear combinations and residuals.
We are interested in maximization of submodular functions, i.e. maxS⊆V f(S) subject to some constraints
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on S. For example, S can have cardinality constraints (e.g. constrained budget) where |S| ≤ k for some
k. This problem is NP-hard for several classes of submodular functions, including mutual information (?)).
Hence efficient algorithms are required with theoretical approximation guarantees.
A simple approach of solving submodular maximization with cardinality constraints is the greedy algorithm.
We start with the empty set S0, and in iteration i, add the element maximizing the marginal gain ∆(x|Si−1):
Si = Si−1 ∪ {arg max
x
∆(x|Si−1)}
. A famous result by Nemhauser et al. (1978), restated here, proves that the greedy algorithm provides a good
approximation to the optimal solution of the NP-Hard optimization problem. In fact, for several classes of
submodular functions, this is the best result that can be achieved with any efficient algorithm.
Fix a nonnegative monotone submodular function f : 2X → R+ and let {Si}i≥0 be selected by a greedy
algorithm, that adds the element with maximum marginal gain at every iteration. Then for all positive integers
k and l,
f(Sl) ≥ (1− e−l/k) max
S:|S|≤k
f(S)
In particular, for l = k, f(Sk) ≥ (1− 1/e) max|S|≤k f(S).
The min-cost coverage problem involves searching for minimum cost sets that achieve a given amount q
of submodular value, i.e. S∗ = arg minS |S|s.t.f(S) ≥ q, for some quota 0 ≤ q ≤ f(V ) of value. Wolsey
(1982) proved the following result about the greedy algorithm:
Suppose f : 2X → N is monotone submodular and integer-valued, and let 0 ≤ q ≤ f(X). Let S0, S1, · · ·
be the sequence of sets picked by the greedy algorithm, and let l be the smallest index such that f(Sl) ≥ q.
Then
l ≤ (1 + ln max
x∈X
f({x}))OPT
where OPT = minS |S|s.t.f(S) ≥ q.
Another benefit of submodular functions is that the greedy algorithm can be sped up, sometimes with
orders of magnitude gains in speed, by using lazy evaluations (discussed in Chapter 2).
In several applications, such as sequential experimental design or active learning, we wish to adaptively
select a set, make observations, and use the feedback after selecting any particular element. In such adaptive
optimization problems we optimize over policies (equivalently strategies) i.e. functions from the information
we have obtained to the next action.
We model states (of the world) as a random variable H (instances are denoted h). H could refer to the set
of all hypothesis we wish to test. We presume a Bayesian model with a prior probability P (H) over H . We
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suppose there is a set of actions X (for example, tests we can run) we can perform and a set of outcomes or
observations O. The state h is a function from actions to outcomes of those actions, i.e. h : X → O and h(x)
is the outcome of performing action x. The domain of ψ, denoted dom(ψ), is the set of actions performed up
to that point. We call h a realization and ψ a partial realization. We assume that there is an objective function
f : 2X ×OX → R+ indicating the reward f(A, h) obtained from actions A under realization of the world
state h. A policy pi can then be a mapping from partial realizations ψ to the actions, so that pi(ψ) is the action
taken by pi upon observing ψ. Finally, define V (pi, h) to be the set of actions by pi under realization h. This
leads to two optimization problems:
The expected reward of a policy pi is
favg(pi) ≡ E[f(V (pi,H), H)] =
∑
h
P (h)f(V (pi, h), h)
. The goal of Adaptive Stochastic Maximization problem is to find a policy pi∗ such that
pi∗ ∈ arg max
pi
favg(pi)s.t.|V (pi, h)| ≤ k∀h
, where k is a budget over the number of actions (e.g. the number of tests we can perform).
Alternatively, we can define the average cost cavg(pi) of a policy as the expected number of actions it
makes, so that cavg(pi) ≡ E[|V (pi,H)|]. The goal of the Adaptive Stochastic Minimum Cost problem is to
find
pi∗ ∈ arg min
pi
cavg(pi)s.t.f(V (pi, h), h) ≥ q∀h
, i.e. the policy that minimizes the expected number of items picked such that under all possible realizations,
at least reward q is achieved.
Both problems are notoriously intractable: even approximating a solution (to a factor of O(|V |1−)) is
intractable. However, if f satisfies certain generalizations of monotonicity and submodularity, defined below,
the performance bounds can be generalized.
Given a partial realization h and an item x, the conditional expected marginal benefit of x conditioned on
having observed ψ, is
∆(x|ψ) ≡ E[f(dom(ψ){x}, H)− f(dom(h), H)|ψ]
, where the expectation is taken w.r.t P [h|ψ].
A function f : 2X ×OX → R+ is adaptive monotone w.r.t. distribution P [h] if the conditional expected
marginal benefit of any item is nonnegative, i.e. for all ψ with P [ψ] > 0 and all x ∈ X we have ∆(x|ψ) ≥ 0.
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A function f : 2X ×OX → R+ is adaptive submodular with respect to distribution P [h] if the conditional
expected marginal benefit of any fixed number of items does not increase as more items are selected and
their states are observed. Formally, f is adaptive submodular w.r.t. P [h] if for all ψ and ψ′ such that ψ is
a subrealization of ψ′ (i.e. ψ ⊂ ψ′), and for all x ∈ X dom(ψ′), we have ∆(x|ψ) ≥ ∆(x|ψ′). Adaptive
submodularity reduces to submodularity in the case when the world state realization H is deterministic.
Analogously, the adaptive greedy algorithm iteratively selects the action maximizing the conditional expected
marginal benefit, conditioned on the outcomes of all its previous actions17.
For adaptive stochastic maximization, the algorithm terminates after selecting k actions. For adaptive
stochastic minimum cost cover, it stops after achieving the quota q of value. A key result, proved by Golovin
and Krause (2010a), restated here is used to prove the results of adaptive submodular optimization with noisy
observations in Chapter 2.
Let pigreedyl be the greedy policy, implemented by the adaptive greedy algorithm, run for l iterations (to
select l actions), and let pik∗ be any policy selecting at most k actions for any realization h. Then
favg(pi
greedy
l ) ≥ (1− e−l/k)favg(pik∗)
where favg(pi) ≡ E[f(V (pi,H), H], is the expected reward of pi.
Another import application for submodularity is in online learning. In the above we have assumed that
the utility function f is known. In some applications the objective function may not be known in advance. If
f1, · · · , fT is drawn from some distribution and we perform the same task repeatedly, we can learn to perform
well on average over time. This is the premise behind no-regret algorithms that are used widely in machine
learning. This approach is not used in this thesis; refer to Krause and Golovin (2013) for a review. Notably,
Srinivas et al. (2012) proved no-regret bounds for online experimental design under certain constraints (values
of f are sampled from a known Gaussian Process).
1.3.2 Discrete Choice models
Discrete choice models describe the decision makers’ choices among alternatives such as competing products
or actions. In the framework, the set of alternatives, called the choice set must be mutually exclusive (choosing
one alternative implies not choosing any of the others), exhaustive, and countably finite.
The discrete choice models can be derived under the assumption of utility-maximization by the decision
maker. Thurstone (1931) introduced the law of comparative judgement, from the point of view of psychophysics
17At each iteration of the adaptive greedy algorithm: (i) Select x∗ ∈ arg maxx ∆(x|ψ); (ii) Observe h(x∗); (iii) Set ψ ←
ψ{(x∗, h(x∗))}
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now called the binomial probit model. Marschak (1950) later interpreted the stimuli as utility and provided
a derivation from utility maximization; models derived this way are called Random Utility Maximization
(RUM) models. Although it is consistent with utility maximzation, this does not preclude the model from
being consistent with other forms of behaviour.
In RUMs, the utility the decision maker n obtains from alternative j is Unj , j = 1, · · · , J . The decision
maker chooses the alternative with greatest utility, i.e. arg maxi Uni. The researcher however does not observe
the utilities, only attributes of the alternatives xnj∀j, and some attributes of the decision maker, sn. The
representative utility constructed by the researcher, depending on unknown parameters, is Vnj = V (xnj , sn)∀j.
Utility is decomposed as Unj = Vnj + nj , where nj are random structural errors - unknown variables not
captured by the model. The joint density of the random vector ′n =< n1, · · · , nJ > is denoted f(n). The
probability that the decision maker n chooses i is:
Pni = P (Uni > Unj∀j 6= i) =
∫

I(nj − ni < Vni − Vnj∀j 6= i)f()dn (1.3.1)
where I is an indicator function, and the multidimensional integral is over th density of the unobserved portion
of utility, f(n). Different discrete choice models result from different different assumptions over f(n). Train
(2009) provides a comprehensive overview of the models and underlying assumptions.
The simplest and most widely used discrete choice model is the logit, which has a closed form solution. If
the representative utilities are linear in parameters, i.e. Vnj = β′xnj , then the logit probabilities become:
Pni =
eβ
′xni∑
j e
β′xnj
(1.3.2)
The log-likelihood function of these choice probabilities is globally concave in β which can be maximized
with simpler numerical procedures like the Newton-Rhapson method.
In terms of identification, only differences in utility matter, and the overall scale of the utility is irrelevant.
For any two alternatives i and k, the ratio of logit probabilities is Pni/Pnk = eVni−Vnk . The ratio does not
depend on any other alternatives than i and k. Thus the logit model exhibits Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives or IIA. There are situations where the unobserved portions of utility are correlated. The probit
model assumes jointly normal unobserved utility components, and the correlations between the errors can be
specified in the covariance matrix.
Mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) can approximate, to an arbitrary degree, any regular RUM-consistent
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choice probabilities, under very mild restrictions on the class of choice sets (McFadden and Train (2000)).
Pc(i) =
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
eZiα()∑
j∈C eZjα()
d (1.3.3)
where α() is a vector of polynomial functions of the uniform random vector  and Zj are vectors of polynomial
functions of observed characteristics of the consumer and observed attributes of alternative j. This is a latent
variable model and has ties to computational neuroscience and machine learning. This class of latent variable
models is a single hidden-layer feedforward neural network with MNL activation functions. The asympototic
approximation theory developed for neural networks can be used to prove convergence rates and stopping
rules (Cheng and Titterington (1994)). Furthermore Bayesian methods, developed for neural networks (Neal
(1995)), can be utilized to learn the parameters and do inference on MMNL models.
As noted by McFadden (2001) in his Nobel prize lecture, the random utility maximization (RUM) theory
of decision-making is flexible enough to model psychological factors in consumer behaviour. It is thus a useful
extensible framework for incorporating non-choice measurements and elements of behavioural economics.
1.4 Findings and Contributions
Here we summarize the central contributions of this thesis:
• In chapter 2, we introduce the methodology of Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs (BROAD).
BROAD sequentially chooses the “most informative” test at every step, and updates the beliefs over
hypotheses based on (possibly noisy) responses, which informs the selection of the next test to run. We
prove that the Equivalent Class Edge Cutting, EC2, criteria used by BROAD satisfies the mathematical
property of adaptive submodularity. This allows us to prove theoretical guarantess against the intractable
Bayes-optimal solution, even in the presence of noisy responses. In simulated ground truth experiments,
BROAD uses fewer tests than Information Gain and Generalized Binary Search. Furthermore, we
use the property of adaptive submodularity to implement an accelerated greedy version of BROAD
which leads to orders of magnitude speedups. BROAD thus enables us to conduct real-time laboratory
experiments, to compare theories with multiple parameters requires complex experimental designs with
very large possible choice sets, which are infeasbile with classical experimental design.
• In chapter 2, we apply BROAD to compare the main classes of theories for decision-making under
risk: expected value, prospect theory, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and moments’ models. 57
subjects from Caltech and UCLA were presented with choices between two lotteries, with realizable
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losses. We find limited evidence in favour of CRRA and moments models from aggregate posterior
model probabilities, and most subjects are classified by prospect theory, followed by expected value.
Strategic manipulation, whereby subjects hide their true preferences to create a more favourable sequence
of tests, is a possibility in adaptive experimental design. We give reasons why strategic manipulation
is infeasible in practice, and use an experimental treatment that encourages manipulation. We find no
signatures of strategizing in the data.
• In chapter 3, we compare the main theories of time preference or discounting models: exponential,
hyperbolic, “present bias” i.e. quasi-hyperbolic (α, β) and fixed cost model, and generalized-hyperbolic
discounting. 40 subjects from UCLA were given choices between a smaller but more immediate payoff
versus a larger but later payoff. We found very limited evidence for present bias models and hyperbolic
discounting, and most subjects were classified as generalized hyperbolic discounting types, followed by
exponential discounting.
• The time preference models compared in chapter 3 assumes a linear mapping between the subjective
perception of time and the calendar time. We consider a psychological model where the perception
of time is subjective, and prove that when the biological (subjective) time is positively dependent, it
implies hyperbolic discounting and temporal choice inconsistency.
• Motivated by the evidence for prospect theory in laboratory experiments, we sought to test the predictions
of behavioral theories in the “wild” in chapter 4. Loss aversion and reference dependence predicts that
consumers will behave in a distinct way than the standard rational model. Specifically, loss aversion
distinctly predicts that when an item is being offered at a discount, the demand for it will be greater than
that explained by price elasticity. Even more importantly, when the item is no longer discounted, demand
for its close substitute would rise in excess. In contrast, the standard model predicts that consumers
might “stockpile” when an item is discounted, and there will be no change (or a possible decrease) in
demand for the substitute when the discounting period for an item is over. We tested this prediction
using a discrete choice model with loss-averse utility function on data from a large eCommerce retailer.
Not only did we identify loss aversion, but we also found that the effect decreased with consumers’
experience.
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Chapter 2
Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive
Designs
Choices used in experimental and survey-based social science are typically developed by hunches and
cumulative search for informative questions that test theories. The conventional designs that have emerged are
typically a fixed set of test questions .1
A popular example in estimating risk preference, introduced by Holt and Laury (2005) (HL, hereafter)2 is
a “choice list”, in which one makes a sequence of ten choices between two gambles that each have the same
set of possible payoffs throughout the sequence, but in which the distribution over payoffs varies. Specifically,
each gamble has two payoffs, high and low, and the probability of the high payoff is i ∗ 0.1 for both gambles in
the ith choice in the list. Using a fixed set of items permits rapid near-replications to establish rugged stylized
facts across studies.
We propose an approach, in which the sequence of choices is customized for each subject rather than
fixed. The subjects themselves tell us, through their answers, the “best”(most informative) question to ask
them next. We illustrate the approach using an experiment on theories of risky choice: Viz., expected utility,
prospect theory, and statistical moments models (mean-variance-skewness). Our approach is abbreviated as
BROAD, for Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Design. The BROAD method is an innovation in an old,
large family of adaptive methods (described in the next subsection). The big contribution is an edge-cutting
measure of information value which is adaptively submodular, which therefore provably guarantees some
useful theoretical and practical properties. The method was introduced by Golovin et al. (2010), and applied
here to novel economic questions, and includes new ideas about how to detect and control strategizing by
subjects.
1Note that “test questions”, in experimental economics could include choices from budget sets Andreoni and Miller (2002); Choi et al.
(2007); Fisman et al. (2007), strategies in games, auction bids, and trading strategies. Our method could also be applied to large-scale
panel surveys in which branching methods are already used (as in, “If your answer to (18) is “No” please skip to question (24)”).
2The HL paper had 1764 Google Scholar citations as of 8/27/2012.
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Earlier applications of adaptive methods were made in statistics (Lindley (1956)), decision theory (Howard
(1966)), computer-assisted testing (CAT) in psychometrics (e.g., Wainer (1990)) and cognitive psychology
(e.g., Myung and Pitt (2009)), adaptive choice-based conjoint measurement in marketing (e.g., Abernethy
et al. (2007)), “active learning” methods in computer science (e.g., Golovin and Krause (2010b)) and machine
learning (Nowak (2009); Dasgupta (2004)), and management science (Cavagnaro et al. (ming); Toubia et al.
(ming)).
Note that some early efforts to introduce optimal adaptive design in experimental economics (e.g., El-
Gamal et al. (1993), El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993), Moffatt (2007)) did not gain traction. The time is now riper
for BROAD methods because: Computing power is better than ever; a new method from computer science
(called EC2) applied here provides theoretical guarantees on efficient computability; and there are many new
competing theories in behavioral economics which need to be efficiently compared.
In our application and all the others mentioned above, the goal is to sequentially select among a set of
noisy, expensive observations (outcomes of experiments, medical tests to run to diagnose patients, etc.) in
order to determine which hypothesis (theory, diagnosis, etc.) is most accurate. One way to formalize such
active learning problems is Bayesian experimental design (Chaloner and Verdinelli (1995)). This approach
specifies prior beliefs over a set of hypotheses, as well as probabilistic assumptions about the outcomes of test
choices. The goal then is to determine the correct hypothesis while minimizing the cost of the experimentation
(where cost is synonymous, for present purposes, with the number of test choice questions that are asked).
Unfortunately, finding an optimal sequence of test choices is not just computationally difficult (NP-hard) but is
also difficult to approximate (Chakaravarthy et al. (2007)). Several heuristic approaches have been proposed
that perform well in some specific applications, but do not have theoretical guarantees (e.g., MacKay (1992));
that is, there are no proofs about how costly the heuristic sequence will be compared to the optimal sequence.
In the case where observations are noise-free3, a simple algorithm, generalized binary search4(GBS), is
guaranteed to be competitive with the optimal test sequence, since the expected number of tests is a factor of
O(log n) (where n is the number of hypotheses) more than that of the optimal policy (Kosaraju et al. (1999)),
which matches lower bounds up to constant factors5 (Chakaravarthy et al. (2007)).
Unfortunately, when responses are likely to be imperfect or noisy, as in economics experiments, the
theoretical basis and performance of heuristic methods is not well understood. There are no efficient algorithms
that provably achieve minimal cost, except in very restricted settings (Krause and Guestrin (2009)). 6
3This case is known as the Optimal Decision Tree (ODT) problem.
4GBS selects test choices to maximize, in expectation over the test outcomes, the probability mass of eliminated hypotheses (i.e., those
with zero posterior probability, computed with respect to the observed test outcomes). The method is myopic (or “greedy” in computer
science terms) because it only searches ahead for one test at a time.
5In other words, unless P = NP, no efficient algorithm can be guaranteed to find a policy whose expected number of tests is less than C
log(n) times that of the optimal policy, for some absolute constant C (see Papadimitriou (2003)).
6While there are some recent positive results in understanding the label complexity (bounds on the sample size required) of noisy
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In this paper, we introduce and address a general formulation of Bayesian active learning with noisy
observations that we call the Equivalence Class Determination problem. We show that, perhaps surprisingly,
generalized binary search, and some other popular algorithms, perform poorly in this setting (i.e., in simulations
where the true hypothesis is known, the algorithms do not always discover the true hypothesis quickly and
reliably).
However, we show that a myopic (greedy) active learning algorithm using the Equivalence Class Edge
Cutting (EC2) objective function, can be proved to have an expected cost that is a multiple of the optimal test
sequence cost. The key insight is that the EC2 objective function for measuring information value satisfies
adaptive submodularity (Golovin and Krause (2011)). Adaptive submodularity is a natural diminishing returns
property that generalizes the classical notion of submodularity to adaptive policies, and leads to a provable
performance guarantee as well as a shortcut in evaluating test choices (called “lazy evaluation”).
Here are some possible advantages of BROAD approaches:
◦ The posterior distribution of all theory and parameter probabilities is quickly recomputed for each subject
after each trial (because it is a necessary step in finding the optimal next question). As a result, when the
experiment is over, much of the data analysis is already done.
◦ Because of that instant probability updating, BROAD creates a statistical parametric group portrait after
each trial. The portraits show who seems most impatient, most averse to risk, most reciprocal, etc. These data
could then be used to instantly form groups of different types of people to see how those differences affect
group or market behavior.
◦ Since BROAD techniques economize on information gained per minute, they are especially useful for
subject pools who have scarce time or become bored or habituated quickly. Such groups include highly-trained
professionals, internet subjects who can quit, human groups such as lesion patients or children, and animals
that typically make long sequences of lab choices.7
◦ The fact that the BROAD procedure generates sequences of test questions that are provably near-optimal
can sharpen discourse about what different experimental designs are good and bad for. Novel BROAD designs
which are unconventional should gain credibility if they have desirable informational properties. BROAD
methods can also be used to judge the quality of older conventional designs8.
◦ At each trial it is easy to compute how much extra parameter precision (or model selection accuracy) is
expected from asking one more question. This feature permits a cost-benefit method for optimally stopping
active learning (Nowak (2009); Balcan et al. (2006)), the results depend on the assumption that the same query can be made multiple
times with independent noise. This is not appropriate in our setting; if a test subject makes a mistake in evaluating a pair of gambles,
presenting the exact same choice later on is likely to elicit the same mistake, which induces correlation in the noise across tests.
7A sensible argument is that ethical treatment of subjects requires using as little of their time as possible to learn the most McClelland
(1997); BROAD fits that bill.
8For example, retrospective analysis of influential psychology experiments on memory retention indicates that some early designs
were remarkably near-optimal but others were not (Myung and Pitt (2009))
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the experiment (e.g., Swartz and Choi (2009)), if information benefit and cost can be compared.
In economic choice applications, there is one possible imperfection in BROAD methods: In theory, subjects
might prefer to strategically manipulate their early responses in order to get “better” (more economically
valuable) future test questions. We pay special attention to the problem of manipulation, and discuss tests to
detect it and methods to minimize it, within our experimental procedure. This is an important contribution of
this paper, since strategic manipulation is not discussed in any detail in the most common applications (e.g. in
CAT psychometric testing), and is a problem economists are well-equipped to address.
2.1 A brief history of related adaptive methods
The idea of optimizing an experimental design to measure parameters or test theories originated with Charles
S. Peirce (Peirce (1967)), but did not have immediate influence. Dynamic design ideas began with Wald’s
influential sequential probability ratio test (Wald (1949)). Later contributions were made by Kiefer (1959),
Atkinson and Fedorov (1975), and reviewed by Atkinson and Donev (1992) and Chaloner and Verdinelli
(1995). D-optimal designs are optimal for estimating parameter values for a single theory. T-optimal designs
optimally discriminate different theories and are more computationally challenging (cf. “landscaping”, by
D.J. Navarro and Myung (2004)). Many of the principles originally developed under D- and T-optimality now
permeate standard experimental design practice.
The idea of adaptively customizing test choices goes back 100 years to Binet and Simon (1904). It was
pushed forward decades later by the US Army (Bayroff et al. (1960)), and in psychometrics (Lord (1974);
Weiss (1975); Weiss and Betz (1973)) in the 1960s and 70s. The most common method is computerized
adaptive testing (CAT) for psychometric, intelligence (e.g., GRE, ASVAB military), health (PROMIS: Gershon
et al. (2010)), and psychometric measurement (see Van Der Linden and Glas (2000); Wainer (1990)). CAT
chooses maximally-informative items on a psychometric test, based on a subject’s previous responses, using
item response theory (IRT). There are now many applications in personnel selection and professional testing9.
Besides their statistical advantage, there is also some evidence that adaptive methods improve test-taking
motivation (Weiss and Betz (1973)), reduce boredom (Chapman et al. (2009), p. 3) and reduce differences
across ethnic groups (Pine et al. (1979); Pine and Weiss (1978)).
Adaptive methods have also been used in neurophysiology (Lewi et al. (2009)), psychophysics (Kujala
and Lukka (2006); L.A. Lesmes and Dosher (2006)), and medicine (Muller et al. (2007)). In marketing,
9E.g., ASVAB army; GRE and TOEFL; Microsoft Certification; see more examples at a clearinghouse at
http://www.psych.umn.edu/psylabs/catcentral. Note that there are usually practical constraints imposed on large-scale CAT
testing. These include balancing test content and test types and avoiding “overexposure” of highly diagnostic questions which can leak
out across test-takers over time and undermine their future diagnostic value
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adaptive choice-based “conjoint measurement” (ACBC) is used to discover which feature configurations of
products consumers like most (e.g., Sawtooth software (Johnson et al. (2003)). Chapman et al. (2009) found
modest success for ACBC in predicting actual product shares. A newer constraint satisfaction method called
“poly-Q” takes a different approach, finding constrained feature weights which can explain previous choices
(Abernethy et al. (2007); Toubia et al. (2004)). Note that improved methods will undoubtedly improve the
ability to predict real behavior from responses which are hypothetical (often necessarily so). For example,
Ding et al. (2005), Ding (2007), and Dong et al. (2010) describe incentive-aligned conjoint procedures.
These methods use hypothetical data from conjoint measurements or product ranks combined with random
selection of a single real product for purchase (based on WTP or rank inferred from conjoint or ranks), to
boost incentive-compatibility of the conjoint responses. In cognitive psychology, adaptive methods have been
championed by Myung and Pitt (2009), Myung et al. (2009), Cavagnaro et al. (2011), Cavagnaro et al. (2010,
ming).
Two applications closely related to ours are Wang et al. (2010b); Toubia et al. (ming). Wang et al. (2010b)
chooses questions that maximize Information-Gain, and Toubia et al. (ming) picks questions that maximize
the norm of the Hessian of the posterior distribution at a point estimate (MLE) of the mode. None of the
method have theoretical performance guarantees, and our paper provides the first theoretical bounds when
responses are noisy. Furthermore, we use an accelerated greedy implementation of EC2 that generates new
questions in real-time, without the need to store the question sequence in advance, thus there are no practical
limitations on the number of rounds of questions asked. Finally, we thoroughly consider the problem of
strategic manipulation.
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2.2 Models
In this section we describe six models of subjective valuation of risky choices; these models will later be tested
experimentally using the EC2 method. The models are presented first in order to ground discussion of the
EC2 method in a concrete application. Note that EC2 can be applied to many different comparison of social
science theories (e.g., time preference, social preference, etc.). The models are widely used in different areas
of social sciences and in biology, and summarized in Table 2.1 for easy reference.
Choices are risky lotteries with probabilistic outcomes (a.k.a. prospects). The distribution of the payoffs
in lottery L is a random variable with a range of payoffs L ≡ {`1, . . . , `k}. Lottery L is a distribution of
objectively known probabilities pi over payoffs, pi ≡ P [L = `i] (with
∑k
i pi = 1). For present purposes, a
payoff is an amount of money gained or lost. However, in general the lotteries can have any payoffs which are
subjectively valued by numerical utilities, or by other quantities (e.g., biological fitness).
Theory Functional Form Parameters
EV UEV (L) = E [L] none
CRRA UCRRA(L) =
{ ∑
i pi(w + `i)
1−θ/(1− θ) if θ 6= 1∑
i pi log(w + `i) if θ = 1
θ
PT UPT (L) =
∑
i v(`i)pi(pi) where v(`i) =
{
`ρi if `i ≥ 0
−λ(−`i)ρ if `i < 0 ΘPT = {ρ, λ, α}
CPT UCPT (L) =
∑k
i=1 pi
+
i v(`i) +
∑n
j=k+1 pi
−
j v(`j)(2.2.1) ΘCPT = {ρ, λ, α}
MVS UMV S(L) = wµµ− wσ2σ2 + wνν(2.2.2) ΘMV S = {wµ, wσ2 , wν}
NMVS UNMV S(L) = wµµ− wσσ + wν˜ ν˜(2.2.3) ΘNMV S = {wµ, wσ, wν˜}
Table 2.1: We compare 6 models of risky choice, with no parameters: Expected Value (EV), one parameter:
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), adn 3 parameters: Prospect Theory (PT), Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT), Mean-Variance-Skewness (MVS), Normalized Mean-Variance-Skewness
In expected utility (EU) theory, a lottery is valued by the probability-weighted sum of its possible subjective
payoff utilities,
∑k
i piU(`i) (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947),Schoemaker (1982), Binmore (2009)).
Many different utility functions U(`i) have been applied and tested. We consider two popular functions
U(`i): Constant-Relative-Risk-Aversion (CRRA), whose functional form is given in Table 2.1. Wealth w is
non-negative, and in subsequent experiments we set wealth to the subject’s initial endowment10.
The CRRA model is used most widely for modeling risky choices (Wakker (2010)), in economics (Holt
and Laury (2005), Palacios-Huerta and Serrano (2006)), psychology (Luce and Krumhansl (1988)), and health
(Bleichrodt et al. (1999)).
The restriction of CRRA to θ = 0 gives Expected Value (EV). Under EV decision-makers are neutral
toward risk - they care only about the expectation of payoff. This is an unlikely general description (especially
for large payoffs) but it is a useful benchmark.
10Wealth, w can be set somewhat arbitrarily by assuming a level of wealth for the population. In our framework, wealth can be treated
as a parameter that can vary across subjects.
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Prospect theory (PT) (Table 2.1) is a descriptive model of risky choice proposed as a more psychophysically-
realistic alternative to EU (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). The key difference is that values are thought to
depend on gains and losses relative to a reference point (much as sensory evaluations are generally sensitive to
short-term contrast effects with previous stimuli and experiences). Reference-dependence is important because
of two other properties assumed in prospect theory: First, diminishing marginal sensitivity is assumed to hold
both as gains increase in magnitude (from a zero-gain point of reference) and as losses increase in magnitude
(i.e., become more negative). This assumption implies concavity of gain utility and convexity of loss disutility
(contrary to the typical EU analysis in economics, which assumes payoffs are integrated wealth positions).
Second, losses are assumed to loom larger than gains, so that v(`i) < −v(−`i) for `i > 0.
Besides reference-dependence, PT differs from simple EU by assuming that objective probabilities are
transformed into a nonlinear subjective decision weighting functions. These decision weights pi(pi) are then
used to weight reference-adjusted payoffs.11. As in many other experiments, we assume a reference outcome at
0. That is, positive outcomes are gains and negative outcomes are losses in all choices, relative to a benchmark
of a subject’s wealth at the beginning of the experiment.
A CRRA power function is used for the value function v and losses are weighed by a factor λ (typically
greater than one); The functional form of the prospect value of a lottery is shown in Table 2.1. Several
decision weight functions pi(pi) have been proposed (see Hsu et al. (2009), Booij et al. (2010)). In order to
limit the parametric features being compared across models, we consider only the one-parameter decision
weight function axiomatically derived in Prelec (1998), which is pi(pi) = (e−(log(1/pi))
α
). The parameter
α expresses the degree of inflection: α = 1 is linear weighting (as in EU); α < 1 expresses the inflection
hypothesized in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), overweighting probabilities below p =
1/e and underweighting higher probabilities. The parameters ΘPT = {ρ, λ, α} therefore represent utility
nonlinearity, loss aversion and decision weight inflection, respectively.
In the PT model just described, decision weights of all probabilities do not generally add up to one. It
is well-known that this property can generate predicted violations of first-order stochastic dominance. In
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) the original PT is extended by using rank-dependent weights (following
Quiggin (1982)), in a form called Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). In CPT, a payoff is weighted by the
difference between its transformed decumulative probability and the decumulative probability of the payoff
ranked just below it in magnitude. Consider a gamble with two positive gain payoffs `1 > `2, with objective
probabilities p1 and p2 and a zero payoff. Then the ranked payoffs are weighted pi(p1), pi(p2 + p1)− pi(p1)
11Evidence for empirical accuracy of prospect theory has come from many methods and domains: Lab experiments (e.g., Harless and
Camerer (1994), Hsu et al. (2009)); field surveys with large representative samples (Booij et al. (2010)); pricing of stocks (Benartzi and
Thaler (1995)), and options (Gurevich et al. (2009), Barberis et al. (2001), Heath et al. (1999)); game shows (Post et al); and neuroscience
(Trepel et al. (2005), Fox and Poldrack (2009), Christopoulos et al. (2009), Hsu et al. (2009), De Martino et al. (2006b), Tom et al.
(2007))
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and 1− pi(p2 + p1).
More generally, rank payoffs from 1 (best) to n (worst) by `1 ≥ · · · ≥ `k ≥ 0 ≥ `k + 1 ≥ · · · ≥ `n. The
first k payoffs are gains and payoffs ranked k + 1 to n are losses. Denote decision weight in the gain and loss
domains by w+(p) and w−. Then the weights are
for i ≤ k : pi+i = w+(pi + · · ·+ p1)− w+(pi−1 + · · ·+ p1)
for j > k : pi−j = w
−(pj + · · ·+ pn)− w−(pj+1 + · · ·+ pn)
Then the prospect value depends on ranks and the rank dependence of decision weights (refer to Table 2.1).
Besides EU variants, PT and CPT, another class of models assumes that risky choices are valued by
computing and combining their statistical moments– their mean, variance, and skewness (and possibly higher
moments too). Moments-based models have been most widely used in financial economics (Sharpe (1964);
Markowitz (1968)) and biology12.
Two models defined next capture the most common types of moments-based models. Mean-Variance-
Skewness (MVS), in Table 2.1, has parameters ΘMV S = {wµ, wσ2 , wν} are the weights for the mean, variance
and skewness of the lottery respectively, with wµ, wσ2 , wν ≥ 0.
Since variance and skewness become much larger when payoffs are scaled up, it is also reasonable to include
a standardized version of weighted moments that scales with payoff increases more gracefully, which gives
the Normalized Mean-Variance-Skewness (NMVS) (Table 2.1), where parameters ΘSMV S = {wµ, wσ, wν˜}
are the weights for the mean, standard deviation and standardized skewness of the lottery respectively, where
wµ, wσ, wν˜ ≥ 0.
We therefore have six different models to compare. Many previous experiments tried to design choices
which are most different (i.e., most diagnostic) in these different models. For example, EU and MVS
approaches predict either a general aversion to payoff variance, or a preference. PT and CPT allow an aversion
to variance over gains and a preference for variance over losses. It is therefore easy to design choices with gains
and losses in which the theories make different predictions (see Wang et al. (2010b), Toubia et al. (ming)).
A subtler difference arises between PT/CPT, and MVS/SMVS approaches. PT and CPT predict a high
subjective value for risks with low-probability high-payoff gains (due to nonlinear decision weights pi(p) on
the extreme gains). MVS and SMVS also predict high subjective value for such risks because their skewness
is positive. Distinguishing the two approaches therefore requires a deft touch, finding mixtures of high-
12Criticisms of the mean-variance approach emerged early in its evolution. EU valuations can be approximated by weighting mean and
variance, using a Taylor expansion argument. However, mean-variance is strictly compatible with EU-based choice only if payoff utility
is quadratic or if risky choice payoffs are normally distributed (Tobin (1958), Hanoch and Levy (1969)). Quadratic utility can lead to
stochastic dominance valuations, and implies that absolute risk-aversion is increasing, which is unlikely (Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971)).
However, analyses suggest the conclusions from mean-variance models are robust to deviations from quadratic utility and normality (Levy
and Markowitz (1979); Kroll et al. (1984)).
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payoff amount and high-payoff (weighted) probability such that pure skewness preference and high-payoff
overweighting can be distinguished.
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2.3 Dynamic Optimal Designs
We begin with intuition about EC2, then describe the method formally. It has three powerful properties which
other information criteria do not have:
◦Most methods are sensitive to noise.13 The empirical applications which we have an mind all feature
responses with some degree of stochastic noise (i.e., people choosing according to decision rule will not make
the same choice every single time from a fixed choice set). Many of the good properties of previous adaptive
methods rely on deterministic, no-noise processes (so that hypotheses are immediately eliminated by a single
unpredicted “mistake”). Our method EC2 reduces the noisy case to a formally tractable noiseless case, so
good performance properties carry over while noise is allowed.
◦ It can be proved that there is a worst-case cost bound for greedy EC2 which depends on ln(1/pmin)
(where pmin is the prior probability of the least-likely theory). What does that imply? In a medical setting,
for example, there could be a dangerous disease which is extremely rare (pmin is low) but highly contagious;
and figuring out for sure whether a patient has the disease is necessary for protecting public health. This
kind of diagnosis will take many tests in the worst case. However, in the empirical social science settings we
are considering, the lowest pmin is rarely very low because it is usually adequate to consider only a modest
number of possible theories and parameters (pmin might be on the order of 10−3, for example, so that the
worst-case cost multiplier is 6.9).
◦ Since our EC2 information criteria is adaptively submodular, the marginal information value of a test
can only go down after other tests have been done. This permits “lazy evaluation” which reduces runtime
(Leskovec et al. (2007); Minoux (1978)).
To illustrate, suppose there are 30,000 possible tests. The procedure begins by computing the value,
according to the EC2 objective criteria (revealed in later sections), of all 30,000 tests. The highest-value test
is conducted on trial 1, the result is recorded, and all model probabilities are updated. On trial 2, if a candidate
new test has a computed value V, then all the tests with a value lower than V in the initial pre-trial 1 evaluation
can be safely ignored (since those values may change after the trial 1 results, but can never become larger
than V). This insight can be exploited, by considering tests in order of maximum previously computed values
(Refer to Appendix for details).
Next we will provide some background on general methods with no noise, which sets the stage for EC2.
The notation is borrowed from computer science (see Golovin and Krause (2011)) and is designed to apply to
a very wide range of domains (e.g., sensor management, medical testing, etc.). A simple visual illustration is
given below (Figure 2) for the case of hypotheses about risky choice.
13Appendix B illustrates an example where information gain and value of information (VoI) perform badly.
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2.3.1 Bayesian Active Learning in the Noiseless Case
In the Bayesian active learning problem, we would like to distinguish among a given set of hypotheses
H = {h1, . . . , hn} by performing tests from a set T = {1, . . . , N} of possible tests. Running test t incurs a
cost of c(t) and produces an outcome from a finite set of outcomes X = {1, 2, . . . , `}.
In our setting,H would be the parameter values of models, and T , the set of all possible choice pairs. X is
the choice observed (X = {0, 1} for a choice between two lotteries).
We let H denote the random variable which equals the true hypothesis, and model the outcome of each
test t by a random variable Xt taking values in X . We denote the observed outcome of test t by xt. We further
suppose we have a prior distribution P modeling our assumptions on the joint probability P (H,X1, . . . , XN )
over the hypotheses and test outcomes.
In the noiseless case, we assume that the outcome of each test is deterministic given the true hypothesis, i.e.,
for each h ∈ H, P (X1, . . . , XN | H = h) is 0 or 1. Thus, each hypothesis h is associated with a particular
vector of positive test outcomes. We assume that no two hypotheses lead to the same outcomes for all tests.14
Therefore, if we perform all tests, we can uniquely determine the true hypothesis.
However in most applications we will wish to avoid performing every possible test, as this is prohibitively
expensive. Our goal is to find an adaptive policy for running tests that allows us to determine the value of H
with certainty while minimizing the cost of the tests performed. Formally, a policy pi (also called a conditional
plan) is a partial mapping pi from partial observation vectors xA to tests, specifying which test to run next (or
whether we should stop testing) for any observation vector xA. Hereby, xA ∈ XA is a vector of outcomes
indexed by a set of tests A ⊆ T that we have performed so far 15 (e.g., the set of binary choices between risky
gamble pairs, or outcomes of a set of medical tests). After having made observations xA, we can rule out
inconsistent hypotheses. We denote the set of hypotheses consistent with an observation vector, or event Λ, by
V(Λ) ≡ {h ∈ H : P (h | Λ) > 0}. (V(Λ) is often called the version space associated with Λ.)
We call a policy feasible if it is guaranteed to uniquely determine the correct hypothesis. That is, upon
termination with observation xA, it must hold that |V(xA)| = 1. We can define the expected cost of a policy
pi by
c(pi) ≡
∑
h
P (h)c(T (pi, h))
where T (pi, h) ⊆ T is the set of tests run by policy pi in case H = h.
Our goal is to find a feasible policy pi∗ of minimum expected cost, i.e.,
pi∗ = arg min {c(pi) : pi is feasible} (2.3.1)
14That is, we implicitly assume that at least one test can be done that distinguishes any two hypotheses.
15Formally we also require that (xt)t∈B ∈ dom(pi) andA ⊆ B, implies (xt)t∈A ∈ dom(pi) (c.f., Golovin and Krause (2010b)).
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A policy pi can be naturally represented as a decision tree Tpi , and thus problem (3.2.1) is often called the
Optimal Decision Tree (ODT) problem.
Unfortunately, obtaining an approximate policy pi for which c(pi) ≤ c(pi∗) · o(log(n)) is NP-hard ( Chakar-
avarthy et al. (2007)). Hence, various heuristics are employed to solve the Optimal Decision Tree problem and
its variants. Two of the most popular heuristics are to select tests by greedily maximizing the information gain
(IG) conditioned on previous test outcomes, and generalized binary search (GBS). (A search is called “greedy”
if it only considers the immediate effect of tests on some fixed measure of progress).
Both of the IG and GBS heuristics are greedy and after having made observations xA will select
t∗ = arg max
t∈T
∆Alg (t |xA) /c(t),
where Alg ∈ {IG,GBS}.
Here, ∆IG (t |xA) ≡ H (XT | xA)− Ext∼Xt|xA [H (XT |xA, xt)] is the marginal information gain mea-
sured with respect to the Shannon entropy H (X) ≡ Ex[− log2 P (x)], and ∆GBS (t |xA) ≡ P (V(xA)) −∑
x∈X P (Xt = x | xA)P (V(xA, Xt = x)) is the expected reduction in version space probability mass.
Thus, both heuristics greedily choose the test that maximizes the benefit-cost ratio, measured with respect to
their particular (informational) benefit functions. The heuristics stop after running a set of tests A such that
|V(xA)| = 1, i.e., once the true hypothesis has been uniquely determined. It turns out that for the (noiseless)
Optimal Decision Tree problem, the IG and GBS heuristics are equivalent ( Zheng et al. (2005)).
Interestingly, despite its greedy property GBS has been shown ( Kosaraju et al. (1999), Dasgupta (2004),
Guillory and Bilmes (2009), Golovin and Krause (2010b)) to obtain near-optimal expected cost: the strongest
known bound is c(piGBS) ≤ c(pi∗) (ln(1/pmin) + 1) where pmin ≡ minh∈H P (h).
Let xS(h) be the unique vector xS ∈ XS such that P (xS | h) = 1. The result above is proved by
exploiting the fact that fGBS(S, h) ≡ 1 − P (V(xS(h))) + P (h) is adaptive submodular16 and strongly
adaptively monotone, Golovin and Krause (2010b). These two properties will turn out to be crucial for
proving theoretical guarantees of approximation bounds for EC2 later.
Call xA a subvector of xB if A ⊆ B and P (xB | xA) > 0. In this case we write xA ≺ xB. A function
f : 2T ×H is called adaptive submodular w.r.t. a distribution P , if for any xA ≺ xB and any test t it holds
that
∆(t |xA) ≥ ∆(t |xB), where
∆(t |xA) ≡ EH [f(A ∪ {t} , H)− f(A, H) | xA] .
16Submodularity has proved useful in many other economic contexts, e.g. Chambers and Echenique (2008) and Shirai (2010)
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Thus, f is adaptive submodular if the expected marginal benefits ∆(t |xA) of adding a new test t can only
decrease as we gather more observations. f is called strongly adaptively monotone w.r.t. P if, informally,
“more observations never hurt” with respect to the expected reward. Formally, for all A, all t /∈ A, and all
x ∈ X we require
EH [f(A, H) | xA] ≤ EH [f(A ∪ {t} , H) | xA, Xt = x] .
The performance guarantee for IG and GBS follows from the following general result about the greedy
algorithm for adaptive submodular functions (applied with Q = 1 and η = pmin):
Theorem 1 (Theorem 10 of Golovin and Krause (2010b) with α = 1). Suppose f : 2T × H → R≥0
is adaptive submodular and strongly adaptively monotone with respect to P and there exists Q such that
f(T , h) = Q for all h. Let η be any value such that f(S, h) > Q− η implies f(S, h) = Q for all sets S and
hypotheses h.
Then for self–certifying17 instances the adaptive greedy policy pi satisfies
c(pi) ≤ c(pi∗)
(
ln
(
Q
η
)
+ 1
)
.
In the following sections, we will use the concept of adaptive submodularity to provide the first approxima-
tion guarantees of test cost for Bayesian active learning with noisy observations. The concrete form of the
objective criteria f is discussed in section 2.4, along with an effective implementation.
2.3.2 The Equivalence Class Determination Problem
There are many ways to include and estimate noise in choice. The most popular method in social science is to
estimate some functional specification for the noise term, and estimate the amount of noise as a parameter(s)
in the general model of choice18. For adaptive design this approach has been pursued by Wang, Filiba and
Camerer (2011). This can be problematic for two reasons:
First, with finite test vectors, it will generally be impossible to guarantee feasibility– i.e., the property that a
test method will certainly locate the true hypothesis eventually– which undermines approximation guarantees.
Put differently, the version space will not shrink rapidly because noise means that it is difficult to conclusively
eliminate hypotheses.
Second, honing in on likely models both accurately and precisely requires simultaneously identifying the
noise parameter and other parameters whose identification depends on noise. The results in Wang et al. (2011)
17The technical requirement that instances be self-certifying means that the policy will have proof that it has obtained the maximum
possible objective value, Q, immediately upon doing so. It is not difficult to show that this is the case with the instances we consider in
this paper. See Golovin and Krause (2010b) for more detail.
18See Becker et al. (1963), Loomes and Sugden (1995), Loomes and Sugden (1998), Loomes et al. (2002), Moffatt (2005), Moffatt and
Peters (2001), Hey (2005), Hey and Orme (1994), Wilcox (2008)
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are somewhat pessimistic in this regard (i.e., precision in identifying the amount of noise does not increase
much over dozens of experimental trials.)
We therefore pursue a different approach. The trick is to model noise by assuming that there is random
switching of “true” deterministic responses. To gain intuition, consider a simple model where tests have binary
outcomes, and we know that the outcome of exactly one test, chosen uniformly at random unbeknownst to
us, is flipped. If any pair of hypotheses h 6= h′ differs by the outcome of at least three tests, we can still
uniquely determine the correct hypothesis after running all tests. In this case we can reduce the noisy active
learning problem to the noiseless setting by creating N “noise-injected” copies for each hypothesis. Each
noisy copy is obtained by flipping the outcome of one of the N tests. The modified prior P ′ would then
assign mass P ′(h′) = P (h)/N to each noisy copy h′ of h. The conditional distribution P ′(XT | h′) is still
deterministic (since flipping the outcome of one of the tests changes it from 0 to 1 or vice versa). Thus, each
deterministic hypothesis hi in the original problem is now associated with a setHi of deterministic hypotheses
in the modified problem. However, instead of selecting tests to determine exactly which noisy copy has been
realized, we only care which set ofHi (all generated by flipping elements of hi) is realized. That is, we will
not necessarily be able to locate the correct noisy copy, but we can locate the familyHi of noisy copies, which
all spring from a single hypothesis hi. Note that until we have enough observations, multiple hypotheses hi
would exist in the same equivalence classHi.
In the Equivalence Class Determination problem19, a set of hypotheses H is partitioned into a set of m
equivalence classes {H1, . . . ,Hm} so thatH =
⊎m
i=1Hi. The goal is to determine which classHi the true
hypothesis lies in.
Formally, upon termination with observations xA we require that V(xA) ⊆ Hi for some i. As with the
ODT problem, the goal is to minimize the expected cost of the tests, where the expectation is taken over the
true hypothesis sampled from P . In §2.3.3, we will show how the ECD problem arises naturally from Bayesian
experimental design problems in probabilistic models.
Given the fact that GBS performs near-optimally on the Optimal Decision Tree problem, a natural approach
to solving ECD would be to run GBS until the termination condition is met. Unfortunately, and perhaps
surprisingly, GBS can perform very poorly on the ECD problem. Consider an instance with a uniform prior
over n hypotheses, h1, . . . , hn, and two equivalence classesH1 ≡ {hi : 1 ≤ i < n} andH2 ≡ {hn}. There
are tests T = {1, . . . , n} such that hi(t) = 1[i = t], all of unit cost. Hereby, 1[Λ] is the indicator variable for
event Λ. In this case, the optimal policy only needs to select test n. However GBS may select tests 1, 2, . . . , n
in order until running test t, where H = ht is the true hypothesis. Given our uniform prior, it takes n/2 tests
19 Bellala et al. (2010) simultaneously studied ECD, and, like us, used it to model active learning with noise ( Bellala et al. (2009)).
They developed an extension of GBS for ECD. We defer a detailed comparison of our approaches to future work.
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in expectation until this happens, so that GBS costs, in expectation, n/2 times the optimal expected cost in this
instance.
The poor performance of GBS in this instance may be attributed to its lack of consideration for the
equivalence classes. Another natural heuristic would be to run the greedy IG policy, only with the entropy
measured with respect to the probability distribution on equivalence classes rather than hypotheses. Call this
policy piIG. It is clearly aware of the equivalence classes, as it adaptively and myopically selects tests to reduce
the uncertainty of the realized class, measured w.r.t. the Shannon entropy. However, we can show there are
instances in which it costs Ω(n/ log(n)) times the optimal cost, even under a uniform prior (see Appendix B
for an example).
The EC2 selection criterion. The reason why GBS fails is because reducing the version space mass does
not necessarily facilitate differentiation among the classes Hi. The reason why IG fails is that there are
complementarities among tests; a set of tests can be far better than the sum of its parts (so greedy test choice
can fail badly because it only considers one test at a time).
Thus, we would like to optimize an objective function that encourages differentiation among classes,
but lacks complementarities. We adopt an elegant idea from Dasgupta (2006), and define weighted edges
between hypotheses that we would like distinguish between. However, instead of introducing edges between
arbitrary pairs of hypotheses (as done in Dasgupta (2006)), we only introduce edges between hypotheses in
different classes20. Tests will allow us to cut edges inconsistent with their outcomes, and we aim to eliminate
all inconsistent edges while minimizing the expected cost incurred. We now formalize this intuition.
Specifically, we define a set of edges E = ∪1≤i<j≤m {{h, h′} : h ∈ Hi, h′ ∈ Hj}, consisting of all
(unordered) pairs of hypotheses belonging to distinct classes. These are the edges that must be cut, by
which we mean for any edge {h, h′} ∈ E , at least one hypothesis in {h, h′} must be ruled out (i.e.,
eliminated from the version space). Hence, a test t run under true hypothesis h is said to cut edges
Et (h) ≡ {{h′, h′′} : h′(t) 6= h(t) or h′′(t) 6= h(t)}. See Fig. 3.1 for an illustration. We define a weight
function w : E → R≥0 by w({h, h′}) ≡ P (h) ·P (h′). We extend the weight function to an additive (modular)
function on sets of edges in the natural manner, i.e., w(E ′) ≡∑e∈E′ w(e). The objective fEC that we will
greedily maximize is then defined as the weight of the edges cut (EC):
fEC(A, h) ≡ w
(⋃
t∈A
Et (h)
)
(2.3.2)
The key insight that allows us to prove approximation guarantees for fEC is that fEC shares the same
beneficial properties that make fGBS amenable to efficient greedy optimization.
20We do not care to distinguish noisy copies within an equivalence class, so there is no need to create edges between these copies.
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Proposition 2. The objective fEC is strongly adaptively monotone and adaptively submodular.
Based on the objective fEC , we can calculate the marginal benefits for test t upon observations xA as
∆EC (t |xA) ≡ EH [fEC(A ∪ {t} , H)− fEC(A, H) | xA] .
We call the adaptive policy piEC that, after observing xA, greedily selects test t∗ ∈ arg maxt ∆EC (t |xA) /c(t),
the EC2 algorithm (for equivalence class edge cutting).
Note that these instances are self–certifying, because we obtain maximum objective value if and only if the
version space lies within an equivalence class, and the policy can certify this condition when it holds. So we
can apply Theorem 1 to show EC2 obtains a ln(Q/η) + 1 approximation to Equivalence Class Determination.
Hereby, Q = w(E) = 1 −∑i(P (h ∈ Hi))2 ≤ 1 is the total weight of all edges that need to be cut, and
η = mine∈E w(e) ≥ p2min is a bound on the minimum weight among all edges. We have the following result:
Theorem 3. Suppose P (h) is rational for all h ∈ H. For the adaptive greedy policy piEC implemented by
EC2 it holds that
c(piEC) ≤ (2 ln(1/pmin) + 1)c(pi∗),
where pmin ≡ minh∈H P (h) is the minimum prior probability of any hypothesis, and pi∗ is the optimal policy
for the Equivalence Class Determination problem.
2.3.3 Noisy Observations
In this section we address the case of noisy observations, using ideas from §2.3.2, and generalize the notion of
the noise model in previous sections. With noisy observations, the conditional distribution P (X1, . . . , XN | h)
is no longer deterministic. We model the noise using an additional random variable Θ. The vector of test
outcomes xT is assumed to be an arbitrary, deterministic function xT : H × supp(Θ) → XN ; hence
XT | h is distributed as xT (h,Θh) where Θh is distributed as P (θ | h). For example, there might be up to
s = | supp(Θ)| ways any particular disease could manifest itself, with different patients with the same disease
suffering from different symptoms.
In cases where it is always possible to identify the true hypothesis, i.e., xT (h, θ) 6= xT (h′, θ′) for all h 6= h′
and all θ, θ′ ∈ supp(Θ), we can reduce the problem to Equivalence Class Determination with hypotheses
{xT (h, θ) : h ∈ H, θ ∈ supp(Θ)} and equivalence classesHi ≡ {xT (hi, θ) : θ ∈ supp(Θ)} for all i. Then
Theorem 3 immediately yields that the approximation factor of EC2 is at most 2 ln (1/minh,θ P (h, θ)) + 1,
where the minimum is taken over all (h, θ) in the support of P . In the unit cost case, running EC2 with a
modified prior a` la Kosaraju et al. (1999), allows us to obtain an O(log |H|+ log | supp(Θ)|) approximation
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factor. Note this model allows us to incorporate complex correlations in the noise terms.
However, a major challenge when dealing with noisy observations is that it is not always possible to
distinguish distinct hypotheses. Even after we have run all tests, there will generally still be uncertainty about
the true hypothesis, i.e., the posterior distribution P (H | xT ) obtained using Bayes’ rule may still assign
non-zero probability to more than one hypothesis. If so, uniquely determining the true hypothesis is not
possible. Instead, we imagine that there is a set D of possible decisions we may make after (adaptively)
selecting a set of tests to perform and we must choose one (e.g., we must decide how to treat the medical
patient, which scientific theory to adopt, or which classifier to use, given our observations). Thus our goal is to
gather data to make effective decisions (Howard (1966)). Formally, for any decision d ∈ D we take, and each
realized hypothesis h, we incur some loss `(d, h). Decision theory recommends, after observing xA, to choose
the decision d∗ that minimizes the risk, i.e., the expected loss, namely d∗ ∈ arg mind EH [`(d,H) | xA].
A natural goal in Bayesian active learning is thus to adaptively pick observations, until we are guaranteed
to make the same decision (and thus incur the same expected loss) that we would have made had we run
all tests. Thus, we can reduce the noisy Bayesian active learning problem to the ECD problem by defining
the equivalence classes over all test outcomes that lead to the same minimum risk decision. Hence, for each
decision d ∈ D, we define
Hd ≡ {xT : d = arg min
d′
EH [`(d′, H) | xT ]}. (2.3.3)
If multiple decisions minimize the risk for a particular xT , we break ties arbitrarily. Identifying the best
decision d ∈ D then amounts to identifying which equivalence class Hd contains the realized vector of
outcomes, which is an instance of ECD.
One common approach to this problem is to myopically pick tests maximizing the decision-theoretic value
of information (VoI) (Howard (1966)): ∆VoI (t |xA) ≡ mind EH [`(d,H) | xA]−Ext∼Xt|xA [mind EH [`(d,H) | xA, xt]].
The VoI of a test t is the expected reduction in the expected loss of the best decision due to the observation of
xt. However, we can show there are instances in which such a policy pays Ω(n/ log(n)) times the optimal
cost, even under a uniform prior on (h, θ) and with | supp(Θ)| = 2 (Appendix B contains an example). In
contrast, on such instances our algorithm obtains an O(log n) approximation. More generally, we have the
following result for EC2 as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Fix hypothesesH, tests T with costs c(t) and outcomes in X , decision set D, and loss function `.
Fix a prior P (H,Θ) and a function xT : H× supp(Θ)→ XN which define the probabilistic noise model. Let
c(pi) denote the expected cost of pi incurs to find the best decision, i.e., to identify which equivalence classHd
the outcome vector xT belongs to. Let pi∗ denote the policy minimizing c(·), and let piEC denote the adaptive
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policy implemented by EC2. Then it holds that
c(piEC) ≤
(
2 ln
(
1
p′min
)
+ 1
)
c(pi∗),
where p′min ≡ minh∈H {P (h, θ) : P (h, θ) > 0}.
If all tests have unit cost, by using a modified prior (Kosaraju et al. (1999)) the approximation factor can
be improved to O (log |H|+ log | supp(Θ)|) as in the case of Theorem 3.
2.3.4 A simple illustration
Intuitively, EC2 chooses the test which (a) distinguishes two hypotheses, connected by an edge, which make
different predictions on that test, and (b) has the largest product of those two hypotheses’ probability. The
method is like a sports tournament in which all pairs of challengers that make different predictions are created
(edges). Pairs are ranked by the product of their probabilities of being the “best” (i.e., most likely). The pair
of contending theories with the highest probability product are then chosen to compete on a conclusive test
(which will knock out one and be consistent with the other; In fact, a challenge question can maximize the
sum of probability products for multiple edges, hence knocking out multiple theories at the same time). The
idea is to choose the challenge which knocks out one of two theories –in our context, one of two theories that
have the highest product of likelihoods of being true– as quickly as possible.
Figures 2.1 and 3.1 show a graphic illustration of how EC2 works. 2.1 (top left) shows an equivalence-
class: Each oval represents an equivalence class (EC) of theory predictions. The theory predicts choices of
[0,0,0] for three tests X1, X2, X3. A “noisy copy” of the theory’s prediction [1∗,0,0] is randomly generated
by flipping the first choice from 0 to 1. (No noisy copy is created for the bottom oval theory.) If the noise
rate is 10%, then the probability of observing choices [1∗,0,0] is 0.1*0.9*0.9 times the probability of the
true predicted choices [0,0,0]. 2.1 (top right) illustrates equivalence-class edges: Edges connect all pairs of
predictions between equivalence sets (although, importantly, no edges connect within an equivalence set since
those predictions all stem from noisy copies of the same true theory). The thickness of the edges is a visual
index of the product of the probabilities of the predictions connected by that edge. The test which can cut the
sum of the thickness of multiple edges is chosen.
Suppose the test X1 is chosen. It can distinguish the true (noiseless) predictions in left red EC and in lower
green EC, which predict 0 in X1, from the upper right blue EC which predicts 1. If the choice is actually 1,
then all theories that predicted 0 are eliminated and their edges disappear, as shown in Figure 3.1b.
An important caveat: Note that when implemented, the EC2 algorithm applied to the ECD will not
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Figure 2.1: Constructing Equivalence Class Graphs. (top left) An equivalence class is the set of hypotheses
that generate the same vector of outcomes. (top right) An edge joins two observation vectors generated by
hypotheses from a sequence of tests in distinct equivalence classes. (bottom) An EC2 graph consists of all
equivalence classes and the edges connecting them.
always choose the true hypothesis. Here’s an example illustrating why: Suppose there are 10 binary tests. A
hypothesis h1 is a vector of ten 0’s and 1’s. Now suppose we flip those numbers so that all possible vectors are
generated (i.e., there are 10 one-flip noisy copies, 10!/(10-2)!2=45 two-flip noisy copies, etc.). If we do that
for another hypothesis h2, then one of the noisy h1 copies will exactly match one of the h2 copies. We cannot
draw an edge between them, because no test can distinguish them. The approach can’t guarantee that we will
pick the true hypothesis even if we conduct all 10 tests.
Conceptually, our approach is therefore to flip some small percentage of all true hypothesis vector elements.
This approach also can not guarantee perfect accuracy. The reason is that we might have failed to randomly flip
a specific test choice for a true hypothesis in the way that corresponds to an actual noisy choice a person made.
The extent to which the wrong hypotheses are selected, averaged across many simulated designs, will be
seen in ground-truth simulations below (Figures 2.4, 3.2, and 2.6). The asymptotic probability of choosing the
correct hypothesis is about 90% for the reasonable noise rates we use. That is, even if all tests are conducted,
the fact that noise is injected randomly means we sometimes choose a wrong hypothesis (if the bit flipping just
happened to match choices). This is an unavoidable price for a realistic noise model such as this one, which
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Figure 2.2: A stylized example of Equivalence Class Edge Cutting.
allows for human error to lead to model indistinguishability in some cases.
In practical implementation, for a reasonable number of hypotheses and observations, the equivalence
classes can be exponentially large. In the next section, we’ll discuss a couple of approaches to simplify the
computations under mild assumptions.
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2.4 Implementation: Efficiency and Challenges
The previous sections discussed the theoretical constructs by explicitly representing the observation vectors
and edges between equivalence classes. In practice we can make simplifying assumptions, as discussed
next, that leads to an effective implementation. In the following section, we show that by exploiting the
adaptive submodular property of the objective function, we can implement the algorithm using lazy evaluation
techniques that lead to orders of magnitude speedups.
2.4.1 Effective Implementation
For some noise models, Φ may have exponentially large support. In this case reducing Bayesian active learning
with noise to Equivalence Class Determination results in instances with exponentially-large equivalence classes.
This makes running EC2 on them challenging, since explicitly keeping track of the equivalence classes is
impractical. We next describe an algorithm that approximates EC2.
For clarity, we only consider the 0-1 loss function, i.e. our goal is to find the most likely hypothesis (MAP
estimate) given all data xT , namely h∗(xT ) = arg maxh P (h|xT ). Recall the defintion of the Bayesian noisy
active learning objective and consider the weight between the edges between distinct equivalence classesHi
andHj :
w(Hi×Hj) =
∑
xT ∈Hi,x′T ∈Hj
P (xT )P (x′T ) =
( ∑
xT ∈Hi
P (xT )
)( ∑
x′T ∈Hj
P (x′T )
)
= P (xT ∈ Hi)P (x′T ∈ Hj)
(2.4.1)
In general, P (XT ∈ Hi) can be estimated to arbitrary accuracy using a rejection sampling approach with
bounded sample complexity. We focus on the case where, upon observing all tests, the hypothesis is uniquely
determined, i.e., P (hj |T ) is deterministic for all xT in the support of P . In this case, it holds that P (XT ∈
Hi) = P (H = hi). Thus, the total weight is
∑
i 6=j
w(Hi ×Hj) =
(∑
i
P (hi)
)2 −∑
i
P (hi)
2 = 1−
∑
i
P (hi)
2. (2.4.2)
This insight motivates us to use the objective function
∆eff (t|xA) =
[∑
x
P (Xt = x|xA, φ)
(∑
i
P (hi|xA, Xt = x, φ)2
)]−∑
i
P (hi|xA, φ)2 (2.4.3)
which is the expected reduction in weight from the prior to the posterior distribution. Here φ ∈ Φ is an
instance of the noise model, thus P (Xt = x|xA, φ) is the likelihood that test Xt has an outcome x given
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the observations xA and noise φ. Note that the weight of a distribution 1 −
∑
i P (hi)
2 is a monotonically
increasing function of the Renyi enropyt. Thus the objective ∆Eff can be interpreted as a (non-standard)
information gain in terms of the (exponentiated) Renyi entropy. In our experiments, we show that this
criterion performs well in comparison to existing experimental design criteria, including the classical Shannon
information gain. Computing ∆Eff (t|xA) requires us to perform one inference task for each outcome x of
Xt, and O(n) computations to calculate the weight for each outcome. We and present pseudocode of the
greedy algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Input: Set of hypothesesH; Set of tests T ; prior distribution P ; function f .
begin
A ← ∅;
while ∃h 6= h′ : P (h | xA) > 0 and P (h′ | xA) > 0 do
foreach t ∈ T do
∆eff (t|xA) =
[∑
x P (Xt = x|xA)
(∑
i P (hi|xA, Xt = x)2
)]−∑i P (hi|xA)2;
Select t∗ ∈ arg maxt ∆eff (t|xA)/c(t);
Set A ← A∪ {t∗};
Observe outcome xt∗ and update posterior distribution overH;
Algorithm 1: Sequential algorithm for effectively implementing EC2.
Note that algorithm 1 is a framework for adaptive experimental design where starting with a prior of the
hypotheses, we choose a test to run based on an objective criterion. After observing the outcome of the test,
the posterior distribution over the hypotheses are updated. What differs here is that the objective criteria used
is EC2. Thus, any framework that is currently utilizing Information Gain can be easily replaced by EC2
which has theoretical guarantees in the presence of noisy responses. Furthermore, as we will see in the next
section, EC2 objective function also lends itself to an accelerated greedy evaluations which makes it orders of
magnitude faster than information gain.
2.4.2 Accelerated Greedy Evaluation
Implementation speeds of BROAD algorithms are important because subjects are waiting for dynamic
computation after each trial. Therefore a relevant metric of comparison is the information gained as function
of time (rather than just across the number of trials). We exploit the adaptive submodular property of EC2 to
develop an accelerated greedy implementation that reduces computation time.
The details of the algorithm are in Appendix B. The key insight (illustrated in figure 2.17, Appendix B)
can be gleaned from the definition of adaptive submodularity: ∆(t |xB) ≤ ∆(t |xA), where test t ∈ T for all
xA ≺ xB. The value of a test t can only decrease in future rounds as more observations are made. Initially,
the values of all the tests are calculated and sorted21, and the highest value test is presented in the first round
21A Priority Queue is often used to store sorted values for efficient calculation.
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(and removed from the queue). In subsequent iterations, the value of the most valuable test is recalculated,
and only the tests that had a higher value than this in the previous iteration needs to be recalculated. This
saves an enormous amount of computation, and in practice could lead to orders of magnitude improvement in
efficiency.
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Figure 2.3: (Left) Accuracy as a function of time assuming a response time of 28 seconds (average response
time across all subjects). (Right) Accuracy as a function of logarithmic time with no response delay.
In figure 2.3, we plot the Information gained per unit of time for accelerated EC2, Information Gain
and Random, assuming a response time c (= 28 seconds) per question. EC2 is more efficient compared to
Information Gain and Random. When the responses are immediate (c = 0), such as when querying a machine
database, Random performs well in a short time assuming no costs for the number of queries asked. EC2 is
superior to InfoGain in both time and accuracy in this case.
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Method Theoretical Properties Reference
Information Gain Equivalent to GBS in noise free setting. Lindley (1956)
Value of Information Can only be optimized in restricted settings Howard (1966)
Generalized Binary Submodular in non-adaptive setting assuming Burnashev and Zigangirov (1974)
Search (GBS) conditionally independent observations
Random Asymptotic convergence when all tests applied –
Table 2.2: Summary of the experimental design methods that are compared against EC2
2.5 Design and Evaluation
The goal is to adaptively select a sequence of tests to present to a subject, in order to distinguish which of the
six theories best explains the subject’s responses. Each choice test t is a pair of lotteries, (Lt1, L
t
2). Based on
the theory that represents behaviour, one of the lotteries would be preferred to the other, denoted by a binary
response xt ∈ {1, 2}. (Stochastic response will be introduced shortly.)
Each lottery consists of three outcomes and their corresponding probabilities, (Lti) = {(x1, p1), (x2, p2), (x3, p3)}.
The middle outcome x2 = $5 is fixed in our experiments. The loss outcome x1 varied between {−20,−10,−5}
dollars and the gain outcome x3 varied between {10, 20, 50} dollars. The distribution (p1, p2, p3) over the
payoffs was varied, where the probabilities pi ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.99} are chosen such that
p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
To conduct the experiment, we used a display that showed the two lotteries along with a bar graph (see
Appendix A). By considering all non-identical pairs of such lotteries, we obtained the set of 31626 possible
choice test (i.e. question pairs).
2.5.1 Ground Truth Analyses
In this section we evaluate the quality of five different design methods, which are summarized in Table 2.2.
Both Information Gain and Generalized Binary Search are adaptive submodular in the deterministic no-noise
setting (where running a test long enough is guaranteed to generate the correct response), Golovin and Krause
(2010b). In the Random method, a test was picked uniformly at random in each trial from the set of possible
tests without replacement. This should asymptotically converge to the optimal decision once all tests have
been conducted. Value-of-Information (VoI) criteria is defined w.r.t a decision problem to choose which among
several, potentially expensive, variables to observe in order to most effectively increase the expected utility
(Howard (1966)). Although maximizing VoI non-myopically is optimal, in all but chain-models (e.g. Markov
Chains, and slight generalizations) this non-myopic optimization is extremely intractable (Krause and Guestrin
(2009)), making it infeasible for our problem.
We evaluated the speed and ability of the five methods to recover the true model based on a large sample of
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simulated response sequences. In each sequence, a specific true model is assumed, which generates simulated
responses to the sequence of test choices generated by each method. The conclusion the method draws about
which model is likely to have produced the observed responses is then compared to the true (known) model.
This model-recovery exercise is sometimes called “ground truth” analysis. The responses were generated
using a trembling hand function, with a known probability  of making the wrong choice due to noise.
We chose discrete prior parameter values for different theories based generally on previous estimates
reported in empirical literature, as follows:
◦ The expected value (EV) model has no parameters. ◦ CRRA has one risk-aversion parameter, ΘCRRA ∈
{0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0}. ◦ A range of parameter values for prospect theory has been reported in the literature
(e.g., Booij et al. (2010), Table 1). For both PT and CPT we chose ρ ∈ {0.5, 0.62, 0.74, 0.86, 0.98, 1.1}, loss
aversion, λ ∈ {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3.0}, and Prelec-style probability weighting inflectionα ∈ {0.4, 0.52, 0.64, 0.76, 0.88, 1.0}.
◦ The range of parameter values for moments models MVS and SMVS were not readily available in ex-
perimental literature. To choose an appropriate range of parameter values, we created artificial choice
data based on prospect theory parameters (from the last paragraph) and found MLE best-fitting MVS
and SMVS parameters.22 The resulting parameter ranges were: wµ ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}, wσ2 ∈
{0.05, 0.25, 0.45, 0.65, 0.85, 1.05} × 10−2 and wν ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} × 10−4. For SMVS the parame-
ter ranges chosen were: wµ ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}, wσ ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45} and wν˜ ∈
{0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. We added a slight offset to wσ2 and wσ of 0.05 and 0.0005 respectively, to dis-
tinguish the model predictions between distinct parameter values (otherwise several values would make the
identical prediction over all designs). Note that this procedure actually limits the ability of the BROAD model
to find questions that sharply distinguish PT and moments models, because the candidate parameters for the
moments models are those which fit PT-generated choices. However, once more information about likely
moments models parameters is built up (from our data and others) the entire procedure can be repeated with a
different parameter range that should be even more diagnostic than the one used here.
For the ground truth analysis, each of the six model classes started with an equal overall prior belief of
1/6, spread uniformly across all parameter value configurations in that model class. (For example, each of the
125 specific parameter configurations for PT was assigned prior 1/6 divided by 125.) In each ground truth run,
a model and parameter configuration was chosen at random. Thirty test choices were then generated using
each of the five methods. In each such run, we record whether each of the five methods is accurate after each
22For all possible experimental designs (roughly 32,000) in our setup, we generated the responses for all possible parameter values
(125) for the prospect theory model, which generated about 4 million artificial datapoints. Next, we used a binary search to find a range of
good-fitting parameter values for the moments models. We started with a wide range, and estimated the maximum likelihood fit of the
generated responses. Then we did a binary split, by choosing the half of the range that contained the MLE. We repeated this procedure
until dividing the parameter range led to a decrease in the likelihood of the responses, i.e. some responses are better explained with the
higher parameter range.
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question. Accuracy in a run is defined as assigning the highest posterior probability to the ground-truth model
(for the overall model in the same class) in that run. The procedure was repeated for 1000 runs.
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Figure 2.4: Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.05. The asymptotic bound from
running all tests in random order is also shown.
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Figure 2.5: Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.10. The asymptotic bound from
running all tests in random order is also shown.
Figures 2.4, 3.2, and 2.6 show the performance of the 5 methods for three error rates ( = 0.05, 0.10, 0.20).23
We also plot the asymptotic performance upper bounds from running all the test choices (they are 91.09%,
89.9% and 88.2% across the three error rates).
The Figures show that VoI and GBS both perform significantly worse than Random in the presence of
noise. These methods are clearly poorly-suited when responses are noisy, which most experimental social
science data are likely to be. Indeed, the accuracy of the random method degrades as noise increases. EC2
is noticeably more accurate than InfoGain for lower error rates, and comparable for the highest error rate
23Test-retest switching rates for monetary gamble choices repeated twice are similar to these error rates, around 15% (e.g. Camerer, J
Risk Uncertainty 1989).
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Figure 2.6: Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.20. The asymptotic bound from
running all tests in random order is also shown.
 = 0.20. It is also evident that most of the improvement in accuracy occurs in the first 5-20 test choices; and
improvement is most rapid when error is low.
These ground-truth analyses show how frequently the test selection methods get the right answer. Another
performance criterion is how well the experimental setup and methods distinguish among the models. To
investigate this, we plot the accuracy curves for the individual models from the ground truth process in Figure
2.7, for  = 0.05. The experimental setup we use is extremely efficient (almost 100% accuracy) at classifying
SMVS, EV and CRRA. However, classification accuracy for CPT is weaker and for MVS classification is
relatively poor, although significantly better than chance ( which is 1/6 ≈ 16.7%).
– PT CPT MVS NMVS EV CRRA
PT 72.7 21.5 2.9 0 2.9 0
CPT 40.6 57.3 1.1 0 0.5 0.5
MVS 0.6 0 52.7 5.8 40.3 0.6
NMVS 0 0.6 1.3 96.2 0.6 1.3
EV 0.5 0 2.6 0.5 96.4 0
CRRA 0 0 0 0 0 100.0
Table 2.3: Misclassification Matrix: Percentage of samples (row) that are classified as another model (column)
using EC2 after 50 rounds. The diagonal represents correct classification.
We analyzed the classifications to generate a misclassification matrix in Table 2.3, i.e. we looked at how
the samples from the models are classified by EC2. Each matrix entry shows the frequency with which a
true row model is classified into each possible column model (Excellent classification would be evidenced
by percentages close to 100% on the diagonal.). As pictured in Figure 2.7, the method correctly classifies
SMVS, EV and CRRA almost perfectly. The analysis reveals where the misclassification occurs. One limit is
that a significant number of PT samples (21.5%) are misclassified as CPT, and 40.6% of CPT samples are
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Figure 2.7: Performance of the algorithms for individual models when probability of error,  = 0.05. The
asymptotic bounds are also shown for recovering individual models.
misclassified as PT. The other limit is that a large number of MVS samples (40.3%) are misclassified as EV.
This is because the weight on skewness in MVS can be zero, and when the weight on variance is low enough,
the choices of EV and a low-variance-weight MVS model are difficult to distinguish.
The efficiency of classification can potentially be improved through alternate experimental setups. Classifi-
cation quality will also be sensitive to how the parameter ranges are chosen, to how reliably subjects make
choices consistent with one model or another, and other factors. Finally, keep in mind that even with an
efficient setup, the method cannot necessarily achieve perfect classification using just a small number of test
choices.
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2.6 Manipulation
In BROAD designs, subjects could misrepresent their true preferences in some choices if the following chain
of conditions hold: (i) they believe that future test choices depend on previous responses; (ii) they can compute
how to misrepresent preferences in early choices to create better future choices (as evaluated by their own
preferences); and (iii) the value of misrepresentation is high enough to be worthwhile.
We present arguments and evidence that misrepresentation resulting from the chain of conditions (i)-(iii) is
likely to be rare. When misrepresentation does occur, it could be easily detected and is not likely to lead to
wrong conclusions about revealed preferences which cannot be easily reversed.
We illustrate with a concrete example from our empirical study. For maximum fidelity, the reader should
assume she has true preferences corresponding to prospect theory (PT), that was the most common type in the
data.
The first test choice presented to all subjects is the same (because no choice history is used to fine-tune
the test-choice selection). Subjects are asked to choose between L1 = {(−10, 0.9), (5, 0), (10, 0.1)} and
L2 = {(−20, 0.5), (5, 0.49), (50, 0.01)}.
What would a myopic (non-manipulating) agent choose? What would a manipulating agent choose? In
post-experiment polls of this type with subjects people are not clear how manipulation would change the
answer about what risky choice to pick. Even if the algorithm is known, solving the decision tree to make the
optimal strategic decision is not easily computable. Here’s an easier version: Suppose your preferences are EV.
The maximum EV choice is L2. Should you strategically choose L1 instead?
These examples might shake the readers’ faith that manipulation is easy to figure out. But more can be
said. Next we speculate about whether manipulation pays, whether it occurs, how it might be detected in
experimental results, and how its effects might be muted or corrected.
◦ Does manipulation pay? To partially answer this question, it is helpful to establish an upper bound
on the maximum gain from manipulation, for a particular design and player type. The upper bound on the
marginal gain is likely to be low. Here’s why: In later periods, it does not pay to manipulate since doing
makes suboptimal immediate choices. And in early periods, manipulation is immediately costly for the same
reason. So there is a natural tradeoff between the cost of manipulation in a period– the utility losses from
deliberately making the wrong choices– and the future gains from improved choice sets. It could be that in a
10-period experiment, for example, manipulation is only beneficial in the first three periods. If so, the posterior
probabilities computed after 10 periods might be close to the correct posteriors because they include 7 periods
of non-manipulation choice data after three periods of misleading data. It is also possible that when ranking
different subjects by their risk-aversion, for example, we can recover an approximately correct ranking across
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subjects even if manipulation leads to biased estimates of their means.
To be more concrete, we computed the upper bound of manipulation for a clairvoyant agent. Specifically,
consider a version of our experimental setup with 10 questions, leading to 210(= 1024) potential sequences of
choices. We assume that the agent knows all the conditional sequences of tests, or tree, that will be generated
by the EC2 algorithm. He chooses the sequence of responses that maximize his expected earnings over all 10
trials.
We find that the earnings of a clairvoyant agent with EV preferences are only 8% higher than an agent who
myopically chooses options that maximize his earning for each round. More importantly, the resulting type
classification is incorrect in 68 cases, or with 6.6% error rate, which would partly be due to sampling error
(Table 2.3).
◦ Does manipulation actually happen? One way to see whether manipulation is common is to do an
experiment in which one treatment group is told that an adaptive algorithm is used to generate their future
choices, and it may benefit them to choose risks they do not like to induce the algorithm to offer them better
choices in the future. We created two treatments with different instructions. Subjects were told that the
algorithm is adaptive and can theoretically be manipulated (Additional instructions in Appendix A). In post
experiment self-reports, most subjects reported that they did not try to manipulate the system or were not able
to do so. Others said they did make different choices (See online supplementary methods for self-reports). The
most striking feature of the result was that the EC2 algorithm identified more subjects in the “informed” as
using expected value maximization. Some subjects said that knowing an algorithm was changing their choices
led them to maximize EV. It is also notable that the subjects in the “informed” condition did not have higher
average earnings (as might be expected if they are manipulating). This is explained in more detail below.
◦ Can manipulation be detected? Strategizing will typically leave clear fingerprints in the data from
choices across a sequence of questions. First, in typical cases the posterior probability of the most likely
model (as judged from final round result) goes up across the trials. In contrast, a manipulating respondent will
appear to be one “type” in early trials, and then revert to their true “type” in later trials (as the future benefit
of manipulation shrinks). This will leave a telltale pattern of posterior probabilities veering from one type
to another, from earlier to later trials. We explored how diagnostic this pattern is for simulated agents who
optimally misrepresent, and in actual experimental data, in figure 2.14. When artificial subjects are known
to be manipulating, the percentage of subject classifications corresponding to the true type (as judged from
final-round posteriors) is very low in early rounds. However, the opposite pattern is evident in the actual choice
data.
Furthermore, if manipulation in early choices is cognitively demanding, manipulating subjects will initially
50
have high reaction times that decrease sharply over time, as they begin to express easily-computed true
preferences in alter trials. However, reaction times from actual experimental data are similar in the control and
cued-manipulation treatment, see Figure 2.15.
◦ How can manipulation be limited? There are two sensible ideas about how manipulation could be limited.
(Unfortunately, both of them weaken the incentives to respond truthfully to all questions that are asked.) The
first remedy24 is to create a space of questions Q, then sample from Q using a BROAD procedure. Subjects are
told that one question will be chosen for payment from the entire set Q, not from the subset that were actually
selected and answered. Misrepresenting preference in the first few questions in the BROAD procedure does
lead to “better” questions being included later in the BROAD set, but it does not change at all the chance that
those questions will be chosen for payment (since BROAD-selected and all other questions in Q are equally
likely).
A second remedy is to make the probability with which questions are chosen for payment much higher for
the earlier questions in the sequence (where the incentive for mispresentation is highest). We will investigate
numerically how much “front-loading” probability onto early questions mutes the incentive to misrepresent.
To tackle this, we ran 2 sessions, with 30 subjects at UCLA, with augmented instructions (Appendix A).
Subjects were informed that an adaptive algorithm was being used, and that prior choices will affect subsequent
options.
By definition, subjects would manipulate the algorithm in order to increase their earnings. The average
earnings in the prior session was 9.44 dollars, with a standard deviation of 9.40, and the average earnings with
the augmented instructions was 9.00 dollars with a standard deviation of 9.3. Thus the earnings from both
sessions were nearly identical.
In Figure 2.8 we show the classifications for the two different cases to test for effects of manipulability (see
Section 2.6 below). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the two distributions of classifications are statistically
different using a 2-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We show stacked plots of the posterior distribution of the
two treatments in figure 2.9.
Furthermore, we obtained self-reports from subjects (the questions are shown in Appendix A), to find
out if the participants used any strategies to game the system. The majority of the participants did not try to
manipulate the algorithm. The few subjects who reported attempts to manipulate the algorithm did not come
up with any effective method (summarized self-reports to be made available online).
24This idea was suggested by Cathleen Johnson, but never published.
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Figure 2.8: The classifications for the two treatments to test for manipulability. Treatment 1 has 27 subjects,
and treatment 2 has 30 subjects. The difference between the two distributions was not found to be statistically
significant.
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Figure 2.9: Stacked bar plot of posterior distribution over the 6 models (averaged over the final 5 rounds) for
27 subjects in the non-manipulation condition (left) and the manipulation condition (right).
2.6.1 Noise Specification
The theoretical guarantees forEC2 do not depend on the choice of the noise model Φ, but the specific objective
criteria implemented in section 2.3 assumes a conditionally independent noise model. In the ground truth
analysis above, the errors are generated with a probability of , and responses are correct with probability
1− . A natural concern is, does the  noise model accurately capture the noisy responses of subjects, and if
not, does it introduce a bias in the results?
A popular alternative choice model is softmax (for e.g. used in computational neuroscience by Sutton and
Barto (1998)) where the probability of chosing an option c is P (c) = exp(U(c)/σ)/
∑
i exp(U(ci)/σ). As σ
grows, the subject will be less likely to choose the most utile alternative and make an error. If two choices
have similar utility, then the subject is more likely to make errors, which can partially be explained by the
fact that the subject is indifferent between the two outcomes with similar utility. We test whether the resulting
classifications are robust when the noise generation process is softmax, and where the misclassifications (if
any) occur. To do this, we run the ground truth analysis again, with the noise now being generated by a softmax
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function with parameters, σ = {0.86, 1.12}25.
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Figure 2.10: Performance of the algorithms for individual models when probability of error, σ = 0.86 for an
average error rate of 10%(left) and σ = 1.12 for an average error rate of 20% (right).
– PT CPT MVS NMVS EV CRRA
PT -2.1 -2.5 -0.9 0 0.9 0
CPT -9.6 -6.3 0.2 0 0.0 0.0
MVS 0.6 0 -2.8 -0.8 -7.3 0.6
NMVS 0 0.0 -0.3 -3.0 0.0 -0.3
EV 0.1 0 1.1 0.1 1.1 0
CRRA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.4: Differences in Misclassification Matrix: Percentage of samples (row) that are classified as another
model (column) using EC2 after 50 rounds for  noise minus the Softmax noise model for average error rate
of 0.10. The diagonal represents no difference in classification accuracy.
Figure shows the accuracy of EC2, Information Gain, and random questions with the number of rounds
for σ = {0.86, 1.12} corresponding to average error rates of 10% and 20%. The difference in accuracy when
the noise model is  or softmax is statistically not significant. We compare the misclassification matrix from
the softmax noise model with the  noise model, and the differences are shown in table 2.4. Each cell is the
difference in misclassification by the  noise model, and the softmax noise model where average error rate
is 0.10. The fact that there is no overall difference in accuracy is partially understandable since we picked
values of σ so that the average error rates match the  error rates. We notice fewer classification errors with
the softmax noise model since the EC2 criteria does not choose tests, at least in the initial rounds, where the
utility of the choices are very similar. The  noise thus “throws off” the algorithm more since choices with
high difference in utility can still generate errors (at random) whereas they are unlikely in the softmax model.
25We simulated choices over all tests and all theory and model parameter values for values of σ between 0.5 and 2 in increments of
0.01. We calibrated the σ such that the average number of errors over 1000 trials for σ = {0.86, 1.12} are 0.10, and 0.20 respectively.
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2.7 Empirical Data and Analysis
We ran experiments with 57 subjects in 4 separate sessions at UCLA to determine which models and parameters
fit their behaviour best. We used 2 different treatments using slightly different instructions (shown in Appendix
A).26
Thirty test choices were created using EC2. To incentivize the subjects, one of their choices was selected
at random for payment. Subjects were given an initial endowment of $20 and a $10 show-up fee27. Subjects
received payment based on the lottery they picked in the selected choice, and on a random outcome from that
lottery28. Earnings from choices ranged from $5 to $50, with a mean of $9.21 and median of $5.
Figure 2.11: Examples of the dynamically-estimated posterior probability over all models for two subjects.
The subject on the left is rapidly classified as EV; the one on the right is less rapidly classified as CPT.
The data reveals heterogeneity in the subjects’ estimated types, and the dynamics of how type estimation
changes over the 30 test choices. We illustrate two examples in Figure 2.11. In one example the subject’s type
is identified very early in about 10 rounds. In the second case, the classification is evenly split between PT and
CPT until the final five rounds.
Figure 2.12 shows stacked plots of the posterior distributions of all 57 subjects across all six models (aver-
aged over the last five experimental trials). The stacked plot reveals high confidence in the EV classifications.
The posterior mass is typically spread between the PT and CPT classifications, for those cases in which either
of those models are considered the most likely. The moments models MVS and SMVS fit fewer subjects, but
are typically sharply distinguished from each other. It is perhaps surprising that CRRA is never the best-fitting
model.
Overall classification can be summarized by compressing the data in Figure 2.12. Figure 3.4 shows
26We followed the IRB protocols of UCLA for the conduct of human subject experiments.
27The earnings from the experiment were added to the endowment. Since the minimum outcome was minus $20, the subjects would
never have to pay money, as per IRB requirements.
28A 10× 10 matrix of values from 1 to 100 was generated by random permutation, and subjects were asked to pick a row and column
number. The number at the row and column was the random probability for the subject, which was used to realize the lottery outcome. For
example, if the lottery picked was L = {(−5, 0.1), (5, 0.5), (20, 0.4)}, and the random number generated was 67, the subject would
earn $20.
54
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 550
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Subjects
Po
ste
rio
r P
ro
b.
 
 
EV
FPT
CPT
MVS
NMVS
CRRA
Figure 2.12: Stacked bar plot of posterior distribution over the 6 models (averaged over the final 5 rounds) for
57 subjects. The subjects are ordered on the x-axis based on maximum posterior probability into models EV,
FPT, CPT, MVS, SMVS and CRRA .
the average posterior distribution of all models after each round, aggregated over all subjects. It is clear
that the posterior distribution of EV, PT and CPT are generally higher than the moments models and CRRA.
Furthermore, it appears that separation in model fit both occurs rapidly, in about five trials, and stabilizes after
about 20 trials; after 20 trials the overall ranking of the model fits does not change at all.
2.7.1 Distribution of Parameters
At the end of the experiment, we obtain a posterior distribution over all hypotheses (theory and specific
parameters). We sum over all parameters within a theory to obtain the posterior distribution over the theories,
and obtain the MAP classification of the subjects. Given the final classification to a theory, we can also obtain
the MAP estimate of specific parameters. Expected Value (EV) has no parameters and n = 17 classifications,
and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) had no classifications. For the rest of the theories, the MAP
parameter estimates were:
• Functional Prospect Theory (PT) had n = 14 classifications; average values of parameters (with standard
errors) were: ρ = 0.88(±0.07), λ = 2.22(±0.40), α = 0.77(±0.12).
• Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) had n = 11 classifications; average values of parameters (with
standard errors) were: ρ = 0.79(±0.11), λ = 1.90(±0.39), α = 0.85(±0.09).
• Unnormalized Mean-Variance-Skewness (MVS) had n = 9 classifications; average values of parameters
(with standard errors) were: wµ = 0.89(±0.10), wσ2 = 0.0026(±0.0023), wν = 0.000028(±0.00001).
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Figure 2.13: The posterior distribution of the 6 models after each round. The aggregate mean and standard
error is shown for 57 subjects.
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Figure 2.14: The percentage of subjects whose current classification in a round, corresponds to final classifi-
cation (in round 30). Subjects trying to manipulate the algorithm might misrepresent their true type in early
rounds.
• Normalized Mean-Variance-Skewness (NMVS) had n = 6 classifications; average values of parameters
(with standard errors) were: wµ = 0.94(±0.18), σ = 0.188(±0.08), wτ˜ = 0.16(±0.07).
Since the objective for EC2 is to distinguish between theories, the experimental design and the sequence
of questions asked is not optimized towards increasing the resolution of the parameter estimates, or even
narrowing in on the correct parameters. Our methodology can easily be extended to estimating the parameters
of a specific theory, such as prospect theory, with a high resolution.
2.7.2 Interpretation of Results
How should the experimental results be interpreted in the context of results in literature? Our lab experiments
with 57 subjects found no classifications, and least evidence, for Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA).
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Figure 2.15: (left) A cartoon of the hypothetical reaction times in the two treatments to test for manipulation.
We expect higher reaction times when subjects are trying to manipulate. (right) The actual reaction times with
standard error bars for the two treatments.
This is a surprising finding in the context of the literature where CRRA is the most popular model used in lab
experiments, including in the HL paradigm (Holt and Laury (2005)). A plausible explanation is that CRRA is
used to estimate a subject’s risk aversion in risky choice experiments that don’t include losses or outcomes
with very low probabilities. Our experiments suggest that since Prospect Theory nests CRRA, these subjects
are likely Prospect Theory types that exhibit risk aversion when the choices are only in the domain of gains
without extreme probabilities.
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Figure 2.16: The “collapsed” classification of 57 subjects into the four class of theories: Prospect Theory (PT),
Moments Models (MVS), Expected Value (EV) and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA).
The misclassification matrix in table 2.3, shows that with a small number of rounds (30, in our experiments),
the two variants of prospect theory can be hard to distinguish, and the two variants of moments models are
also hard to separate. Since we obtain the posterior distribution over the theory and parameter values, we can
consider “collapsing” the classifications into 4 distinct class of theories: Expected Value (EV), Prospect Theory
(PT), Moments (MVS) and CRRA. Doing so is as simple as summing over the hypotheses over two theories
equivalent to adding posterior probabilities. Figure 2.16 shows the “collapsed” classification according to the
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4 classes of theories.
We find that PT is the dominant class of theories, although there is good evidence for EV and Moments
models. We have to be cautious in making strong claims about which theory is better at classifying subjects
since the classification is mixed (and there genuinely are mixed types in the population), and because the
results depend on the experimental designs. In our designs, there are 3 possible outcomes (states) and the
probabilities are varied over them, so we can compute the first, second and third moments. dAcremont and
Bossaerts (2008) has shown that as the number of states get very high, subjects switch to computing statistical
moments rather than tracking states (thus state representations collapse to moments). This is relevant in
finance since the number of states is very high, and calculating utility using prospect theory is computationally
intensive.
The heterogeneity in classifications in our experiments is consistent with other studies that have found
heterogeneity in risk and loss aversion in larger populations; Some of the heterogeneity can be explained by
socioeconomic factors (Von Gaudecker et al. (2011)). Figure 3.4 shows the posterior probability for the 6
theories aggregated for all 57 subjects, which can be interpreted as our confidence level in the classifications.
There is a possibility we have not considered a theory that would be an accurate model of the choices for most
subjects. In that case, the “unexplained” evidence would be captured by the noise term.
Finally, our conclusions are based on the assumption that the subject’s strategy (or type) stays consistent
throughout the experiment. If the subject’s strategy changes arbitrarily throughout the experiment, then it is
generally difficult to classify them. However, if the subject’s strategy changes early on and then stays consistent
till the end of the experiment, since we utilize Bayesian updates, and account for noise (so a hypothesis does
not get eliminated entirely, but the evidence is decreased), the algorithm can recover to find the subject’s final
strategy.
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2.8 Conclusions and future directions
This paper proposes and implements a new BROAD method for adaptively selecting which choice pairs to
present to identify a distribution of economic preference parameters (and associated theories) from a known
prior distribution. The novel approach here uses Equivalence Class Determination as a way to to make
inferences about noisy choice theories using methods developed for a classic, noiseless case. The trick is
intuitively simple: A noiseless deterministic theory will make a single 0-1 choice in each choice pair. A small
amount of noise is tolerated by “flipping” those 0-1 bits in a vector of choices and creating noise-injected
“copies” of a target theory. Then the algorithm only tries to distinguish between an equivalence class (the target
theory and all its noisy copies) and other equivalence classes.
We introduced an adaptive greedy (myopic) algorithm EC2, to choose questions from a design space. The
algorithm measures edge strength by the product of the probabilities of two theories with similar predictions,
then chooses a test which will “cut” the strongest edge (by ruling out one theory in the edge-pair and letting
the other survive). The edge-cutting objective function is adaptive submodular, which leads to nice theoretical
properties.
We applied EC2 to an experimental design problem choosing among six different theories of risky choice
(expectational theories, such as EU and prospect theory, and moment-weighting theories). Ground-truth
simulations, which evaluate how well the algorithm approximates behavior that is known (from simulation)
shows that EC2 chooses the right theories rapidly (within 5-20 trials), and more rapidly than other theories for
modest error rates.
In our empirical application, the method indicates that most subjects choosing among monetary gambles
are classified (with high posterior probability) as using prospect theory evaluation, or EV.
As economists, we are also naturally concerned that if subjects understand that the algorithm is adaptive,
there is a strategic incentive to misreport preferences in early trials to create better choices in latter trials.
However, we argue that computing the value of misrepresentation is difficult; The value is small even when it
can be computed (e.g., 8% increase in earnings), and misrepresentation is likely to leave telltale signs in a time
series of choices (high early response times and switching of posterior modes partway through the experiment)
which we simply do not see in data. As a last check, in one experimental treatment we explained that the
method of selecting choice questions was adaptive and that, in theory, the subjects could earn more if they
exploited this property. Subjects in that treatment did not behave significantly differently and did not earn
more money.
The EC2 criteria is also applicable when more than 2 choices are presented, e.g. if subjects are asked to
choose between one of 3 lotteries in every round. It can even be used in the case where subjects are asked to
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provide an ordinal ranking over several choices. Both the cases increases the information obtained per round,
potentially leading to increased accuracy with a fewer number of questions. The caveat is that is potentially
complicates the decision for the subjects, or prevent their understanding of the instructions. In lab experiments
with simple choices (Reutskaja et al. (2011)), too many choices has been shown to lead to biases in results due
to choice overload: such as subjects searching more in a focal region of the display.
The major future direction for research is to implement these algorithms to efficiently sort through theories
in many areas of empirical economics, where multiple theories have coexisted for a long time.
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Appendix A: Details of the Experiment
User Interface
	   	  
Table 2.5: The User Interface presented to the participants. The two amounts and probabilities for the 2
lotteries are shown in text on the right. The same information is displayed as a graph on the left.
Instructions
This is an experiment on the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions and make good
decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. The funds have
been supplied by a foundation that supports this research.
The experiment has 60 rounds. At the beginning you will begin with an endowment of $20. In each round
you will choose between one of two lotteries.
Each lottery has 3 possible outcomes:
(i) One negative (loss) outcome of -$5, -$10 or -$20. (If you lose this amount it will be subtracted from
your initial $20 endowment and you will be paid the remainder.)
(ii) One positive (gain) outcome of $5.
(iii) One positive (gain) outcome of $10, $20 or $50.
Each of the three possible outcomes has an associated probability of occurring. You will see a textbox
with the two lottery choices described in text, on the right side of the screen. On the left side of the screen, you
will see the same information displayed as a histogram. The height of each line represents the probability of
that outcome occurring. The $5 outcome is always shown in green, the higher positive outcome in blue, and
the negative outcome in red.
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For example, you might see the following screen:
	   	  
In Lottery 1, you can lose $5 with probability 0.1, gain $5 with probability 0.4 or gain $10 with probability
0.5.
In Lottery 2, you can lose $20 with probability 0.01, gain $5 with probability 0.74 or gain $10 with
probability 0.25.
You must close the graph display by clicking on the X (close) button. Then you can enter your choice into
the textbox by pressing 1 or 2.
There is no time limit for viewing the graph and entering your choice. After you enter your choice, the
screen will say REST. Another choice between two lottery options will be displayed after a couple of seconds.
After finishing all 60 rounds, we will randomly pick one of the 60 pairs of lotteries you were asked about
to determine your additional earnings. Each lottery pair is equally likely to be chosen so you should treat each
one as if it could be the paid round.
To determine which of the three outcomes you receive a random integer number between 1 and 100 will
determine the outcome you get. Each of those integers will be equally likely (using a procedure described
next).
To use the example above, suppose you chose Lottery 1. In that lottery, the outcome -$5 has 10%
probability. Therefore, if the random number chosen is 1-10 then the outcome will be -$5. Notice that the
range 1-10 is 10% of all the numbers from 1 to 100. So the percentage of possible numbers that would give
the outcome -$5 corresponds to the probability .10.
In the lottery 1 example, the outcome will be +$5 with probability .4, and +$10 with probability .5. To
implement these probabilities fairly, numbers from 11 to 50 will lead to the outcome +$5 and numbers from
51-100 will lead to the outcome +$10. Those two ranges of numbers are 40% and 50% of all the numbers
1-100, so the percentage of possible numbers corresponds to the probabilities stated in the text and shown on
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the graph.
Additional Instructions for Manipulability Check
These additional instructions appended to the original instructions for Manipulability Check condition:
It could help you to know that an adaptive algorithm generates the choices between two lotteries
that are presented to you, in the first 30 lottery choices. That is, your previous choices determine the
following questions that are presented to you, because the algorithm is trying to determine the kinds
of risks you like to take and the kinds of risks you do not like to take. It is possible, mathematically, to
choose lotteries you do not like in the beginning in order to lead the adaptive algorithm to create future
lottery choices that you like better. If you think you can guide the algorithm in this way, by choosing
lotteries you dont like to create bettery choice pairs in future trials, you are free to do so. However,
your final payoff will be calculated from one of the questions selected at random.
Quiz before the Experiment
1. There is always a possible $5 outcome for every lottery (circle one)
TRUE FALSE
2. The red lines in the graph show the larger amounts that could be won ($10, $20, $50) (circle one)
TRUE FALSE
3. If the row I choose has a random number which leads to a loss -$20 for the lottery that I chose, I still get
to keep the $20 endowment. (circle one)
TRUE FALSE
Self-Report after Experiment
1. Did you think that the questions in the first part were generated by an adaptive algorithm (circle one)
YES NO
2. Have you figured out how the adaptive algorithm chose the subsequent questions based on your
responses? If so, can you state the strategy you used to game it?
3. What strategy did you use to maximize your potential earnings in the first round? Please write a few
sentences.
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4. How was your strategy in the first part different from your strategy in the second part? Please write a
few sentences.
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Figure 2.17: Sorted values of tests for the accelerated EC2 implementation.
Appendix B
Details of the Efficient Implementation
Figure 2.17 illustrates the efficient accelerated implementation ofEC2 using a Priority Queue. Initially, the the
tests are sorted according to their value, and the first test (number 1) is selected in the first round (and removed
from the queue). In the second iterations, the value of the most valuable test (number 2) is recalculated, and
only the tests that had a higher value than this in the previous iteration needs to be recalculated (number 3
and 4). The other tests (from 5) cannot have a higher value in round 2 than test number 2, and can be ignored.
Algorithm 2 outlines the general procedure.
The methods were coded in Java SE 6.0. On a 2.53 GHz Intel computer with 4GB memory, the Information
Gain criteria has to evaluate all 31,626 tests and takes 20.1 seconds to generate each question. The accelerated
EC2 method evaluates between 1 and up to 12 thousand tests at each iteration. By pre-computing all the values
and efficient caching, the accelerated EC2 method takes between 0.02 seconds to 6.1 seconds to generate a
question. The average time is 0.4 seconds (over 1000 simulation runs of 100 rounds each).
Additional Proofs
Lemma 5. The objective function f of Eq. (3.2.5) is strongly adaptive monotone.
Proof. We must show that for all xA, t /∈ A and possible answer x for test t that
EH [f(A, H) | xA] ≤ EH [f(A ∪ {t} , H) | xA, Xt = x] (2.8.1)
Towards this end, it is useful to notice that for all t ∈ T the function h 7→ Et (h) depends only on Xt. Hence
for any xA, the function h 7→ f(A, h) is constant over realizations xT  xA, so we can define a function
g(xA) such that g(xA) = EH [f(A, H) | xA] by g(xA) := w
(⋃
t∈A Et (xt)
)
where xA = (xt)t∈A and
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Input: Set of hypothesesH; Set of tests T ; prior distribution P ; function f .
begin
A ← ∅; Ψ← ∅; PriorityQueue Q← EmptyQueue
foreach t ∈ T do
Q.insert(t,+∞)
while ∃h 6= h′ : P (h | xA) > 0 and P (h′ | xA) > 0 do
δmax ← −∞; tmax ← NULL;
while δmax < Q.maxPriority() do
t← Q.pop();
δ ← ∆(t|Ψ);
Q.insert(t, δ);
if δmax < δ then
δmax ← δ; tmax ← t;
Set A ← A∪ {tmax}; Q.remove(tmax);
Observe outcome xtmax ; Set Ψ← Ψ ∪ {(tmax, xtmax)}
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for accelerated EC2. Q.insert(t, δ) inserts t with priority δ, Q.pop() removes
and returns the item with greatest priority, Q.maxPriority() returns the maximum priority of the
elements in Q, and Q.remove(t) deletes t from Q.
Et (x) is the set of edges cut by t if Xt = x. Note that for all xA ≺ xB we have g(xA) ≤ g(xB), since the
edge weights are nonnegative. Setting B = A ∪ {t} yields Eq. (2.8.1) and hence implies strong adaptive
monotonicity.
Lemma 6. The objective function f of Eq. (3.2.5) is adaptive submodular for any prior with rational values.
Proof. We first prove the result assuming a uniform prior P (·), and then show how to reduce the general
prior case to the uniform prior case. Hence all edges have weight 1/n2, where there are n hypotheses. For
convenience, we also rescale our units of reward so that all edges have unit weight. (Note that f is adaptive
submodular iff cf is for any constant c > 0.) To prove adaptive submodularity, we must show that for all xA ≺
xB and t ∈ T , we have ∆(t |xB) ≤ ∆(t |xA). Fix t and xA, and let V(xA) := {h : P (h | xA) > 0} denote
the version space, if xA encodes the observed outcomes. Let nV := |V(xA)| be the number of hypotheses
in the version space. Likewise, let ni,a(xA) := | {h : h ∈ V(xA, Xt = a) ∩Hi} |, and let na(xA) :=∑m
i=1 ni,a(xA). Also, define ea(xA) :=
1
2
∑
i6=j
∑
b6=a ni,b(xA) · nj,b(xA) to be the number of edges cut
such that at t both hypotheses agree with each other but disagree with the realized hypothesis h∗, conditioning
on Xt = a. We define a function θ of these quantities such that ∆(t |xA) = θ(n(xA), e(xA)), where n(xA)
is the vector consisting of ni,a(xA) for all i and a and e(xA) is the vector consisting of ea(xA) for all a. For
brevity, we suppress the dependence of xA where it is unambiguous. Then, as we will explain below, θ is
defined as
θ(n, e) :=
1
2
∑
i6=j
∑
a 6=b
ni,a · nj,b +
∑
a
ea
(
1− na
nV
)
(2.8.2)
Here, i and j range over all class indices, and a and b range over all possible outcomes of test t. The first
66
term on the right-hand side counts the number of edges that will be cut by selecting test t no matter what the
outcome of t is. Such edges consist of hypotheses that disagree with each other at t and, as with all edges, lie
in different classes. The second term counts the expected number of edges cut by t consisting of hypotheses
that agree with each other at t. Such edges will be cut by t iff they disagree with the true hypothesis h∗ at
t. The edges {h, h′} with h, h′ ∈ V(xA) and P (Xt = a | h) = P (Xt = a | h′) = 1 (of which there are ea)
will be cut by t iff Xt 6= a. Since we assume a uniform prior, P [Xt 6= a | xA] = 1− na/nV for any partial
realization xA with t /∈ A, hence the expected contribution of these edges to ∆(t |xA) is ea (1− na/nV),
from whence we get the second term.
Now fix xB  xA. Our strategy for proving ∆(t |xB) ≤ ∆(t |xA) is as follows. As more observations
are made, the version space can only shrink, i.e. V(xB) ⊆ V(xA). This means that for all i and a, ni,a
is nonincreasing, i.e., ni,a(xB) ≤ ni,a(xA). Note we may interpret ea as a function of the variables in
{ni,a : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, a ∈ X}, and that it is nondecreasing in each ni,a, so we may also deduce that ea(xB) ≤
ea(xA) for all a. Hence we consider a parameterized path p(τ) in R(m+1)·` from p(0) := (n(xB), e(xB)) to
p(1) := (n(xA), e(xA)). Then by integrating along the path we obtain
∆(t |xA)−∆(t |xB) =
∫ 1
τ=0
(
d(θ◦p)
dτ
)
dτ . (2.8.3)
We require that at each point in p it holds that ea = 12
∑
i 6=j
∑
b 6=a ni,b · nj,b for all a, and also ensure that p is
nondecreasing in each coordinate. There exists a path meeting these requirements, since (n(xB), e(xB)) ≤
(n(xA), e(xA)) and each ea is nondecreasing in each ni,b variable. This implies ∂ni,a/∂τ ≥ 0 and ∂ea/∂τ ≥
0 for all i and a. Hence we can prove the integral is nonnegative by applying the chain rule for the derivative
to obtain
d(θ◦p)
dτ
=
∑
i,a
∂θ
∂ni,a
∂ni,a
∂τ
+
∑
a
∂θ
∂ea
∂ea
∂τ
and then proving that ∂θ/∂ni,a ≥ 0 and ∂θ/∂ea ≥ 0 for all i and a. Next, observe that ∂θ/∂ea =
(1− na/nV) ≥ 0. So fix a class index k and an outcome c and consider ∂θ/∂nk,c. Elementary calculus tells
us that
∂θ
∂nk,c
=
∑
j 6=k, b 6=c
nj,b +
∑
b
ebnb
n2V
− ec
nV
(2.8.4)
This quantity is nonnegative iff
nVec ≤ n2V ·
∑
j 6=k, b 6=c
nj,b +
∑
b
ebnb (2.8.5)
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Now substitute 12
∑
i 6=j
∑
b 6=c ni,b · nj,b for ec to obtain
nVec =
nV
2
∑
i 6=j
∑
b 6=c
ni,b · nj,b ≤ nV ·
 ∑
j 6=k, b 6=c
nj,b
∑
i,a
ni,a
 ≤ n2V ·
 ∑
j 6=k, b 6=c
nj,b
 (2.8.6)
Since
∑
b ebnb ≥ 0, we obtain Eq. (2.8.5) from Eq. (2.8.6) by inspection, and hence ∂θ/∂nk,c ≥ 0 for all k
and c. This completes the proof of the adaptive submodularity of f under a uniform prior.
We now show how to reduce the general prior case to the uniform prior case. Fix any prior P with rational
probabilities, i.e. P (h) ∈ Q for all h. Then there exists d ∈ N and function k : H → N such that such that
P (h) = k(h)/d. Create a new instance containing d hypotheses, where for each h ∈ H there are k(h) copies
of h, denoted by h1, . . . , hk(h). Each copy of h induces the same conditional distribution of test outcomes
P (X1, . . . , XN | h). All copies of h belong to the same class, and copies of h and h′ belong to the same class
iff h and h′ do. Finally, assign a uniform prior to this new instance. Then the adaptive submodularity of f on
this new instance implies the adaptive submodularity on the original instance, if the weight of edge {h, h′}
in the original instance is proportional to the number of edges between the copies of h and the copies of h′
in the new instance. That is, it suffices to set w({h, h′}) ∝ k(h) · k(h′), and our choice of weight function,
w({h, h′}) := P (h) · P (h′), satisfies this condition.
A Bad Example for Information Gain
A popular heuristic for the Optimal Decision Tree problem are to adaptively greedily select the test that
maximizes the information gain in the distribution over hypotheses, conditioned on all previous test outcomes.
The same heuristic can be applied to the Equivalence Class Determination problem, in which we compute the
information gain with respect to the entropy of the distribution over classes rather than hypotheses. Let piIG
denote the resulting policy for Equivalence Class Determination.
Another common heuristic for Optimal Decision Tree is to adaptively greedily select the test maximizing
the Bayesian decision-theoretic value of information (VoI) criterion. Recall the value of information of a test t
is the expected reduction in the expected risk of the minimum risk decision, where the risk is the expected loss.
Formally, consider the Bayesian decision-theoretic setup described in §2.3.3. The VoI criterion myopically
selects test to maximize
∆VoI (t |xA) := min
d
EH [`(d,H) | xA]− Ext∼Xt|xA
[
min
d
EH [`(d,H) | xA, xt]
]
.
This heuristic can be also be applied to the Equivalence Class Determination problem, by taking the decision
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set D to be the set of equivalence classes, and the loss function to be the 0–1 classification loss function, i.e.,
`(d,H) = 1[H /∈ d]. Let piVoI denote the resulting policy.
In this section we present a family of Equivalence Class Determination instances for which both piIG and
piVoI perform significantly worse than the optimal policy.
Theorem 7. There exists a family of Equivalence Class Determination instances with uniform priors such
that c(piIG) = Ω (n/ log(n)) c(pi∗) and c(piVoI) = Ω (n/ log(n)) c(pi∗), where n is the number of hypotheses
and pi∗ is an optimal policy.
In fact, we will prove a lower bound for each policy within a large family of adaptive greedy policies
which contains piIG and piVoI, which we call posterior–based. Informally, this family consists of all greedily
policies that use only information about the posterior equivalence class distribution to select the next test.
More precisely, these policies define a potential function Φ which maps distributions of distributions over
equivalence classes to real numbers, and at each time step select the test t which maximizes Φ of the posterior
distribution (over test outcomes xt) of the posterior distribution over equivalence classes generated by adding
xt to the previously seen test outcomes. In the event of a tie, we select any test maximizing this quantity at
random. The information gain policy is posterior–based; Φ is simply −1 times the expected entropy of the
posterior equivalence-class distribution. Likewise, the value of information policy is also posterior–based; Φ is
simply −1 times the expected loss of the best action for the posterior equivalence-class distribution. Hence to
prove Theorem 7 it suffices to prove the following more general theorem.
Theorem 8. There exists a family of Equivalence Class Determination instances with uniform priors such
that c(pi) = Ω (n/ log(n)) c(pi∗) for any posterior–based policy pi, where n is the number of hypotheses and
pi∗ is an optimal policy.
Proof. Fix integer parameter q ≥ 1. There are m = 2q classes Ha for each 1 ≤ a ≤ 2q. Each Ha consists
of two hypotheses, ha,0 and ha,1. We call a the index of Ha. The prior is uniform over the hypotheses
H = {ha,v : 1 ≤ a ≤ m, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1}. There are four types of tests, all with binary outcomes and all of unit
cost. There is only one test of the first type, t0, which tells us the value of v in the realized hypothesis h∗a,v.
Hence for all a, H = ha,v ⇒ Xt0 = v. Tests of the second type are designed to help us quickly discover
the index of the realized class via binary search if we have already run t0, but to offer no information gain
whatsoever if t0 has not yet been run. There is one such test tk for all t with 1 ≤ k ≤ q. For z ∈ N, let φk (z)
denote the kth least-significant bit of the binary encoding of z, so that z =
∑∞
k=1 2
k−1φk (z). Then for each
ha,v we have H = ha,v ⇒ Xtk = 1[φk (a) = v]. Tests of the third type are designed to allow us to do a
(comparatively slow) sequential search on the index of the realized class. Specifically, we have tests tseqk for all
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1 ≤ k ≤ m, such that H = ha,v ⇒ Xtseqk = 1[a = k]. Finally, tests of the fourth type,
{
tdumbk : k ∈ N
}
, are
dummy tests that reveal no information at all. Formally, Xtdumbk always equals zero.
Given this input, suppose H = ha,v. One solution is to run t0 to find v, then run tests t1, . . . , tq to
determine φk (a) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ q and hence to determine a. This reveals the value of H , and hence the class
H belongs to. Since the tests have unit cost, this policy pi′ has cost c(pi′) = q + 1.
Next, fix a posterior–based policy pi and consider what it will do. Call a class possible if not all of its
hypotheses have been ruled out by tests performed so far. Note that all possible classes contain the same
number of hypotheses, because they initially have two, and each test tk that can reduce the size of a possible
class to one, will reduce the size of every possible class to one. This, and the fact that the prior is uniform,
implies that the posterior equivalence-class distribution is uniform over the remaining possible classes. If no
tests in {tk : 0 ≤ k ≤ q} have been run, as is initially the case, any single test in this set will not change the
posterior equivalence-class distribution. Hence, as measured with respect to Φ, such tests are precisely as good
as the dummy tests. If these tests are each better than any test in
{
tseqk : 1 ≤ k ≤ m
}
, then pi selects among
{tk : 0 ≤ k ≤ q} ∪
{
tdumbk : k ∈ N
}
at random. Since there are infinitely many dummy tests, with probability
one a dummy test is selected. Since the posterior remains the same, pi will repeatedly select a test at random
from this set, resulting in an infinite loop as dummy tests are selected repeatedly ad infinitum. Otherwise,
some test tseqk is preferable to the other tests, measured with respect to Φ. In the likely event that t is not the
index of H , we are left with a residual problem in which tests in {tk : 0 ≤ k ≤ q} still have no effect on the
posterior, there is one less class, and the prior is again uniform. Hence our previous argument still applies,
and pi will either enter an infinite loop or will repeatedly select tests in
{
tseqk : 1 ≤ k ≤ m
}
until a test has an
outcome of 1. Thus in expectation pi costs at least c(pi) ≥ 1m
∑m
z=1 z = (m+ 1)/2. Since m = 2
q , n = 2m,
and c(pi∗) ≤ c(pi′) = q + 1 = log2(n) we infer
c(pi) ≥ m
2
=
(
n
4 log2(n)
)
c(pi∗)
which completes the proof.
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Chapter 3
Time Preference
The rational prescription for making decisions that are delayed in time uses an exponential discounting function,
and avoids temporal inconsistency (Strotz (1955)). Now, there is a growing literature in experimental and
behavioural economics providing evidence that human behaviour is indeed time-inconsistent, and people are
willing to forego larger delayed rewards for smaller immediate rewards (see Frederick et al. (2002); Doyle
(2013), for literature surveys). Economic models that account for this departure from rationality vary from the
one-parameter hyperbolic discounting function, to present-bias models (e.g. quasi-hyperbolic discounting and
fixed time cost models that have an additional parameter) that account for the observation that people pay a
premium to choose options that are immediately available. Two-parameter, generalized-hyperbolic discounting
models (Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)) nest exponential discounting models, and hyperbolic discounting
models, for specific parameter values.
Time preference (also called temporal discounting) models have been studied in many contexts, in both
economics and psychology. In consumer behaviour, Estle et al. (2007) looked at monetary and consumable
rewards (and found steeper discounting for the latter); and rewards as leisure time (Chapman and Elstein
(1995)). Others have looked at drug addiction, smoking, gambling and alcoholism and their relationship to
delay discounting (Madden and Bickel (2010)).
Despite the multitude of models, and experiments with them in different contexts, the literature containts
few face-to-face comparisons. Furthermore, since time preference seems to be highly dependent on the domain
or context ( Hardisty et al. (2012); Tsukayama and Duckworth (2010); Weatherly et al. (2010)), a universal
discounting model may not be appropriate. A framework for efficiently comparing time preference models can
inform decision-makers in choosing the appropriate model to use within a context.
Choices used in experimental and survey-based social science are typically developed by hunches and
cumulative searches for informative questions to test theories. The conventional designs that have emerged are
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typically a fixed set of test questions .1 We apply an approach, developed previously in Ray et al. (2013), in
which the sequence of choices is tailored for each subject rather than fixed. The subjects themselves tell us,
through their answers, the “best”(most informative) question to ask them next.
Our approach, Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Design) (abbreviated as BROAD), is an innovation in a
large family of adaptive methods (described in section 3.2). The key innovation is an edge-cutting measure of
information value that is adaptively submodular, which therefore provably guarantees some useful theoretical
and practical properties. The method was introduced by Golovin et al. (2010), Ray et al. (2013), and applied
here to novel economic questions.
Earlier applications of adaptive methods were made in statistics (Lindley (1956)), decision theory (Howard
(1966)), computer-assisted testing (CAT) in psychometrics (Wainer (1990)), cognitive psychology (Myung
and Pitt (2009)), adaptive choice-based conjoint measurement in marketing (Abernethy et al. (2007)), active
learning methods in machine-learning (Golovin and Krause (2010b); Nowak (2009); Dasgupta (2004)), and
management science (Cavagnaro et al. (ming); Toubia et al. (ming)).
Some early efforts to introduce optimal adaptive design in experimental economics (e.g., El-Gamal et al.
(1993), El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993), Moffatt (2007)) did not gain traction. The time is now ripe for BROAD
methods because: Computing power is better than ever; a new method from computer science (called EC2)
applied here provides theoretical guarantees on efficient computability; and there are many new competing
theories in behavioral and experimental economics which need to be efficiently compared.
In our application, and all the others mentioned above, the goal is to sequentially select among a set of
noisy, expensive observations (outcomes of experiments, medical tests to run to diagnose patients, etc.) in
order to determine which hypothesis (theory, diagnosis, etc.) is most accurate. One way to formalize such
active learning problems is Bayesian experimental design (Chaloner and Verdinelli (1995)). This approach
specifies prior beliefs over a set of hypotheses, as well as probabilistic assumptions about the outcomes of test
choices. The goal then is to determine the correct hypothesis while minimizing the cost of the experimentation
(where cost is synonymous, for present purposes, with the number of test choice questions that are asked).
Unfortunately, finding an optimal sequence of test choices is not just computationally difficult (NP-hard) but is
also difficult to approximate (Chakaravarthy et al. (2007)). Several heuristic approaches have been proposed
that perform well in some specific applications, but do not have theoretical guarantees (e.g., MacKay (1992));
that is, there are no proofs about how costly the heuristic sequence will be compared to the optimal sequence.
In the case where observations are noise-free2, a simple algorithm, generalized binary search3(GBS), is
1Note that “test questions”, in experimental economics could include choices from budget sets Andreoni and Miller (2002); Choi et al.
(2007); Fisman et al. (2007), strategies in games, auction bids, and trading strategies. Our method could also be applied to large-scale
panel surveys in which branching methods are already used.
2This case is known as the Optimal Decision Tree (ODT) problem.
3GBS selects test choices to maximize, in expectation over the test outcomes, the probability mass of eliminated hypotheses (i.e., those
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guaranteed to be competitive with the optimal test sequence4. Unfortunately, when responses are likely to be
imperfect or noisy, as in economics experiments, the theoretical basis and performance of heuristic methods is
not well understood.5
In this paper, we introduce and apply a general method, called BROAD, using a formulation of Bayesian
active learning with noisy observations that we call the Equivalence Class Determination problem. BROAD
utilizes a myopic (greedy) active learning algorithm using the Equivalence Class Edge Cutting (EC2) objective
function, that can be proved to have an expected cost that is a multiple of the optimal test sequence cost. The
key insight is that the EC2 objective function for measuring information value satisfies adaptive submodularity
(Golovin and Krause (2011)). Adaptive submodularity is a natural diminishing returns property that generalizes
the classical notion of submodularity to adaptive policies, and leads to a provable performance guarantee as
well as a shortcut in evaluating test choices (called “lazy evaluation”).
Here are some possible advantages of BROAD approaches:
◦ The posterior distribution of all theory and parameter probabilities is quickly recomputed for each subject
after each trial (because it is a necessary step in finding the optimal next question). As a result much of the
data analysis is already done when the experiment is over.
◦ Because of that instant probability updating, BROAD creates a statistical parametric group portrait after
each trial. The portraits show who seems most impatient, most averse to risk, most reciprocal, etc. These data
could then be used to instantly form groups of different types of people to see how those differences affect
group or market behavior.
◦ Since BROAD techniques economize on information gained per minute, they are especially useful for
subject pools who have scarce time or become bored or habituated quickly. Such groups include highly-trained
professionals, internet subjects who can quit, human groups such as lesion patients or children, and animals
that typically make long sequences of lab choices.
◦ The fact that the BROAD procedure generates sequences of test questions that are provably near-optimal
can sharpen discourse about what different experimental designs are good and bad for. Novel BROAD designs
which are unconventional should gain credibility if they have desirable informational properties. BROAD
with zero posterior probability, computed with respect to the observed test outcomes). The method is myopic (or “greedy” in computer
science terms) because it only searches ahead for one test at a time.
4The expected number of tests is a factor of O(logn) (where n is the number of hypotheses) more than that of the optimal policy
(Kosaraju et al. (1999)), which matches lower bounds up to constant factors (Chakaravarthy et al. (2007)). In other words, unless P = NP,
no efficient algorithm can be guaranteed to find a policy whose expected number of tests is less than C log(n) times that of the optimal
policy, for some absolute constant C (see Papadimitriou (2003)).
5There are no efficient algorithms that provably achieve minimal cost, except in very restricted settings (Krause and Guestrin (2009)).
While there are some recent positive results in understanding the label complexity (bounds on the sample size required) of noisy active
learning (Nowak (2009); Balcan et al. (2006)), the results depend on the assumption that the same query can be made multiple times with
independent noise. This is not appropriate in our setting; if a test subject makes a mistake in evaluating a pair of gambles, presenting the
exact same choice later on is likely to elicit the same mistake, which induces correlation in the noise across tests.
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methods can also be used to judge the quality of older conventional designs6.
◦ At each trial it is easy to compute how much extra parameter precision (or model selection accuracy) is
expected from asking one more question. This feature permits a cost-benefit method for optimally stopping
the experiment (Swartz and Choi (2009)), if information benefit and cost can be compared.
◦ In theory, subjects might prefer to strategically manipulate their early responses in order to get “better”
(more economically valuable) future test questions. Ray et al. (2013) discussed tests to detect and minimize it
in applications of BROAD, and found no evidence for strategic manipulation in experimental data.
In section 3.1, we give a brief overview of the time preference models that we compare in this paper.
In section 3.2, we introduce the Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Design (BROAD) method, followed by
implementation details and experimental setup in 3.3. We analyze the results of laboratory experiments
comparing the time preference models in section 3.4, followed by a discussion of future applications of
BROAD in time preference in section 3.5.
6For example, retrospective analysis of influential psychology experiments on memory retention indicates that some early designs
were remarkably near-optimal but others were not (Myung and Pitt (2009))
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3.1 Models
Formally, pairs (x, t) represent dollars x obtained at time t (equivalently, t periods from now). Assuming the
subject’s preferences over monetary rewards are linear, the discount function D(x, t) is defined so that the
subject is indifferent between the pair (x, t) and the pair (xD(x, t), 0). We say that ”the value of x at time t is
xD(x, t).
The standard method in finance of translating present values into future values is by a geometric mean
taken on the ratio of increase7. As the compounding becomes continuous, we get the Exponential discounting
function with the form:
D(x, t) = exp(−rt), r > 0 (3.1.1)
The exponential discounting function is also a normative discounting model that produces time-consistent
choices.
In accounting, the arithmetic average rate of return is frequently calculated (Ryan (2007)). While a model
of compound interest underpins exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting is underpinned by a model of
simple interest, with no compounding (Rachlin (2006)). Hyperbolic discounting was also featured early on as
a model of animal foraging (Mazur (1987)), with a functional form that induces declining subjective discount
rates.
D(x, t) =
1
1 + rt
, r > 0 (3.1.2)
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting displays a present bias, and was introduced by Laibson (1997). The
parameters θ = {r, α} includes the present bias term α which induces a variable cost associated to future
payoffs. The discount function D(x, t) is given by:
D(x, t) =

1, if t = 0
α exp(−rt), if t > 0
(3.1.3)
For α = 1 we would have a straightforward compounding model, but if α < 1, this parameters gives a one-off
boost to discounting over the first compounding period. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is only hyperbolic in
mimicing the initial steep discounting of the hyperbolic model, but is an exponential model in every other
sense.
Instead of a percentage decrement for non-present rewards, Benhabib et al. (2010), suggested using a fixed
7The compounding growth model for discrete time is, F = P (1 + r)T , where F is the future value, P is the present value, r
the growth rate, and T is the compounding periods. If we increase the number of compounding periods to n per annum, we get
F = P (1 + r/n)nT . For continous compounding, we get the exponential discounting form.
75
cost to model the present bias, that is, an absolute decrement. Any reward x is valued at x− b when received
in the future. The discount curve is:
D(x, t) =

1, if t = 0
exp(−rt)− b
x
, if t > 0
(3.1.4)
Additionally, we consider the class of Generalized hyperbolic functions, first introduced in Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992) and Prelec (2004) as the functional form:
D(x, t) = (1 + αt)−(θ/α), α, θ > 0. (3.1.5)
The α coefficient determines how much the function departs from constant discounting. The limiting case,
as α goes to zero, is the exponential discount function. When θ/α = 1, we get hyperbolic discounting; And
when θ/α < 1, the function discounts more steeply than exponential at short durations, but less so at longer
durations. McKerchar et al. (2010, 2009), found that modeling the additional parameter leads to statistically
significant improvements in fit over the hyperbolic discounting model.
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Figure 3.1: A stylized example of Equivalence Class Edge Cutting.
3.2 Optimal Adaptive Design
We begin with a brief history of adaptive methods, followed by an intuitive sketch of the objective function
behind BROAD, and a theoretical outline. The appendix covers the theory in greater detail; interested readers
should see Ray et al. (2013) for detailed proofs.
3.2.1 A brief history of related adaptive methods
The idea of optimizing an experimental design to measure parameters or test theories originated with Charles
S. Peirce (Peirce (1967)), but did not have immediate influence. Dynamic design ideas began with Wald’s
influential sequential probability ratio test (Wald (1949)). Later contributions were made by Kiefer (1959),
Atkinson and Fedorov (1975), and reviewed by Atkinson and Donev (1992) and Chaloner and Verdinelli
(1995). D-optimal designs are optimal for estimating parameter values for a single theory. T-optimal designs
optimally discriminate different theories and are more computationally challenging (cf. “landscaping”, by
D.J. Navarro and Myung (2004)). Many of the principles originally developed under D- and T-optimality now
permeate standard experimental design practice.
The idea of adaptively customizing test choices goes back 100 years to Binet and Simon (1904). It was
pushed forward decades later by the US Army (Bayroff et al. (1960)), and in psychometrics (Lord (1974);
Weiss (1975); Weiss and Betz (1973)) in the 1960s and 70s.
Adaptive methods have also been used in neurophysiology (Lewi et al. (2009)), psychophysics (Kujala and
Lukka (2006); L.A. Lesmes and Dosher (2006)), and medicine (Muller et al. (2007)). In marketing, adaptive
choice-based “conjoint measurement” (ACBC) is used to discover which feature configurations of products
consumers like most e.g., Sawtooth software (Johnson et al. (2003)), and in preference elicitation (Abernethy
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et al. (2007); Toubia et al. (2004)). Improved methods will undoubtedly improve the ability to predict real
behavior from responses which are hypothetical (often necessarily so). For example, Ding et al. (2005), Ding
(2007), and Dong et al. (2010) describe incentive-aligned conjoint procedures. These methods use hypothetical
data from conjoint measurements or product ranks combined with random selection of a single real product
for purchase (based on WTP or rank inferred from conjoint or ranks), to boost incentive-compatibility of the
conjoint responses. In cognitive psychology, adaptive methods have been championed by Myung and Pitt
(2009), Myung et al. (2009), Cavagnaro et al. (2011), Cavagnaro et al. (2010, ming).
Two applications closely related to ours are Wang et al. (2010b); Toubia et al. (ming). Wang et al. (2010b)
chooses questions that maximize Information-Gain, and Toubia et al. (ming) picks questions that maximize the
norm of the Hessian of the posterior distribution at a point estimate (MLE) of the mode. None of the method
have theoretical performance guarantees, while BROAD (Ray et al. (2013)) provides the first theoretical
bounds when responses are noisy. Furthermore, we use an accelerated greedy implementation of EC2 that
generates new questions in real-time, without the need to store the question sequence in advance, thus there
are no practical limitations on the number of rounds of questions asked.
We begin with intuition about EC2, then describe the method. The Appendix has a more detailed
development; but readers should see Ray et al. (2013) for proofs. It has three powerful properties which other
information criteria do not have:
◦ Most methods are sensitive to noise.8 The empirical applications which we have an mind all feature
responses with some degree of stochastic noise (i.e., people choosing according to decision rule will not
make the same choice every single time from a fixed choice set). Many of the good properties of previous
adaptive methods rely on deterministic, no-noise processes (so that hypotheses are immediately eliminated by
a single unpredicted “mistake”). EC2 reduces the noisy case to a formally tractable noiseless case, so good
performance properties carry over while noise is allowed.
◦ There is a provable worst-case cost bound for greedy EC2 which depends on ln(1/pmin) (where pmin is
the prior probability of the least-likely theory). What does that imply? In a medical setting, for example, there
could be a dangerous disease which is extremely rare (pmin is low) but highly contagious; and figuring out for
sure whether a patient has the disease is necessary for protecting public health. This kind of diagnosis will take
many tests in the worst case. However, in the empirical social science settings we are considering, the lowest
pmin is rarely very low because it is usually adequate to consider only a modest number of possible theories
and parameters (pmin might be on the order of 10−3, for example, so that the worst-case cost multiplier is 6.9).
◦ Since our EC2 information criteria is adaptively submodular, the marginal information value of a test
8Ray et al. (2013) illustrates an example where information gain and value of information (VoI) perform badly.
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can only go down after other tests have been done. This permits “lazy evaluation” which reduces runtime
(Leskovec et al. (2007); Minoux (1978)).9
Next we will provide a simple visual illustration to develop intuition, followed by a more formal theoretical
development (refer to Appendix for the details).
3.2.2 A simple illustration
Intuitively, EC2 chooses the test which (a) distinguishes two hypotheses, connected by an edge, which make
different predictions on that test, and (b) has the largest product of those two hypotheses’ probability. The
method is like a sports tournament in which all pairs of challengers that make different predictions are created
(edges). Pairs are ranked by the product of their probabilities of being the “best” (i.e., most likely). The pair
of contending theories with the highest probability product are then chosen to compete on a conclusive test
(which will knock out one and be consistent with the other; In fact, a challenge question can maximize the
sum of probability products for multiple edges, hence knocking out multiple theories at the same time). The
idea is to choose the challenge which knocks out one of two theories –in our context, one of two theories that
have the highest product of likelihoods of being true– as quickly as possible.
Figure 3.1a shows a graphic illustration of how EC2 works. Each oval represents an equivalence class
(EC) of theory predictions. In the upper left, the theory predicts choices of [0,0,0] for three tests X1, X2, X3.
A “noisy copy” of the theory’s prediction [1∗,0,0] is randomly generated by flipping the first choice from 0
to 1. (No noisy copy is created for the bottom oval theory.) If the noise rate is 10%, then the probability of
observing choices [1∗,0,0] is .10 times the probability of the true predicted choices [0,0,0]. Edges connect all
pairs of predictions between equivalence sets (although, importantly, no edges connect within an equivalence
set since those predictions all stem from noisy copies of the same true theory). The thickness of the edges is a
visual index of the product of the probabilities of the predictions connected by that edge. The test which can
cut the sum of the thickness of multiple edges is chosen.
Suppose the test X1 is chosen. It can distinguish the true (noiseless) predictions in left red EC and in lower
green EC, which predict 0 in X1, from the upper right blue EC which predicts 1. If the choice is actually 1,
then all theories that predicted 0 are eliminated and their edges disappear, as shown in Figure 3.1b.
An important caveat: Note that when implemented, the EC2 algorithm applied to the ECD will not
always choose the true hypothesis. Here’s an example illustrating why: Suppose there are 10 binary tests. A
9To illustrate, suppose there are 30,000 possible tests. The procedure begins by computing the value of all 30,000 tests. The
highest-value test is conducted on trial 1, the result is recorded, and all model probabilities are updated. On trial 2, if a candidate new test
has a computed value V, then all the tests with a value lower than V in the initial pre-trial 1 evaluation can be safely ignored (since those
values may change after the trial 1 results, but can never become larger than V). This insight can be exploited, by considering tests in
order of maximum previously computed values (Refer to Ray et al. (2013) for implementation details).
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hypothesis h1 is a vector of ten 0’s and 1’s. Now suppose we flip those numbers so that all possible vectors are
generated (i.e., there are 10 one-flip noisy copies, 10!/(10-2)!2=45 two-flip noisy copies, etc.). If we do that
for another hypothesis h2, then one of the noisy h1 copies will exactly match one of the h2 copies. We cannot
draw an edge between them, because no test can distinguish them. The approach can’t guarantee that we will
pick the true hypothesis even if we conduct all 10 tests.
Our approach is therefore to flip some small percentage of all true hypothesis vector elements (5-20%).
This approach also can not guarantee perfect accuracy. The reason is that we might have failed to randomly flip
a specific test choice for a true hypothesis in the way that corresponds to an actual noisy choice a person made.
The extent to which the wrong hypotheses are selected, averaged across many simulated designs, will be
seen in ground-truth simulations below (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). The asymptotic probability of choosing the
correct hypothesis is about 90% for the reasonable noise rates we use. That is, even if all tests are conducted,
the fact that noise is injected randomly means we sometimes choose a wrong hypothesis (if the bit flipping just
happened to match choices). This is an unavoidable price for a realistic noise model such as this one, which
allows for human error to lead to model indistinguishability in some cases. Next we describe the method
formally; The notation is adopted from Computer Science (Golovin and Krause (2010c)).
3.2.3 Bayesian Active Learning in the Noiseless Case
In the Bayesian active learning problem, we would like to distinguish among a given set of hypotheses
H = {h1, . . . , hn} by performing tests from a set T = {1, . . . , N} of possible tests. Running test t incurs a
cost of c(t) and produces an outcome from a finite set of outcomes X = {1, 2, . . . , `}.
We let H denote the random variable which equals the true hypothesis, and model the outcome of each
test t by a random variable Xt taking values in X . We denote the observed outcome of test t by xt. We further
suppose we have a prior distribution P modeling our assumptions on the joint probability P (H,X1, . . . , XN )
over the hypotheses and test outcomes.
In the noiseless case, we assume that the outcome of each test is deterministic given the true hypothesis,
i.e., for each h ∈ H, P (X1, . . . , XN | H = h) is a deterministic distribution. Thus, each hypothesis h is
associated with a particular vector of test outcomes. We assume, w.l.o.g., that no two hypotheses lead to the
same outcomes for all tests. Thus, if we perform all tests, we can uniquely determine the true hypothesis.
Hereby, xA ∈ XA is a vector of outcomes indexed by a set of tests A ⊆ T that we have performed so far.
After having made observations xA, we can rule out inconsistent hypotheses. We denote the set of hypotheses
consistent with event Λ (often called the version space associated with Λ) by (Λ) := {h ∈ H : P (h | Λ) > 0}.
However in most applications we will wish to avoid performing every possible test, as this is prohibitively
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expensive. Our goal is to find an adaptive policy for running tests that allows us to determine the value of H
while minimizing the cost of the tests performed. Formally, a policy pi (also called a conditional plan) is a
partial mapping pi from partial observation vectors xA to tests, specifying which test to run next (or whether
we should stop testing) for any observation vector xA.
We can define the expected cost of a policy pi by
c(pi) :=
∑
h
P (h)c(T (pi, h))
where T (pi, h) ⊆ T is the set of tests run by policy pi in case H = h.
Our goal is to find a feasible policy pi∗ of minimum expected cost, i.e.,
pi∗ = arg min {c(pi) : pi is feasible} (3.2.1)
We call a policy feasible if it is guaranteed to uniquely determine the correct hypothesis. That is, upon
termination with observation xA, it must hold that |(xA)| = 1.
A policy pi can be naturally represented as a decision tree Tpi, and thus problem (3.2.1) is often called
the Optimal Decision Tree (ODT) problem. Unfortunately, obtaining even an approximate policy pi that is
near-optimal10 is NP-hard (Chakaravarthy et al. (2007)).
Hence, various heuristics are employed to solve the Optimal Decision Tree problem and its variants. Two
of the most popular heuristics are to select tests greedily to maximize the information gain (IG) conditioned
on previous test outcomes, and generalized binary search (GBS).
Both heuristics are greedy (myopic), and after having made observations xA will select
t∗ = arg max
t∈T
∆Alg (t |xA) /c(t),
where Alg ∈ {IG,GBS}.
Here,
∆IG (t |xA) := H (XT | xA)− Ext∼Xt|xA [H (XT |xA, xt)] (3.2.2)
is the marginal information gain measured with respect to the Shannon entropy H (X) := Ex[− log2 P (x)],
and
∆GBS (t |xA) := P ((xA))−
∑
x∈X
P (Xt = x | xA)P ((xA, Xt = x)) (3.2.3)
is the expected reduction in version space probability mass. Thus, both heuristics greedily (or myopically)
10For which the cost c(pi) ≤ c(pi∗) · o(log(n))
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chooses the test that maximizes the benefit-cost ratio, measured with respect to their particular benefit
functions11.
Interestingly, despite its myopic nature GBS has been shown( Kosaraju et al. (1999), Dasgupta (2004),
Guillory and Bilmes (2009), Golovin and Krause (2010c)) to obtain near-optimal expected cost. The strongest
known bound is
c(piGBS) ≤ c(pi∗) (ln(1/pmin) + 1) (3.2.4)
where pmin := minh∈H P (h).
The result above is proved by exploiting the fact that fGBS is adaptive submodular and strongly adaptively
monotone(Golovin and Krause (2010c))12. In Appendix ??, the concept of adaptive submodularity to used to
prove approximation guarantees for Bayesian active learning with noisy observations.
3.2.4 The Equivalence Class Determination Problem
Generally, we introduce the Equivalence Class Determination problem13, where our set of hypotheses H
is partitioned into a set of m equivalence classes {H1, . . . ,Hm} so that H =
⊎m
i=1Hi, and the goal is to
determine which classHi the true hypothesis lies in.
We now wish to consider the Bayesian active learning problem where tests can have noisy outcomes. Our
general strategy is to reduce the problem of noisy observations to the noiseless setting. To gain intuition,
consider a simple model where tests have binary outcomes, and we know that the outcome of exactly one
test, chosen uniformly at random unbeknown to us, is flipped. If any pair of hypotheses h 6= h′ differs by the
outcome of at least three tests, we can still uniquely determine the correct hypothesis after running all tests.
In this case we can reduce the noisy active learning problem to the noiseless setting by, for each hypothesis,
creating N “noisy” copies, each obtained by flipping the outcome of one of the N tests. The modified prior
P ′ would then assign mass P ′(h′) = P (h)/N to each noisy copy h′ of h. The conditional distribution
P ′(XT | h′) is still deterministic (obtained by flipping the outcome of one of the tests). Thus, each hypothesis
hi in the original problem is now associated with a set Hi of hypotheses in the modified problem instance.
However, instead of selecting tests to determine which noisy copy has been realized, we only care which set
Hi is realized.
The ECD algorithm. We define a set of edges E = ∪1≤i<j≤m {{h, h′} : h ∈ Hi, h′ ∈ Hj}, consisting
of all (unordered) pairs of hypotheses belonging to distinct classes. These are the edges that must be
11It turns out that for the (noiseless) Optimal Decision Tree problem, these two heuristics are equivalent (Zheng et al. (2005))
12Since fGBS(S, h) := 1− P ((xS(h))) + P (h)
13Bellala et al. simultaneously studied ECD Bellala et al. (2010), and used it to model active learning with noise Bellala et al. (2009).
They developed an extension of GBS for ECD.
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cut, by which we mean for any edge {h, h′} ∈ E , at least one hypothesis in {h, h′} must be ruled out
(i.e., eliminated from the version space). Hence, a test t run under true hypothesis h is said to cut edges
Et (h) := {{h′, h′′} : h′(t) 6= h(t) or h′′(t) 6= h(t)}. See Fig. 3.1 for an illustration. We define a weight
function w : E → R≥0 by w({h, h′}) := P (h) · P (h′). We extend the weight function to an additive
(modular) function on sets of edges in the natural manner, i.e., w(E ′) := ∑e∈E′ w(e). The objective fEC that
we will greedily maximize is then defined as the weight of the edges cut (EC):
fEC(A, h) := w
(⋃
t∈A
Et (h)
)
(3.2.5)
The objective fEC is strongly adaptively monotone and adaptively submodular, which leads to proofs of
theoretical guarantees using the results of Golovin and Krause (2010c). Based on the objective fEC , we can
calculate the marginal benefits for test t upon observations xA as
∆EC (t |xA) := EH [fEC(A ∪ {t} , H)− fEC(A, H) | xA] . (3.2.6)
We call the adaptive policy piEC that, after observing xA, greedily selects test
t∗ ∈ arg max
t
∆EC (t |xA) /c(t), (3.2.7)
the EC2 algorithm (for equivalence class edge cutting).
3.2.5 Noisy Observations
A major challenge when dealing with noisy observations is that it is not always possible to distinguish distinct
hypotheses. Even after we have run all tests, there will generally still be uncertainty about the true hypothesis,
i.e., the posterior distribution P (H | xT ) obtained using Bayes’ rule may still assign non-zero probability to
more than one hypothesis. If so, uniquely determining the true hypothesis is not possible. Instead, we imagine
that there is a set D of possible decisions we may make after (adaptively) selecting a set of tests to perform and
we must choose one (e.g., we must decide how to treat the medical patient, which scientific theory to adopt, or
which classifier to use, given our observations). Thus our goal is to gather data to make effective decisions
(Howard (1966)). Formally, for any decision d ∈ D we take, and each realized hypothesis h, we incur some
loss `(d, h). Decision theory recommends, after observing xA, to choose the decision d∗ that minimizes the
risk, i.e., the expected loss, namely
d∗ ∈ arg min
d
EH [`(d,H) | xA] . (3.2.8)
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A natural goal in Bayesian active learning is thus to adaptively pick observations, until we are guaranteed
to make the same decision (and thus incur the same expected loss) that we would have made had we run
all tests. Thus, we can reduce the noisy Bayesian active learning problem to the ECD problem by defining
the equivalence classes over all test outcomes that lead to the same minimum risk decision. Hence, for each
decision d ∈ D, we define
Hd := {xT : d = arg min
d′
EH [`(d′, H) | xT ]}. (3.2.9)
If multiple decisions minimize the risk for a particular xT , we break ties arbitrarily. Identifying the best
decision d ∈ D then amounts to identifying which equivalence class Hd contains the realized vector of
outcomes, which is an instance of ECD. More generally, we have the following result for EC2.
Theorem 9. Fix hypothesesH, tests T with costs c(t) and outcomes in X , decision set D, and loss function `.
Fix a prior P (H,Θ) and a function xT : H× supp(Θ)→ XN which define the probabilistic noise model. Let
c(pi) denote the expected cost of pi incurs to find the best decision, i.e., to identify which equivalence classHd
the outcome vector xT belongs to. Let pi∗ denote the policy minimizing c(·), and let piEC denote the adaptive
policy implemented by EC2. Then it holds that
c(piEC) ≤
(
2 ln
(
1
p′min
)
+ 1
)
c(pi∗),
where p′min := minh∈H {P (h, θ) : P (h, θ) > 0}.
Stated simplistically, for economic experiments, where each test has the same cost, the policy implemented
by EC2 will, in the worst-case, require 2 ln(1/pmin) more number of tests than the optimal policy (which is
infeasible to compute).
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3.3 Implementation
The goal is to adaptively select a sequence of tests to present to a subject in order to distinguish which of
the five models best explains the subject’s responses. Here a test is a pair of lotteries, (L1, L2). Based on
the theory that represents behaviour, one of the lotteries would be preferred to the other, denoted by a binary
response y ∈ {1, 2}.
Each lottery consists of an amount x ∈ {$5, $10, · · · , $50} and a delay t from 0 (payable immediately)
to 90 days. By considering all non-identical pairs of lotteries, we obtained the set of possible tests (roughly
14,000).
The BROAD algorithm and effective objective criteria, alongwith an accelerated greedy version is outlined
in Chapter 2. Here we use simulations in section 3.3.2 as a tool for analyzing the efficiency of our experimental
setup. The accuracy of the method in finding the true model, with the number of tests reveals that we can
expect reasonable answers within 50 questions. Furthermore the Equivalence class edge cutting criteria is
demonstrated to be superior to information gain with error in responses.
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
Subjects were recruited from the UCLA and Caltech student population. Experimental conditions and payment
procedure can possibly influence subject’s time preference behaviour. We choose a standard paradigm of
presenting two choices, one with a smaller amount with a smaller delay, and a larger amount with greater
delay; the details are provided in section 3.3.1. Specifying the delay as calendar time, instead of delay in time
(number of days from now) has been shown to increase patience, Read et al. (2005). Here we present delay as
time, in accord with earlier studies that have compared time preference models, Benhabib et al. (2010). To
avoid any transaction costs for immediate versus delayed payments, the same method (online payments) is
used when the chosen delay is 0.
To conduct the experiment, we used a text display that showed the two lotteries. The instructions to the
subjects are provided in Appendix A.
3.3.2 Ground Truth Analysis
We compared the Information Gain criteria with Equivalence Class Edge-Cutting and a method that picked
tests randomly from the set of possible tests.
We evaluated the ability of the algorithm to recover the true model based on simulated responses. The
responses were generated using a trembling hand function, with the probability of response y = 1 given by
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Table 3.1: Performance of the algorithms when there is no error,  = 0.0 (left) and when probability of error,
 = 0.05 (right).
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Table 3.2: Performance of the algorithms when probability of error,  = 0.10 (left) and  = 0.20 (right).
P (y = 1) = 1− , with the erroneous response y = 2 occurring with probability .
We evaluated the speed and ability of the three methods to recover the true model based on a large sample of
simulated response sequences. In each sequence, a specific true model is assumed, which generates simulated
responses to the sequence of test choices generated by each method. The conclusion the method draws about
which model is likely to have produced the observed responses is then compared to the true (known) model.
This model-recovery exercise is sometimes called “ground truth” analysis. The responses were generated
using a trembling hand function, with a known probability  of making the wrong choice due to noise.
We chose discrete prior parameter values for different theories based on our experimental setup and, more
generally, on previous estimates reported in literature. Each parameter has 11 different values, equally spaced
between the lowest to the highest. This results in 11 different parameter values for the one-parameter models,
and 121 values for the two-parameter models.
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• The Exponential discounting model (Exp) has one discounting parameter, r ∈ {0.0, · · · , 0.02}. For the
maximum delay of 90 days, the highest discount rate r = 0.02, results in a discount factor of 0.165. The
decision-maker is indifferent between $8.26 and $50.00 after 90 days.
• The Hyperbolic discounting model (Hyp) also has one discounting parameter, r ∈ {0.0, · · · , 0.2}. For
the highest discount rate of r = 0.2, the model is indifferent between $2.63 now and $50.00 after 90
days.
• The Quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Quasi-Hyp) has 2 discounting parameters: an exponential
discounting factor r and α. We use the same range of values for r as in the exponential model
(r ∈ {0.0, · · · , 0.02}); And α ∈ {0.5 · · · 1.0}. For the highest discount rates, r = 0.2 and α = 0.5, the
model is indifferent between $1.31 now and $50 after 90 days. In Albrecht et al. (2011), the median α
from individual experimental data was 0.86, with 24 of 27 participants having α < 1.
• The Fixed-cost discounting model (Fixed) has 2 discounting parameters: an exponential discounting
factor has range r ∈ {0.0, · · · , 0.02} a fixed time cost b ∈ {0 · · · 20}. Benhabib et al. (2010) found a
present bias / present premium of about $4 among amounts of $10 through $100.
• Finally, the Generalized-hyperbolic discounting model (GenHyp) has 2 discounting parameters: θ and α.
We chose parameter values to match the range of discount factors generated by the previous 4 models.
For θ we chose θ ∈ {0.02 · · · 0.22}; and we chose α ∈ {0.5 · · · 1.0}. For the higest discount rates,
θ = 0.22 and α = 1, the model is indifferent between $6.87 now and $50.00 after 90 days. When the
ratio θ/α < 1, we get more hyperbolic discounting, wheareas when the ratio is large, the model begins
to approximate hyperbolic discounting. Typical values that are reported in literature for θ/α are in the
range [0.45, 0.78] (McKerchar et al. (2010, 2009)).
For the ground truth analysis, each of the five model classes started with an equal overall prior belief of
1/5, spread uniformly across all parameter value configurations in that model class. (For example, each of the
121 specific parameter configurations for GenHyp was assigned prior 1/5 divided by 121.) In each ground
truth run, a model and parameter configuration was chosen at random. Fifty test choices were then generated
using each of the five methods. In each such run, we record whether each of the five methods is accurate after
each question. Accuracy in a run is defined as assigning the highest posterior probability to the ground-truth
model (for the overall model in the same class) in that run. The procedure was repeated for 1000 runs.
For the ground truth analysis, we generated simulated responses by first choosing a model at random, and
then the parameter values for the model at random. We repeated this for a 1000 trails.
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the performance of the 3 methods, in terms of the accuracy of recovering the
true model with the number of tests, for different error rates ( = 0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20). We find that EC2
outperforms InfoGain significantly, which outperforms Random for all noise levels.
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Table 3.3: The posterior probability of the models over 50 rounds for a ”Hyperbolic” type (left) and the choice
path: amount and delay of the options selected (right).
3.4 Analysis
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Table 3.4: The posterior probability of the models over 50 rounds for a ”General-Hyperbolic” type (left) and
the choice path: amount and delay of the options selected (right).
We tested 40 subjects in 3 separate sessions at Caltech (n=10) and UCLA to determine which model fit
their behaviour best. We followed the IRB protocols of Caltech and UCLA for the conduct of human subject
experiments. Subjects were presented 50 tests using our algorithm. To incentivize the subjects, one of these
tests was picked at random, and subjects received payment based the outcome of their chosen lottery.
The delayed payments were made into the debit cards for subjects at UCLA, and as Amazon gift cards for
subjects at Caltech. Both forms of deferred payment can be used to purchase a similar variety of goods as cash.
To prevent any transaction effects, the immediate payment (if delay = 0 were chosen) was also made using the
same method and sent immediately after the experiment.
We observe heterogeneity in the population. We illustrate with two examples from actual subject behaviour.
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Figure 3.2: The posterior distribution of the 5 models after each round. The aggregate mean and standard error
is shown for 40 subjects.
In Figure 3.3, we plot the posterior probability with the number of rounds for a subject that was quickly
classified as a Hyperbolic type (with 5 rounds). The also plot the “Choice Path” over the 50 rounds: the
amount and delay of the selected options. We find that the subject options that had low delay for various
amounts. This illustrates the algorithm’s ability to narrow down the parameters that best describe the subject’s
preference and offer choices that best distinguish the theories. In figure 3.4, we plot the posterior probability
and choice path of a subject whose behaviour is eventually captured by the General-Hyperbolic model.
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Figure 3.3: The classification of 40 subjects to each of the 5 models.
Figure 3.4 shows the posterior distribution of the models after each round, aggregate over all subjects. It
is clear that the posterior distribution of the generalized hyperbolic discounting and exponential discounting
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functions were significantly higher than the other 3 models. The evidence for the “present-bias” models, as
well as the hyperbolic discounting model, was low.
In figure 3.4 we show a histogram of the number of subjects classified according to each model. After
each round, we obtain a posterior distribution over the 5 models. Behaviour can be classified into one of
the models, by taking the maximum-a-posteriori estimate. To ensure robustness, we take the average MAP
estimate of the last 5 rounds.
3.4.1 Hyper-patience
13 subjects in our experiments always chose the greater amount irrespective of the delay. These “hyper-patient”
subjects’ behaviour was best captured by the Generalized-Hyperbolic model. We wanted to rule out the
possibility that this classified was not due to the parameter support we had used for the models.
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Figure 3.4: The posterior distribution of the 5 models after each round. The aggregate mean and standard error
is shown for 40 subjects.
It is conventional, in the literature, to set the discount factor to positive in the exponential model. If we
allow the discount factor to take small negative values, then the model would encode “hyper-patience” a
preference for the larger amount, irrespective of delay.
The changed the parameter support for all 5 models, so that the models exhibit a preference for the larger
amount irrespective of delay. This meant, adding support for small negative values for some of the parameters.
The grid size increased from 11, to 12, equally-spaced values. Specifically, the parameter values ranged as
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Figure 3.5: The classification of 40 subjects to each of the 5 models with expanded parameter support for
“hyper-patience”.
follows:
◦ For Exponential discounting model, the support of r included the negative value of r = −0.002. Thus,
r ∈ {−0.002 · · · 0.02}.
◦ For Hyperbolic disocounting model, support of r included a negative value of r = −0.02. Thus, r ∈
{−0.02 · · · 0.2}.
◦ For Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting model, r ∈ {−0.002 · · · 0.02}, and values of α were the same; α ∈
{0.5 · · · 1.0}.
◦ For Fixed-cost discounting model, r ∈ {−0.002 · · · 0.02}, and values of b were the same; b ∈ {0 · · · 20}.
◦ For Generalized-Hyperbolic discounting model, support of θ included a negative value θ = −0.02. Thus
θ ∈ {−0.02 · · · 0.22}, and values of α were the same; alpha ∈ {0 · · · 20}.
We re-analyzed the choice data from our experiment, by running the algorithm with the choices that were
made by the subjects. The aggregate posterior probability and classification is shown in figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.1
respectively. The results are statistically not different from above: the Generalized-Hyperbolic model has the
highest number of classifications, followed by the exponential model. Support for “present-bias” models was
weak.
3.4.2 Distribution of Parameters
At the end of the experiment, we obtain a posterior distribution over all hypotheses (theory and specific
parameters). We sum over all parameters within a theory to obtain the posterior distribution over the theories,
and obtain the MAP classification of the subjects. Given the final classification to a theory, we can also obtain
the MAP estimate of specific parameters. The MAP parameter estimates for the theories were:
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• Exponential discounting (Exp) had n = 11 classifications; average values of parameters (with standard
errors) were: r = 0.002(±0.003).
• Hyperbolic discounting (Hyp) had n = 2 classifications; average values of parameters (with standard
errors) were: r = 0.010(±0.028).
• Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting (Quasi-Hyp) had n = 4 classifications; average values of parameters
(with standard errors) were: r = 0.003(±0.008), α = 0.68(±0.01).
• Fixed Cost discounting (Fixed) had n = 3 classifications; average values of parameters (with standard
errors) were: r = 0.002(±0.002), b = 7.0(±1.0).
• Generalized-Hyperbolic discounting (General-Hyp) had n = 20 classifications; average values of
parameters (with standard errors) were: θ = 0.032(±0.008), α = 0.84(±0.17).
Since the objective for EC2 is to distinguish between theories, the experimental design and the sequence
of questions asked is not optimized towards increasing the resolution of the parameter estimates, or even
narrowing in on the correct parameters. Our methodology can easily be extended to estimating the parameters
of a specific theory, such as prospect theory, with a high resolution.
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3.5 Discussion
We applied Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Design (BROAD), a recent methodological advance in exper-
imental testing (ray2013), to compare 5 different types of time preference models. We found the strongest
evidence for generalized-hyperbolic discounting, and some evidence for exponential discounting. Recent stud-
ies have reported evidence for “present bias” models, for which our experimental results show weak evidence.
Our payment method eliminated any transaction costs for future payments, since immediate payments were
also delivered through the same channel, so there is no “present bias” by design.
There are several avenues for empirical research that can be motivated by our study. While generalized-
hyperbolic discounting generalizes exponential and hyperbolic models, Benhabib et al. (2004) presented a
generalized model that nests all of the models that we compared. Although their model is expressive enough,
Benhabib et al. (2004)’s particular data had little power to distinguish between the fits of different functional
forms. This is a challenge for models with multiple parameters, in that a large number of data points will
be required to obtain statistical power to distinguish the functional forms of different discounting models.
BROAD economizes the number of samples required to distinguish among models, and can be used to compare
a very generalized model with models that are more parsimonious in the number of parameters.
The class of models compared in this study, uses a subjective perception of money (as a function of time),
while the perception of time is linear. This class of models are common amongst economists. Another class
of models, with roots in biology and psychology, models the subjective perception of time which leads to
inconsistencies in inter-temporal choices, e.g. Ebert and Prelec (2007); Bleichrodt et al. (2009); Ray and
Bossaerts (2011). BROAD can be used to compare these essentially different classes of models.
Finally, time preference behaviour depends on domain and context. Preferences can change based on the
type of reward: monetary or consumables (Estle et al. (2007)), and can be attributed to pathological behaviours,
such as addiction and gambling (Madden and Bickel (2010)). BROAD methods can be utilized to rapidly
evaluate models in different contexts and with different subject populations, especially subjects that are limited
in attention (pathological behaviours, children and animals).
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3.6 Instructions
This is an experiment on the economics of decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make good
decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in the form of Amazon
Gift cards at a future date, as determined by your choices. The funds have been supplied by a foundation that
supports this research.
The experiment has 50 rounds. In each round you will choose between one of two options: Each option
has an amount, $X, payable after T days.
The amounts will range from $5 up to $50, and the days will range from 0 (given immediately) up to 90
days (3 months later).
For example, you might see the following screen:
!
In option 1, you will get $45 by today. In option 2, you will get $50 2 days from today.
You must enter your choice into the textbox by pressing 1 or 2, followed by the Enter key.
There is no time limit for viewing the graph and entering your choice. After you enter your choice,
the screen will say REST. Another choice between two lottery options will be displayed within a couple of
seconds.
After finishing all 50 rounds, we will randomly pick one of the 50 pairs of options you were asked about to
determine your additional earnings. Each option pair is equally likely to be chosen so you should treat each
one as if it could be the paid round.
Depending on your choice, the Gift card for the amount $X will be sent to you by email after T days (or
immediately if T = 0 days). For example, if you chose option 2 in the case above, your amount will be emailed
to you 2 days from today.
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3.7 Subjective Time
Suppose we are asked to choose between $10 now or $11 tomorrow. We may prefer the $10 immediately
rather than the $11 received after a day. However, if we are offered to choose between $10 to be received after
364 days, or $11 after 365 days, we often prefer to wait the additional day for the extra dollar. After waiting
365 days, the latter choice becomes one between an immediate $10 or $11 tomorrow. Now we would want to
reverse it, asking for the $10 immediately, rather than waiting the extra day we seemed to have been willing to
accept in the past. This time inconsistency can be modeled using hyperbolic discounting of future rewards
Laibson (1997). To avoid inconsistencies, rewards should be discounted exponentially over time Sutton and
Barto (1998).
Here, we conjecture that hyperbolic discounting has a rational explanation, based on the generally accepted
principal that the animal and human biological clocks tick at a different rate from the calendar clock. Animals
and humans are indeed known to maintain an internal representation of time that differs from standard calendar
time and whose properties change with time scale, from microseconds up to years, with representations of
(calendar) time at larger scales showing the highest variability Buonomano (2007). In humans, drugs Meck
(1996); Wittmann et al. (2007), and age Mischel et al. (1992), among other things, are known to influence
time perception. The neurobiological mechanism behind the biological clock has recently become a topic of
intense study Buhusi and Meck (2005).
We start from the preposition that discounting is exponential, as required for time-consistent choice. At
the same time, we posit that the internal representation of time (under which discounting occurs) varies
stochastically (randomly) from calendar time. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6: two events at times 0 and
∆ in calendar are experienced to occur at t0 = F (0) and t∆ = F (∆) in biological time, where F is some
stochastic (random) transformation F .
Now consider two events at a later time s and s+ ∆, separated by the same amount of (calendar-time)
delay ∆. The times s and s + ∆ are transformed to ts = F (s) and ts+∆ = F (s + ∆) in biological time.
Although the delay between the pair of events is the same in calendar time, the corresponding delay between
the events in biological time, t∆ − t0 and ts+∆ − ts are generally different.
We assume that the biological clock is positive quadrant dependent Esary et al. (1967). Intuitively, this
means that if ts is small, the chance increases that the subsequent interval t∆ − ts is small too. It implies
positive autocorrelation, i.e., cov(ts, ts+∆− ts) > 0. And crucially, it implies that discount factors are positive
autocorrelated: cov(exp(−ts), exp(−(ts+∆ − ts))) > 0. We also assume that increments in biological time
are stationary: the distribution of time changes does not depend on when they occur; the distribution of t∆− t0
is the same as that of ts+∆ − ts. The following theorem states the main result.
96
Theorem: Positive dependence in biological time implies temporal choice inconsistency The rigorous
proof of the theorem is provided in the Appendix, that the reader is encouraged to peruse. Here we aim to
provide the intuition with a simple numerical example. We envisage delivery of one dollar now or K dollars at
∆ (a point in calendar time). K is to be chosen so that there is indifference. We then compare delivery of one
dollar at s = 2 with delivery of K dollars at s = 2 + ∆.
The biological clock is as follows. Either s feels like it takes 1 unit of (biological) time, or it takes 3 units,
with an average of 2 units. ∆ is on average half the length; it feels either short (0.5 units) or long (1.5), with an
average of 1 unit.
The biological clock is positive quadrant dependent. We will make the dependence perfect, to simplify the
argument. When s feels like it takes 1 unit, the subsequent ∆ will take 0.5 unit; when s feels long (2 units),
the subsequent ∆ is long as well, at 1.5 units.
As mentioned, K is set so that there is indifference between getting one dollar now and K dollars at ∆.
Today’s value of K is 0.5∗ exp(−0.5) + 0.5∗ exp(−1.5))∗K, because with fifty percent probability, delivery
is felt like taking place in 0.5 units of (biological) time, and with 50% chance, it feels like it takes place 1.5 time
units in the future. We set K so that today’s value equals one dollar. So, K = 2/(exp(−0.5) + exp(−1.5)) =
2.411.
Essentially,K is set so that the gain of having to wait a short time (only 0.5 units of biological time) is offset
by the loss in value for having to wait a long time (1.5 units). The former gain (relative to today’s one dollar) is
2.411∗exp(−0.5)−1 = 0.462, or 46.2%; the latter loss equals 1−2.411∗exp(−1.5) = (1−0.538) = 46.2%.
The gains and losses offset.
As for delivery of K at s + ∆, notice that, while the gain and loss from waiting an extra ∆ beyond s
have equal probability of occurring, they are discounted differently. The gain occurs when s = 2 arrives
early under the biological clock (1 unit); this is weighted more heavily, because it is discounted with only
exp(−1); its weighted value is exp(−1) ∗ 1.462 = 0.538. The loss when s = 2 arrives late (3 units under
the biological clock) is weighted less, because it occurs farther in time; it is discounted with exp(−3); the
weighted value in that case is exp(−3) ∗ 0.538 = 0.027. In expectation, the value of receiving K at s+ ∆
equals (0.538 + 0.027)/2 = 0.283.
Compare this to getting one dollar at s = 2. There is no loss or gain (one always gets one dollar). With 50%
probability, the dollar arrives early (1 unit in biological time), and its discounted value is exp(−1) = 0.368,
and with 50% chance the dollar arrives late (3 units under the biological clock), and its discounted value is
exp(−3) = 0.050. In expectation, the value equals (0.368 + 0.050)/2 = 0.209. This is strictly less than the
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value of getting K delayed (0.283).
Hence, whileK was set to be indifferent between receiving one dollar now andK dollars at ∆, the promise
of K at s+ ∆ is worth more than getting one dollar at s.
The astute reader will have noticed that the positive dependence of the biological clock is not really needed
to get time inconsistencies. They occur also with negative dependence. However, with positive dependence,
the decision maker will always prefer to wait when comparing options in the future for which she is indifferent
now. That is, she looks more patient when deciding about payoffs in the future. This is the classical time
inconsistency that has led to modeling of intertemporal choice using hyperbolic discounting. With negative
dependence, the decision maker looks more patient in the immediate future than when considering options in
the far future.
3.7.1 Simulations
We now illustrate that hyperbolic discounting provides a good fit to the choices resulting from positive temporal
dependence of biological time. To model biological time, we choose the log-normal distribution Jaynes (2003),
which has a continuous positive support. Under the biological clock, any two time increments, such as t∆ − t0
and ts+∆ − ts, are jointly lognormal. When the time increments are positively correlated, they will also be
positive quadrant dependent (this follows from Pitt (1982)), and hence, the corresponding discount factors will
be positively correlated as well.
To make the example concrete, consider the choice between a payoff of 1 at time 0, and 1 +K at a delay
(in calendar time) of ∆ = 0.5. We compare this to a pair of later options equally distanced in calendar time, at
s = 2 and at s+ ∆ = 2.5. In biological time, these events are at t0 = 0 and t∆ for the first pair, ts and ts+∆,
for the second pair. The time of payoff delivery under the biological clock is a random variable.
We obtain the values of the options by Monte Carlo sampling. To generate the samples, we consider n
increments in biological time, τ1, · · · , τn, that correspond to time increments of 0.5 units in calendar time.
The n increments in biological time are drawn from a multivariate lognormal distribution with common mean
0.5 and unit variance. The correlations between the increments are positive, but decrease exponentially as they
are farther apart in time. We encode the correlation structure as a covariance matrix with diagonals equal to 1,
and covariances equal to ρ, ρ2, · · · , ρn−1 in the off-diagonal spots (see Appendix). We obtain instances in
biological time by adding increments: t∆ = τ1, ts =
∑4
i=1 τi, and ts+∆ =
∑5
i=1 τi. These formulae reflect
the fact that the biological expiration time of the delayed early option occurs after one increment, while the
two later options mature after 4 and 5 increments, respectively.
For the first option pair, the value of the immediate option is 1, and the option with payoff at (calendar
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time) ∆ = 0.5, is valued at E[e−t∆(1 +K)], assuming a unit discount rate (in biological time). Monte Carlo
analysis based on N(= 106) samples of t∆ estimates this to be 1N
∑N
i=1 e
−ti∆(1 +K). For K = 0.78, we find
that E[e−t∆(1 +K)] ≈ 1, i.e. the decision-maker is approximately indifferent between immediate delivery of
$1 and a payoff of $1.78 after a delay of ∆ = 0.5 units of calendar time.
For the pair of options at the more distant future, the values of the early and later options are estimated to
remain approximately equal when time increments are independent, i.e., ρ = 0 (E[e−ts(1)] ≈ E[e−ts+∆(1 +
K)] ≈ 0.056). When time increments are positively correlated, i.e., ρ > 0, the later option is valued
more highly, in accordance with our Theorem. For example, when ρ = 0.5, the early option has value
E[e−ts(1)] ≈ 0.091, and the later option has valueE[e−ts+∆(1+K)] ≈ 0.104. So the decision-maker prefers
to wait to receive $1.78 later, while he was indifferent between an immediate $1 and $1.78 after an equally
long delay of ∆ = 0.5. We thus have obtained a temporal inconsistency.
We can obtain a discounting curve by evaluating payoffs at various delays, as in the previous example. We
generated n(= 10) increments, τ1, · · · , τn, of length ∆ = 0.5. The time indicated by the biological clock at
calendar time s is given by ts =
∑s
i=1 τi. The value of a payoff of $1 at time 0 is 1, and at (calendar) time s is
E[e−ts(1)] (we continue to use a unit discount rate.) The values obtained for each point in calendar time can
then be compared to valuation with hyperbolic discounting (in calendar time), assuming a discount factor is
1/(1 + ks). We find the best-fitting value of k by minimizing the squared error between the theoretical values
under the hyperbolic function, and that generated by our Monte Carlo procedure. Similarly, we can also obtain
a comparison with valuation (in calendar time) assuming exponential discounting, where the discount factor
equals e−δs. The discount rate δ is also obtained by minimizing the squared error.
We are interested, in particular, in the effect of the correlation parameter ρ of the biological clock on the
shape of the discounting curve. When autocorrelation equals zero (ρ = 0), the discounting curve is pretty
much exponential, as shown in Figure 3.7.1 (Top). The best-fitting exponential curve has δ = 0.3; this differs
from the true discount rate (1) because the latter only applies to biological time. The hyperbolic curve has
k = 2.75, but its fit is worse. Figure 3.7.1 (Bottom) illustrates how, when the autocorrelations are very high
(ρ = 0.97), hyperbolic discounting provides the better fit. The best-fitting exponential discount rate equals
δ = 0.45, and the hyperbolic discount rate is estimated at k = 1.75.
Variability in the mapping from calendar to biological time also plays a role. In the limit, when the
biological clock is accurate (i.e., the mapping is deterministic, and, because we assume a constant speed for
the biological clock, linear), we of course obtain exponential discounting in calendar time. Appendix 3 shows
how variability induces increased convexity in the discounting curve.
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Figure 3.6: The calendar time and biological time evolve at different rates. Two equal intervals (0,∆) and
(s, s+∆) in calendar time (horizontal axis) translate into unequal intervals (t0, t∆) and (ts, ts+∆) in biological
time (vertical axis). The function F (·) depicts one possible realization of the (stochastic) transformation from
calendar to biological time.
3.7.2 Discussion
Time inconsistencies, like the ones that led to modeling time preferences with hyperbolic discounting, arise
when the biological clock advances randomly in calendar time, and increments in biological time are positively
dependent. When measured in calendar time, discounting becomes increasingly hyperbolic as the biological
clock becomes more highly correlated and more variable.
Prior to our result, hyperbolic discounting emerged in a normative (i.e., fully rational) model because
discount rates were assumed to be stochastic Farmer and Geneakopolos (2009). Our rational explanation
of hyperbolic discounting does not rely on random discounting, but on randomness in the transformation
between calendar time (which determines payoff times) and biological time (which is relevant for decision
making). The two explanations can be shown to be related mathematically, but they are biologically very
different. Specifically, stochastic time perception is biologically plausible, while stochastic discounting is
rarely considered outside the arcane world of mathematical finance. An exception is Skog (1997).
Other rational explanations of hyperbolic discounting focus on specific forms of uncertainty about the
ability of the payer to deliver the future payment (because he is bankrupted) or of the payee to receive it
(because she may have deceased beforehand). When the hazard rate is stochastic, the apparent discount rate
can be shown to become stochastic; see Sozou (1998); Azfar (1999); Sozou and Seymour (2003). However,
payment uncertainty cannot provide a comprehensive explanation. In particular, it fails to explain hyperbolic
discounting in experiments where design precludes bankruptcy and where the time horizon is too short for
significant effects from sudden inability of the payee to take delivery; e.g., Kable and Glimcher (2007).
Our explanation of hyperbolic discounting assumes that discounting is exponential in biological time.
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Figure 3.7: (Top) No autocorrelation of biological time (ρ = 0). The discounting curve in biological time
is exponential with discount rate equal to 1. It generates the dotted discounting curve in calendar time
(“ZeroCorr”). The best exponential (“Exp”) fit in calendar time produces a discount rate of 0.30, and the best
hyperbolic fit (“Hyp”) has a discount rate equal to 2.75. (Bottom) Very high autocorrelation of biological time
(ρ = 0.97). The discounting curve in biological time is exponential with discount rate equal to 1. It generates
the dotted discounting curve in calendar time (“HighCorr”). The best exponential (“Exp”) fit in calendar time
produces a discount rate of 0.45, and the best hyperbolic fit (“Hyp”) in calendar time has discount rate equal to
1.75.
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Consistent with this, temporal discounting has empirically been shown to have an exponential form when
subjective estimates of time elapsed are taken into account Zauberman et al. (2009). Other work has shown
that discounting is hyperbolic if subjects perceive realizations of future events to be uncertain Dasgupta and
Maskin (2005).
The importance of perceived time in discounting has been pointed out before Kim and Zauberman
(2009); Nakahara and Kaveri (2010), but because random time changes were never considered, some type of
misperception had to be invoked to generate hyperbolic discounting and the associated choice inconsistencies.
Specifically, in Kim and Zauberman (2009); Nakahara and Kaveri (2010), the mapping from calendar to
biological time is concave, so that increments farther in calendar time are expected (under the biological clock)
to become shorter, inconsistent with the actual experience once the future arrives. In contrast, in our case, the
speed of the biological clock is in tune with the calendar time, on average. Our approach relies on variability
in the estimates.
Still, we can emulate the misperception of Kim and Zauberman (2009); Nakahara and Kaveri (2010) by
increasing the expected speed of the biological clock for time farther into the future, or equivalently, decreasing
the drift in the mapping from calendar to biological time. This generates concavity in the (random) mapping
from calendar to biological time, and hyperbolic discounting adequately captures the resulting intertemporal
choices; see Appendix 4. Positive dependence in the biological clock is no longer needed; nor is variability.
As such, our framework encompasses explanations that rely on concavity in the mapping from calendar to
biological time.
Stochasticity in time perception has long been accepted in psychology. Gibbon et al. (1984), e.g., uses
a random clock process to explain response accuracy in animal timing tasks. Consideration of temporal
dependence of the biological clock is novel, however, and may elucidate timing anomalies that an independent
clock cannot explain Machado and Keen (1999). Positive temporal correlation in the internal clock is
neurobiologically plausible; it may be supported by the positive autocorrelations recently discovered in human
brain activity oscillations, displaying slow decreases even over thousands of cycles Linkenkaer-Hansen et al.
(2001, 2004), not unlike those generated by fractional Brownian motions Mandelbrot and Van Ness (1968). It
unknown to what extent this generalizes to longer time horizons, however.
Our theoretical framework provides a potentially unifying account for recorded time preferences. This is
fortunate, because hyperbolic discounting is known to not be universal, with the shape (and level) of discounting
changing with context Scholten and Read (2010). Context-dependence is consistent with our theory, which
implies exponential discounting when the speed of the internal clock is expected to be constant, and the relation
between calendar time and biological time accurate, or increments in biological time uncorrelated. Hyperbolic
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discounting emerges when the biological clock exhibits temporal dependence, or when its speed is expected
to decrease in the more distant future. Future research should clarify which features of the biological clock
can account for the observed context-dependence of discounting. In Scholten and Read (2010), intertemporal
preferences were observed to be different depending on whether a time interval is divided up, or time is
extended by adding intervals. In principle, our theory could accommodate such differences, but it may require
the biological clock to not be self-similar Mandelbrot and Van Ness (1968); that is, its temporal properties
may have to change as one moves from coarser to finer sub-divisions of time.
Our theorem provides a new, unifying framework to study time perception and how it relates to impulsivity
in temporal decision-making Wittmann and Paulus (2008). Our linking the phenomena of biological time
and intertemporal discounting should lead to novel studies of the symptoms and causes of many disorders
involving anomalous time perception, such as attention-deficit hyperactivity syndrome, borderline personality
disorder, anxiety disorder, and schizophrenia.
A1. Proof of the main theorem
Theorem: Positive correlation in biological time implies temporal choice inconsistency.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we start with setting the exponential discount rate (in biological time) equal
to 1. This is without loss of generality; any other discount rate would work. Now pick an amount K so that
the decision maker is indifferent between an immediate (at time 0) payoff of 1 and a payoff of 1 +K after a
delay ∆(> 0). Again without loss of generality, we set the initial biological time t0 = 0 (although at times we
will keep t0 explicit, for clarity). Let t∆ be the time that will have passed according to the biological clock
by the time the calendar clock indicates ∆. Because of the preference of our decision maker, the valuations
corresponding to the immediate option (left-hand side) and to the delayed option (right-hand side) are equal:
1 = E[e−(t∆−t0)(1 +K)] (3.7.1)
Now consider the valuation of 1 at some later time s, as well as that of 1 +K at the same time s plus the delay
∆. The corresponding times according to the biological clock are ts and ts+∆ respectively. The increment
from s to s+ ∆ equals ts+∆ − ts in biological time. The (time-0) value of the payoff of 1 at (calendar time) s
equals E[e−ts ], and the value of the payoff of 1 +K at s+ ∆ equals
E[e−ts+∆(1 +K)] = E[e−tse−(ts+∆−ts)(1 +K)] (3.7.2)
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We assume that calendar time increments are perceived to be positive quadrant dependent. Hence, cov(e−ts , e−(ts+∆−ts)) >
0, or, applying the definition of covariance,
cov(e−ts , e−(ts+∆−ts)) = E[e−tse−(ts+∆−ts)]− E[e−ts ]E[e−(ts+∆−ts)] > 0. (3.7.3)
We can use the latter inequality to obtain a lower bound for the value of the later option:
E[e−tse−(ts+∆−ts)(1 +K)] > E[e−ts ]E[e−(ts+∆−ts)(1 +K)]. (3.7.4)
Our assumption that time increments are stationary implies, in particular, that
E[e−(ts+∆−ts)(1 +K)] = E[e−(t∆−t0)(1 +K)]. (3.7.5)
But we picked K so that the latter equals 1. Combining this with the above, we conclude that the later option is
worth more than:
E[e−tse−(ts+∆−ts)(1 +K)] > E[e−ts ]. (3.7.6)
But the right-hand-side is the value of the earlier option. As a result, the decision maker is no longer indifferent
between the earlier and later options as she was when the earlier option was immediate; she now strictly prefers
the later option, which is a time inconsistency.
A2. Generating time increments
Biological time increments τ1, τ2, · · · , τn are generated according to a multivariate lognormal distribution.
The mean of the time intervals is fixed at 0.5. The covariance matrix encodes first-order auto-correlation, with
correlation parameter ρ.
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(3.7.7)
The biological time after s increments is given by: ts =
∑i=s
i=1 τi.
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Figure 3.8: Impact of increased variability onto shape of discounting under mild autocorrelation of the
biological clock (ρ = 0.3). As variability (“Var”) increased from 0.5 over 1 to 4, the discounting function
becomes more convex.
A3. Increased randomness in the mapping from calendar to biological time
Simulations are performed as for Figure 3.7.1. We set the autocorrelation of the biological clock (ρ) equal to
0.3, and increase variability (variances of the multivariate lognormal distribution of biological time intervals)
from 0.50 to 1 and 4 (the middle case is the value used to generate Figure 3.7.1). Variability generates increased
convexity in the discounting curve in calendar time. See Figure 3.7.2.
A4. Concave mapping from calendar time to biological time
The time increments τ1, τ2, · · · , τn are generated according to a multivariate lognormal distribution. To
generate concavity (on average) in the (stochastic) mapping from calendar to biological time, we let the drift
in the mapping from calendar to biological time decrease with time. The expected length of the kth interval in
biological time equals: E[τk] = (0.5k)γ − (0.5(k− 1))γ , where γ < 1 (e.g., γ = 0.5). The covariance matrix
is identity, thus assuming no correlation across increments. As before, the biological time after s increments is
given by: ts =
∑i=s
i=1 τi.
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Figure 3.9: Time intervals generated from concavity in the mapping from calendar to biological time, induced
by decreasing the speed of the biological clock for time intervals further into the future (γ = 0.5). The
biological clock does not exhibit autocorrelation (ρ = 0). The discounting curve in biological time is
exponential with discount rate equal to 1. The dashed-dotted line depicts the resulting discounting curve in
calendar time (“Concav”). The best exponential (“Exp”) fit in calendar time produces a discount rate of 0.40,
and the best hyperbolic fit (“Hyp”) has a discount rate equal to 2.20.
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(3.7.8)
We set γ = 0.5. In figure 3.7.2 we find that the discounting curve generated by the concavity in the
relation between calendar and biological time is best modeled as hyperbolic.
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Chapter 4
Reference Dependence and Substitution
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced Prospect Theory to model the phenomenon, which was tested in
controlled laboratory experiments, where subjects were willing to give up potential gains, to avoid suffering
potential, comparatively smaller losses. This “loss-aversion” depended on a reference level (typically 0 dollars
in these experiments).
Reference dependence was also discussed in the context of consumer behaviour by Thaler (1980), whereby
consumers form expectations in the price or quality of commonly encountered goods, and new goods are
evaluated against this reference level. Consumers are also “loss-averse” in the sense that they tend to react
more strongly towards increases in price from their reference point (a “loss”) compared to relative gains
(Thaler (1980)). This suggests a plausible explanation for why goods are always advertised at a discounted
price, and never at a premium.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) advanced a theoretical model for reference dependence, where a person’s
reference point is her rational expectations, determined in a personal equilibrium consistent with her optimal
behaviour given expectations. Recently, Rosato (2013) developed a model of how sellers can manipulate
consumer’s reference prices for substitute items. It looked at the phenomenon from the firm’s point of view,
and did not offer a quantitative model to measure consumer loss aversion effects among substitute products.
Studies have also noted reference dependence and loss aversion in field data. Using housing market data,
Genesove and Mayer (2001) found that home sellers are averse to losses relative to their reference price - the
purchase price of the home, even if the expected selling prices are going down. Camerer et al. (1997) and
Crawford and Meng (2011) also noted this effect in a labor market for taxicab drivers, who tended to stop
working when their earnings reached a reference level, even with higher demand for labor.
In marketing science, there is substantial literature on reference prices, with early references to the concept
by Monroe (1973). Modeling and behavioural research has focused on the formation (Alba et al. (1999)),
recall through internal and external processes (Mazumdar and Papatla (2000)), and the effects of reference
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pricing (Greenleaf (1995)).
Reference price effects have been established in several empirical studies (Meyer and Johnson (1995),
Kalyanaram and Winer (1995)). One common approach of modeling reference price effects (Briesch et al.
(1997)) treats price changes as “sticker shock”, with the reference price expectations formed from memory,
based on the prices from the past few periods.
Estimates from scanner panel data show substantial consumer loss aversion, even after accounting for
reference price heterogeneity (Bell and Lattin (2000)). Loss averse consumers make substantially more
purchases when prices are discounted against their reference price, and make disproportionately less purchases
when prices are raised, than can be accounted for by price elasticity. However, this does not uniquely identify
loss aversion as the cause of this behaviour. An alternate explanation is that opportunistic buyers who can
anticipate their future demands, “stockpile” items that are on temporary sale (see Bell et al. (1999)). Demand
can dry up after discounts are lifted since consumers have already stocked up on their desired goods.
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Days
D
em
an
d
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
D
em
an
d
D
em
an
d
Figure 4.1: Simulated effect of loss aversion and substitution with each point a different sample of loss aversion parameter
λ (sampled uniformly between 1 and 4). When higher selling item (black dots), goes on sale (periods indicated by blue
line), quantity increases. When sale ends, the quantities sold decrease whilst, due to loss aversion, the relative utility of a
lower selling substitute (red dots) increases. At each period the loss aversion parameter is sampled from a distribution.
We test a prediction made by the reference dependence model that cannot be attributed to stockpiling. The
relative utility of an item, once it is no longer available at a discounted rate, will go down in comparison to its
substitute which did not experience a similar end of sale, as illustrated in figure 4.1. Rational consumers who
stockpile, buy more of an item when it is discounted, and both the item and its substitute will have lower sales
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after the discount period is over. In section 4.3, we develop a discrete choice structural model that incorporates
reference dependence to estimate consumer loss aversion from our retail dataset, and the substitution effect
provides the desired identification.
Emerging evidence shows that behavioural effects are more pronounced among inexperienced players, and
behaviour tends to become more rational through experience. In laboratory settings, Camerer (2003) notes that
subjects become more rational through learning and behaviour starts converging towards Nash equilibrium
in games, such as p-Beauty and prisoner’s dilemma. In a field setting, Gneezy and List (2006) found that
estimates of endowment effect and loss aversion decreased among experienced card traders in a card-trading
league, and also among laboratory subjects after they gained experience. Camerer et al. (1997) also observed
reference dependence effects in a labour market of taxi drivers, though more experienced drivers showed less
of an effect. Genesove and Mayer (2001) find that home owners are averse to selling their homes at a loss with
respect to a reference point (their purchase price), and the effect was twice as large among owner-occupants as
compared to their more experienced investor counterparts.
In section 4.2.1, we use the transaction history of individual customers in our retail dataset to contrast the
effect of experience. We test whether the effects of reference dependence is different based on sales frequency
(as a proxy for experience), and estimate loss aversion in both groups.
In the next section, we provide details of our retail dataset, followed by motivating analysis for reference
and state dependence. We specify our model in section 4.3, and estimate and identify effect parameters from
the retail dataset. We conclude the paper with a discussion of implications for competitive pricing strategy.
4.1 Dataset
We obtained detailed consumer transaction records for the online sales division of a large retailer of hardware
and household products. An example of products available is shown in Figure 4.2. The dataset contained 587
days of records from April 29th, 2010 to December 10th, 2011. 6039 items were available, with a total sales of
over 100 million US Dollars. Over 1.2 million orders, or individual transactions, were recorded for 3.3 million
items sold. Among the items, with individually assigned stock keeping units (SKUs), the distribution of sales
is highly skewed, as shown in figure 4.3, with the top 1000 SKUs representing the majority of sales. We focus
our analysis on the top 1000 ranked SKUs (according to sales), as data for the less popular items are sparse.
The items were frequently discounted. The total discounts per day, plotted in table 4.4, show that the
volume of discounted sales were significantly higher in the last 8 months (days 348 to 587). The fraction of
the days that an item was on sale, in order of sales rank, is shown in table 4.4. Many of the items were on sale
for more than 50% of the days. For our analysis, to test the effect of a sale, we restrict the analysis to those
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Figure 4.2: A snapshot of the retailer’s website powerdrills. Consumers can easily look at the price of the item of interest,
whether it is currently at a discount, as well as the price and discount status of substitutes.
items that were on sale less than 50 per cent of the time.
We extracted unique customer identification information from the transaction records. There were 861,000
unique customers, including large establishments. The total amount of purchases by each customer shows
power law characteristics, with the majority of items being purchased by relatively small number of consumers,
as shown on a log scale in figure 4.3. For our analysis of experience effects in section 4.2.1, we separate
customers into “experienced” and “inexperienced” buyers based on total purchases.
4.2 Motivating Analysis
If consumers are loss-averse, with respect to a reference price, then discounts will have disproportionate impact
on demand, beyond response to a price decrease. Furthermore, once the discount period is over, there should
be a disproportionately large decrease in demand, beyond that explained by the price increase. For our initial
analysis, we use a regression model that includes a dummy variable for days that an item was discounted. We
also included dummy variables that indicated if the last sale ended 1, 2, or n days ago. The regression model
for the quantity of item i sold at time t is given by:
Qit = β0 + βpricePit + βmonthMontht + βsaleSaleit + βsaleend(n)SaleEnd(t− n)it (4.2.1)
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Figure 4.3: The total sales, in log scale, of all 6039 SKUs ranked (left). The total sales made by customers in log scale, in
ranked order (right).
where the variable Pit is the price of item i at time t, Montht is an indicator of the month at time t,
OnSaleit = 1 if item is on sale at time t and 0 otherwise, and SaleEnded(t − n) are n dummy variables
indicating whether the last sale ended n days ago (from time t).
We run the regression using the last 8 months of transactions on the top 1000 items that are discounted less
than 50% of the days. Figure 4.5 shows the mean estimate (with standard errors) of the dummy variables, for
sale and end of sales, for the top 1000 items.
This regression analysis reveals that being available at a discount has a significantly positive effect on
sales, beyond the reduction in price. The 1-8 days following a sale shows a significant dip in sales, with the
effect disappearing after the 12th day.
A likely explanation for this behaviour is consumers’ loss aversion with respect to their reference price
expectations. When an item is on discount, a loss-averse consumer would advance their purchase decision
in order to not experience the “loss” after the temporary discounting period is over. Similarly, a loss-averse
consumer would experience a “loss” when the item is no longer available at a discount, which prevents him
from buying the item. The duration of this effect would last until the consumer forms new expectations for
reference price, as proposed by memory-based reference price formation models (Briesch et al. (1997)).
A criticism of the reference-price explanation of this phenomenon is that rational consumers, who are
aware that items are sometimes available at discounted prices, make opportunistic purchases during these
discount windows. The drop in sales after a discount is lifted can be attributed to this “stockpiling effect” (Bell
et al. (1999)).
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Figure 4.4: The total amount of discounts offered per day over 19.5 months (left). The fraction of days the items (ordered
according to sales rank) are on sale in the last 8 months (right).
A testable prediction made by the reference dependence model, is that the relative utility of an item,
once it is no longer available at a discounted rate, will go down in comparison to its substitute which did
not experience a similar end of sale, as illustrated in figure 4.1. This prediction goes against the stockpiling
explanation, which predicts that consumers will buy more of an item when it is discounted, and both the item
and its substitute will have lower sales after the discount period is over1.
Information on substitute products are available for a subset of the SKUs. While it is feasible to define a
substitute as the SKU with high negative price cross-elasticity, this tends to exaggerate the substitution effect
and resulting loss aversion, and also produce erroneous matches due to the large number of SKUs and daily
variability in sales. We instead obtained a list of products and their substitutes from the e-Commerce source.
This list is typically used by the retailers to classify similar items for a web search on the retailer’s website2
(sample shown in figure 4.2).
We show an illustrative example in figure 4.6, of the sale of two substitutable products: $50 and $100 gift
cards. As expected, the sale for $100 gift card increases when a discount is offered (dots at the bottom indicate
discount period) and go down once the discount is over. More interestingly, once the discount period ends, the
1Consider two substitutes, red and blue hammers, that are identical in all other properties except for their colour, and both sell the
same number of units a day for the same price. If the red hammer is sold at a discount of 10% its sales go up during the sale, and the sales
for blue hammers go down. Once the red hammer is back at its regular price, the reference dependence model says that its utility will
go down relative to the blue hammer, and the sales of the substitute will be relatively higher. The “stockpiling” explanation, however,
suggests that consumers will stock up on red hammers during the sale period, so after the sale, sales of red and blue hammers will be
lower, and there should be no relative difference in sales.
2To identify a product’s substitute, we perform a string-match using the product name and then remove matches that are obviously
wrong, e.g. if “drill” returns “cordless electric drill” and “fire drill dvd”. An alternative method is to select items by searching the retailer’s
website for the item and category. For more robustness, we have requested the retailer to supply us a list of substitutes that is used for
placement and stocking purposes.
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Figure 4.5: (left) The effect of Discounts (day 0) and days since the last discount period for the top 1000 SKUs. (right)
The effect for “experienced” customers (red line) and “inexperienced” customers (black line).
sale for $50 gift cards go up. The effects, captured using dummy variables3 shows a previously noted pattern
for the $100 gift card: sales go up with discounts (day 0) and drop afterwards. For the substitute $50 gift card,
sales increase 1 to 4 days after the discount for $100 card is lifted (and no concurrent discounts are offered for
the $50 card).
4.2.1 Behaviour of Experienced Consumers
There are about 861 thousand unique customers in our dataset, with the distribution of total purchases shown
on a log scale in figure 4.3. Some of the large customers are institutions or secondary retailers fulfill their
inventory online. We eliminate 143 customers whose total orders exceed ten thousand dollars, and 17800
customers whose total orders are less than one dollar.
We separate the customers into quartiles based on the total number of items bought. We run the regression
with the top quartile, the “experienced” group, and the bottom quartile, the “inexperienced” group, equation
4.2.1, from section 4.2 on each group, and show the results in figure 4.5. We find that both groups show a
“Sales” effect, with increased sales when discounts are offered, and a dip in sales when discounts end. However,
the effect lasts longer among the “inexperienced” group who would also show higher values of λ if estimated
from this effect alone.
In the following section, we will test the substitution effect, and estimate values of λ for these two groups,
3We use a regression model as in equation 4.2.1, Qit = β0 + βpricePit + βmonthMontht + βsaleSaleit +
βsaleend(n)SaleEnd(t − n)it + βsaleendsub(n)SaleEndSub(t − n)it, with variables SaleEndSub(t − n)it indicating that
the sale for the substitute ended n days ago.
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Figure 4.6: The $100 gift card has a spurt in sales during sale periods (indicated by black dots). Once the sale is removed,
the quantities sold decline whilst the substitute, $50 gift card, has a greater increase in sales. On the right: The effect on
sales since the day the last sale ended (black line). A sale ending for the substitute (red line) has a positive effect on the
substitute. The quantities and discount periods are smoothed using a 5-day window.
using a structural model.
4.3 Structural Model
Let a product have attributes defined by a vector ~a, and price p. The consumer assigns a value to the
product based on attributes and his unobserved characteristics, represented by parameters θ. If the utility,
given by the expected difference between value and price, is positive, the consumer buys the item, i.e.
U = Eθ[v(~a, θ)− p] > 0
We model the utility of a loss-averse consumer whose reference price level is based on their memory of the
previously posted price, pref . The consumer has unobserved characteristics θ and loss-aversion, parameterized
by λ. For a posted price p, the utility of the loss-averse consumer is given by:
Uλ = Eθ[v(~a, θ)− λ(p− pref )− pref ] (4.3.1)
Thus, the consumer experiences a disutility of λ(p − pref ) if item is sold above a reference price,
(p− pref ) > 0. If the item is sold below the reference price, i.e. p− pref < 0, then the consumer experiences
a gain in utility of -λ(p− pref ).
If λ > 1, then the consumer is loss-averse, and increases in price above reference price produces greater
disutility than corresponding decreases in price below the reference point. If λ = 1, then the utility just reduces
to Uλ=1 = Eθ[v(~a, θ)− p], i.e. the initial case.
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If a rational, loss-averse consumer with λ > 1, is aware that a discount is only temporarily available, she
projects that her future self treats the lower, discounted, rate as the reference price, pref . Knowing that she
will experience a loss in the future, she advances her purchase decision to buy the item when it is on sale. This
“anticipation effect” can affect the timing of the purchase with a lot more sales occuring near the end of the
discounting period. We aim to explore this time-dependent utility in future work.
We model the choices probabilistically using a logit model, McFadden (1980). The probability of choosing
item i, with utility U(i) over substitutes j 6= i with utility U(j) is given by:
P (ci = 1) =
exp(U(i))∑
j 6=i exp(U(j))
(4.3.2)
where P (ci = 1) indicates the probability of the event that item i was purchased (ci = 1).
If λ > 1, the utility of item i, Uλ(i) decreases if its sale ends in a previous period, relative to the utility of
substitutes Uλ(j) whose sale did not end (or is being sold at regular price). Thus, according to Equation 4.3.2,
the observed sales of the item i would go down, and the sales of substitute items j would go up, following the
end of the sale period.
4.3.1 Estimation
We estimate the loss aversion effect from choices: quantity of the product and its substitute purchased. Let yit
indicate the decision of consumer i at time period t. Without loss of generality, we’ll model the decision to
purchase product 1, and its substitute, product 2.
y =

0 no purchase
1 product 1
2 product 2
Let θ represent consumer preference parameters, and P jit(θ) denote the probability that consumer i chooses
product j ∈ {1, 2} at time t. Then,
P jit(θ) = Pr(yit = j) =
exp(Uijt(θ))
1 +
∑2
j′=1 exp(Uij′t(θ))
, for j = 1, 2 (4.3.3)
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By Djit, we denote the decision of consumer i at time t for product j.
Djit =
 1 if yit = j0 otherwise
The likelihood, Lit of a dataset of observations of consumer i’s transactions data over a time period t is:
Lit =
2∏
j=0
(P jit)D
j
it (4.3.4)
The log-likelihood will be used to simplify computation:
logLit =
2∑
j=0
Djit logP
j
it (4.3.5)
Given preference parameters λ, the log-likelihood of a dataset of all consumers’ (i = {1, · · · , N}
transactions data is:
logLλ =
∑
i
2∑
j=0
Djit logP
j
it (4.3.6)
4.3.2 Identification
To identify the reference-dependence effect on substitution, we define a reference-dependent linear utility
function derived from Equation 4.3.1:
Uλ = v(a, θ)− λ(p− pref )− pref
= v(a, θ)− λp+ (λ− 1)pref
= v(a, θ)− λp+ γpref , where, γ = λ− 1
= v − λp+ γpref . (for simplicity)
The implications of the parameters are straightforward with this simple linear model:
• For λ = 1, γ = 0 and Uλ = v−p. So the utility is equal to the consumer suplus. If the value of the item,
v is greater than the price, p the consumer will buy the item. Thus the consumer has no loss-aversion
w.r.t the reference price.
• For higher values of λ, the utility decreases below the consumer surplus proportionately to the difference
in current price from reference price, p− pref . And the utility increases above the consumer surplus as
the current price drops below the reference price.
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• For λ = 0, Uλ = v − pref . So the consumer is blind to the current prices, and only cares about the
reference price.
Let’s say the consumer’s (private) value of an item is $20. The previous price i.e. reference price is $5, and the
current price is $15 (the price increased by $10). The utility for a non loss-averse consumer is equal to the
consumer surplus, i.e. $5, and the consumer would buy. For a loss-averse consumer, with λ = 3, the utility is
-$5 and the consumer would not buy the item.
The parameter λ can be estimated from choice data:
(λˆ) = max
λ
logLλ (4.3.7)
From choice dataset (in a subset of consumers or time-period) we can estimate the parameters using current
prices and reference prices, and test the following reference-dependence effects:
• Test of strict Reference Dependence: λ > 1.
• Test of strict Stockpiling: λ = 1.
If λ = 0, then the consumer only cares about the reference price pref and the utility is not affected at all
by the current prices p (which could be infinite). Furthermore, for λ < 0, the consumer is “loss-seeking” and
gains more utility from an item as its price goes higher than the reference price. Both those scenarios are
absurd, and we only consider positive values of λ by estimating the transformed value, λ = exp(κ).
The effect of loss aversion on the sales of substitutes enters the picture in the probability of choice, P (ci).
A loss-averse consumer would become more likely to buy the substitute after the primary good is taken off
discounts, as we simulate and estimate in the next section.
4.4 Results
We first simulate our model for different degrees of loss aversion and look at the qualitative effect. We then
estimate the parameter from retail data, as well as effect of experience.
4.4.1 Simulations
We simulate the choices from the discrete choice model with the utility function described in the previous
section. Product 1 has a regular price of $8, and a discounted price of $7. The discount is applied from
periods 31 to 60, and the regular price in periods 1 to 30, and after the discounting periods, from 61 to 90.
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The substitute product, 2, has a regular price of $9 in periods 1 to 90 (is not offered at discount). We assume,
w.l.o.g. that the private value for a buyer is v = $10; since the model is linear, the results would hold for any
value of v.
For λ = 1, there is no loss aversion. Utility of product 1 at the regular price is equal to the consumer
surplus, i.e. U1 = 2. At the discounted price, the utility is U1 = 3. For the substitute, product 2, the utility
at all periods is U2 = 1. As shown in Figure 4.7(left), the probability of chosing product 1, P (C1 = 1) =
exp(2)/(exp(2) + exp(1)) = 0.73 is periods 1 to 30 and 61 to 90. In periods 31 to 60, with discounting, the
probability increases to P (C1 = 1) = exp(3)/(exp(3) + exp(1)) = 0.88.
If λ = 3, there is a significant effect of loss aversion. From periods 1 to 30, U1 = 2, while the subsitute
product has utility U2 = 1. Probabily of choosing 1, P (C1 = 1) = 0.73. When the price is discounted,
however, the consumer has a reference price, Pref , equal to $8, and current price P = 7. The utility of the
loss averse consumer is U1 = 10− 3 ∗ 7 + 2 ∗ 8 = 5. The probability of chosing product 1, is substantially
higher at P (C1 = 1) = exp(5)/(exp(5) + exp(1)) = 0.98. In periods 61 to 90, when the price rises back to
the original price of $8, the reference-dependent consumer uses the price of $7 from the previous periods as
reference price, so the utility decreases to U1 = 10− 3 ∗ 8 + 2 ∗ 7 = 0. The utility for product 1, is less than
the utility for product 2, and P (C1 = 1) = exp(0)/(exp(0) + exp(1)) = 0.27. The loss-averse consumer is
now more likely to buy product 2 in periods 61 to 90.
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Figure 4.7: The probability of choosing first item, P (Ci = 1), for no loss aversion, λ = 1 on left. P (Ci = 1) for loss
aversion coefficient λ = 3 on right.
We then ran the simulation where, at each period, λ is sampled from a uniform distribution between 1 (no
loss aversion) and 4. For clarity, we multiply the probabilities of choosing each item by 100 units, and plot the
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per period demand in Figure 4.1.
4.4.2 Estimation from Retail Data
Illustrative Example
To illustrate the method of estimating the reference dependence (loss aversion) parameter, λ, we consider
the pair of substitutable products in the previous section: the $50 and $100 gift cards (shown in figure 4.6).
Due to the daily fluctuations in sales quantity and price, we apply a “smoothing window” of one week. The
reference price, pref is the average of the previous week’s prices, and the current quantity, qt is the average of
qt to qt + 6. Note: The results are not different for window lengths between 3 to 10 days, and one week is a
representative length of time for online sales.
In addition to the loss aversion parameter, λ, the private values for the two products, v1 and v2 are unknown.
We estimate the likelihood of the data under different parameter values of λ, v1, v2. λ ranges between 0.1 and
5.0 in increments of 0.1 (since λ = exp(κ), we have κ range between log(0.1) and log(5.0). v1 and v2 is
allowed to range between 0 and 200 (upper range is twice the maximum price), in increments of 10. We then
take the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) jointly over λ, v1, v2.
For the pair of $50 and $100 gift cards, the MLE of v1 = 60 and v2 = 110. The private values are higher
than the median price of the two products, $50 and $100 respectively. This is consistent with the utility model
where consumers will buy the product if their private values are higher than the price of the product. MLE
of λ = 1.5, with a log-likelihood of −1108.32; in contrast the log-likelihood by fixing λ = 1 was -1212.02;
with a log-Ratio
( logL(λ∗)
logL(λ = 1)
)
of 0.91. Thus we find evidence of reference dependence and the effect on
substitutes on these pair of substitutable products.
Estimation on Dataset
We then applied the estimation method across all products that are within the top 1000 SKUs in terms of sales.
For each pair, we jointly estimated the private values v1, v2 and loss aversion parameter λ. v1 and v2 ranged
between 0 and twice the maximum price of the item, and λ ∈ {0.1, · · · , 5.0}.
We contrasted the estimated values of λ among the substitute products, as well as the estimate among the
non-substitutable products. Table 4.1 shows estimated values for the top 3 products (in terms of total sales)
and their substitutes, as well as some that are not substitutes. We also show the ratio of the log-Likelihood of
the pair under the multinomial choice model for the MLE λ value, and for λ = 1 (logRatio =
logL(λ∗)
logL(λ = 1)
).
The conclusion that we draw regarding the estimates of λ for substitute and non-substitute products is
critically based on how we define substitutes. We have avoided debate on the definition by using an internal
list used by the retailer. The retailer maintains this list to suggest products that are similar on the website, as
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well as internal decisions on which products to offer for promotions. Alternate means of finding substitutes
ourselves, such as calculating cross-elasticity, is prone to noise and identifies pairs as substitutes that clearly
are not4. In the absence of a list from a list from the retailer, we could have “crowd-sourced” this identification
to random shoppers on the internet using Amazon mechanical turk or Google Consumer Surveys5.
The list from the retailer identified 3673 substitutes among the top 1000 SKUs. The median number of
substitutes per SKU was 3. The mean value of estimated λ was 1.43 among the substitutes, with a standard
error of 0.014 (n = 3673). The mean value of λ among the 495,827 non-substitutes was 1.06, with a standard
error of 0.008 (n = 495827). Figure 4.9 shows a bar graph of the λ values for the two samples.
Note that the estimated value of λ varies considerably, among both the samples. The highest estimate
of λ among the non-substitutes was 5, while the highest value of λ was also 5 among the substitutes. This
variability is due to the inherent noisiness (daily variability) of eCommerce sales data. In future work, we
aim to develop robust estimation methods that deal with the daily variation in the sales data. We applied the
two-sample t-test to test the null hypothesis that the λ estimates of the substitute samples has the same value
as the λ estimates of the non-substitute samples. We reject the null hypothesis, and accept the alternative that
the mean of the former samples is greater, with a t-statistic of 7.22, and p-value of 8.110−12. We conclude
that the λ estimates of the substitutes is significantly higher than the non-substitute samples.Histogram of All
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Figure 4.8: A histogram of the estimated values of λ for all 3673 substitute pairs.
Figure 4.8 shows the distribution of λ for all the 3673 substitute pairs. We find a cluster of values above
λ = 1, and a smaller cluster near λ = 0.1. The average difference between the private values v1 and v2 and
the average price for the item is $11.65(±6.11). This is reasonble since under the utility model the purchase
4We computed the cross-elasticity of the top selling SKU, “45 Watt Solar Panel”, against the top 1000 SKUs. The two SKUs that had
the highest cross-elasticity score were: “6-inch Digital Calipers” and “1200 lb. capacity air motorcycle lift”.
5Amazon Mechanical Turk: https://www.mturk.com/mturk.
Google Consumer Surveys: https://www.google.com/insights/consumersurveys.
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SKU1 SKU2 λ logRatio
45 Watt Solar Panel Kit 3 Piece Decorative Solar Light Set 0.9 0.99
45 Watt Solar Panel Kit 10 Piece Stainless Steel Solar Light Set 1.5 0.88
45 Watt Solar Panel Kit 80 Watt Monocrystalline Solar Panel 1.4 0.86
45 Watt Solar Panel Kit Saw Mill with 7 HP Gas Engine 1.0 1.00
45 Watt Solar Panel Kit Automatic Battery Float Charger 0.7 0.93
45 Watt Solar Panel Kit 4-1/2 Angle Grinder 1.0 0.93
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 120 Amp Arc Welder 1.2 0.92
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 80 Amp Inverter Arc Welder 1.1 0.91
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 115 Volt Spot Welder 1.6 0.81
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 230 Volt Spot Welder 1.8 0.71
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 135 AC/105 DC Amp Power Arc Welder 1.5 0.93
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 100 Amp Flux Wire Welder 1.3 0.89
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 240 Volt Inverter Arc/TIG Welder 0.9 0.96
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder Saw Mill with 7 HP Gas Engine 1.0 1.00
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder Color Security Camera w/ Night Vision 1.0 1.00
90 Amp Flux Wire Welder 4-1/2 Angle Grinder 1.0 1.00
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet 13 Drawer Red Industrial Quality Roller Cabinet 2.2 0.79
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet Red Roller Cabinet Top Chest 1.8 0.68
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet 8 Drawer Roller Cabinet with 8 Drawer Top Chest 1.6 0.66
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet 20 Drawer Roller Cabinet - Red Glossy Finish 2.4 0.62
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet 13 Drawer Black Onyx Roller Cabinet 1.3 0.90
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet 40 Lb. Capacity Floor Blast Cabinet 1.0 1.00
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet Heavy Duty Milling/Drilling Machine 0.1 0.96
11 Drawer Roller Cabinet Semiautomatic Tire Changer 0.1 0.96
Table 4.1: Examples of λ values for 3 top-selling SKUs along with their substitute SKUs as well as examples of
non-substitute SKUs. The ratio of the log-Likelihood of the pair under the multinomial choice model for the MLE λ value,
and for λ = 1 is also shown; logRatio =
logL(λ∗)
logL(λ = 1)
.
only occurs when the private value is higher than the price.
4.4.3 Effect of Experience
We split the sales data for the top 1000 SKUs into two groups: the data from the top quartile (top 25%) of
customers, the “experienced” group; and the data from the bottom quartile of customers (in terms of sales
made on the site), the “inexperienced” group. Out of 3673 substitute pairs in the original dataset, only 2710
pairs of SKUs had sufficient data in each group. For estimation of λ we considered only the SKU pairs that
have at least 25 days worth of sales data from each group of customers. We calculated the maximum likelihood
estimate of λ for each of the 2710 SKU pairs separately for each group using method described above.
The mean value of estimated λ among the substitutes in the experienced group was 1.22, with a standard
error of 0.032 (n = 2710). The mean value of λ among the substitutes in the inexperienced group was 2.16,
with a standard error of 0.090 (n = 2710). Figure 4.9 shows a bar graph of the λ values for the two groups.
The λ values of substitutes, in both the experienced and inexperienced group, is also significantly higher than
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the non-substitute goods, as shown in figure 4.9.
Since there is considerable variability in the λ values for different SKU pairs, we use the two-sample t-test
to test the null hypothesis that the distribution of the estimated λ values between the two groups is equal. The
test rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternative that the mean of the latter group is higher, with
t-statistic of 4.10, and p-value of p = 0.00021. We conclude that the λ estimates are significantly higher in the
inexperienced group.
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Figure 4.9: The estimates of λ (and errorbars) for substitute and non-substitute goods among the general (left), experienced
(middle) and inexperienced customers (right).
The estimates of the λ for the second and third quartiles are 1.85 and 1.88 (with standard error of 0.061
and 0.087 respectively). Thus the estimates of λ for the top quartile is significantly below the estimates for the
second, third and bottom quartile. An explanation for this is that the top quartile of consumers in this dataset
are likely to be businesses that can purchase large quantities of the same item and stockpile.
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4.5 Discussion
Increased sales of durable goods, beyond that explained by a response to price change, followed by a slump
when the sales are lifted, can be attributed to reference dependence. Estimates using scanner data has shown
significant loss aversion in literature. However that does not identify the effect since other factors, such as
stockpiling could be occurring.
The substitution effect, whereby the relative sales of a substitute product increases when a discount is
lifted, helps to identify the reference-dependence model. We found evidence of reference dependence and loss
aversion in the sales of substitute goods. The average loss aversion parameter estimated on 3673 SKU pairs
was significantly higher than the non-substitute SKU pairs. We also found that the effect is more pronounced
among inexperienced consumers compared to experienced consumers.
A valid criticism of our findings is that in order for the consumers to exhibit loss aversion and prefer
substitute products, they need to know when items are put on sale and when they are removed from sale. Since
we only have data when a sale occurs, we are limited by the data in finding out if the consumer has seen
the past prices before making a sale. This criticism affect reference dependent pricing literature in general
(see) which relies on data to identify how customers are tracking price changes and forming reference prices.
Furthermore, our estimation provides evidence against the “stockpiling” explanation which doesn’t suggest
this switching of preferences for substitutes.
There is sufficient evidence that in the eCommerce setting consumers track prices very frequently and do
comparison shopping online. The “transaction cost” for finding prices is very low (just a mouse click away)
and several online sites6 track prices across multiple websites. The industry averages of the ratio of visitors
who look at a page, to the number of purchases was 5.1% over the 2013 year (according to Internet Retailer
www.internetretailer.com). The number of repeat visitors was 30-65% over the same period across the top 500
e-Retailers. This low visitor to sale ratio and high percentage of repeat visitors is universal across eCommerce
sites, and should be similar for the eCommerce retailer used in our estimation as well. Furthermore, figure 4.2
shows the typical page for an item, which indicates whether an item is at a regular price or on sale, as well as
similar and substitutable items and their prices along with any discounts on them. So consumers are not only
aware of the price of the product (and whether it’s on discount), but also the price of the substitute as well as
its discount status.
Due to the daily variation in sales data, there is high variability in the estimates of λ among the different
pairs of substitute SKUs. In future work, we aim to develop more robust methods of estimating loss aversion
by modeling the “noise” in the sales data. Furthermore, although we consider only pairs of substitute products,
6Some online price comparison sites are www.pricegrabber.com, www.pronto.com
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we can extend our method to estimate the reference dependence effect on a basket of goods.
The values of λ estimated in our dataset is lower than that found in laboratory experiments of reference
dependence and loss aversion, which can have several explanations: (i) In lab experiments, λ is measured at
an individual level among gambles that are designed to measure the effect. Instead, here we are inferring the
effect from aggregate choice data. (ii) The aggregate choice data includes consumers with varying levels of
experience and loss aversion. Because of the type of retailer, consumer choices can be based on industrial
demands that are less sensitive to behavioural effects. We see this once we divide the dataset into customer
types. Future work will look at a variety of types of items, like fashion clothing, that are more individual
purchases.
Consumer reference dependence, even if observed in a subset of goods, has important implications for
competitive strategy, pricing, and the timing of promotions. According to prevailing theory, firms could offer
items at discounts, or have promotions, for rational consumers in order to take away sales from their competitors
(Bell et al. (1999)). However, if consumers are loss averse, and not prone to stockpiling, then discounts and
promotions have an adverse effect once the period is over, and consumers can switch to competitors’ offerings.
Even if our method is not robust enough to identify substitutes from data, the estimated λ is useful in
projecting the effect a price reduction or promotion can have on a product’s substitutes. We have provided
a quantitative model for firms to use in optimizing the timing and magnitude of price discounts on a set of
SKUs. Furthermore, since the only two variables used in our model is price and sales quantity, firms can use
competitor’s observable sales data (even if the sales quantities are approximate) to predict the competitor’s
pricing on their own sales, and vice versa.
The theory presented in this paper suggests interesting experiments to run, or questions to answer if we
had access to different data.
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Chapter 5
Discussions
In this thesis, we presented Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs (BROAD) - a methological advance
in adaptive experimental design. BROAD allowed us to design experiments to compare theories of risky
choice in real-time experiments. Comparing behavioural theories with prior methods was difficult or infeasible
due to the number of parameters which requires a very large design space. The objective criteria, EC2 used
in BROAD was proved to be adaptive submodularity which allowed us to prove theoretical guarantees of
near-optimality, and write a faster implementation using accelerated greedy algorithms that led to orders to
magnitude in speedups.
We also applied BROAD to also compare some key theories of time preference and found that generalized
hyperbolic discounting describes subjects’ behaviour the best. We also proved a theoretical result for a
psychological time preference models, where positive dependence in the subjective perception of time led to
hyperbolic discounting and temporal choice inconsistency.
Finally, based on the evidence for prospect theory in our lab experiments with risky choices, we sought to
find evidence of prospect theory in the wild. We found evidence for loss aversion in consumers (using data
from a eCommerce retailer) by testing a distinct prediction of the theory, as compared to what a standard
model predicted.
At the end of the thesis there are many more open questions than answers. There are several directions that
I would have naturally extended this thesis to, and several studies that could have been done. The purpose of
this line of research has mainly been to broaden the scope of behavioural and experimental economics, and to
push the envelope in terms of the experiments that can be done. The methods and empirical studies presented
in the thesis are only the beginnings, and I briefly describe some nascent ideas that have spawned off of this
research.
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5.1 Future Directions
Many economic theories sacrifice realism to gain mathematical tractability. By economizing experiments,
BROAD methods can be used to test complicated, realistic theories using complex designs and utilize
measurements that go beyond choice data. Theories that have been vetted in the lab can also be tested and
estimated with field data. This leads to faster accumulation of evidence for certain theories while eliminating
those that do not have evidence from both lab and field studies.
5.1.1 New measurements in Experimental design
BROAD provides a means of including neurophysiological and psychological measurements to augment
experimental design. Standard experimental economics has so far looked at choices alone. The aim of
behavioural economics is to incorporate psychological realism into economic models, and knowledge of
physiology should allow us to incorporate biological measurements as an added source of data. Such models
would inevitably be more accurate than “as-if” models. Suppose model A and model B both fit choice data
equally well, but additionally model B fits neurophysiological data. We’d claim that model B would have better
realism and out-of-sample predictive power than model A. We now discuss different biological measurements,
from simple response times, to complex fMRI data, that can be utilized in improving experimental designs.
Response times Response times (RTs) are simple add-on measurements for any computerized laboratory
choice-based experiment. Race-to-barrier models (also called drift-diffusion) of value accumulation describe
choices that vary in difficulty lead to differences in RTs (Smith and Ratcliff (2004)). For binary choice between
two valued alternatives, difficult typically means that choices are close in subjective value. Response times
could provide statistical information to differentiate models of valuation, if they are related to choice difficulty.
Denote the response time of observed choice a by t(a). The differential subjective utility of choice a
compared to unchosen alternative b under model k is U(a|k)− U(b|k) ≡ ∆U(a|k).
As a motivating example, Figure 5.1.1 illustrates a common pattern of RTs (y-axis) as a function of
differential subjective value (x-axis), for one model and one subject from our risky choice experiment. The
thickest inverted-U shaped line in the center represents the best quadratic fit of the actual RTs. RTs are higher
for choices in which the value difference is close to zero (those are the hardest decisions and take the longest).
The inverted-Us are contour plots of the same probability showing possible relations between ∆U(k) and
response time t. The actual RT level in one trial is shown by a horizontal line cutting across the figure.
A theory Ha which is accurate (the actual choice has a positive utility differential according to the theory)
predicts a smaller RT is likely. The intersection of the theory’s ∆U(Ha) value and the observed RT lies on
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Figure 1: Actual response times (in
milliseconds) in choosing between
two delayed rewards [60]. The x-axis
is a measure of di↵erential subjective
value.
The di↵erential subjective value (or utility) of choice a compared to the unchosen alternative b
under model k, is U(a|k)  U(b|k) ⌘  U(a|k). (This number is on the x-axis of Figure 1.)
1. After each trial, for each model k compute  U(a|k) and record t(a). Graphing these
utility-time (u,t) pairs across all models k gives a plot like Figure 1. However each point will be
associated with a posterior probability p(k|a) (from updating by equation (2.4)). This collection
of points provides a basis to estimate the relation between u and t.
2. From the (u,t) data, compute a smoothed probability distribution f(t| U(k)) using a
3-D Lowess (or other) smoothing procedure. This procedure will give smoothed probabilities
of RTs associated with values of  U(k), denoted fˆ(t| U(k)). Intuitively, this procedure gives
the most likely relation between  U(k) and the RTs, taking into account that each model
has specialized utility di↵erences for the observed choice, and taking into account each model’s
likelihood.
3. For each model k the observed choice a has an associated (x-axis) value  U(k). Read o↵
the (fitted) probability of the likely RT, for that model, fˆ(t| U(k)) ⌘ g(t|k). Then use Bayes
rule to adjust the posteriors p(k|a) according to P (k|t) = g(t|k)p(k|a)P
m g(t|m)p(m|a) .
Figure 1 gives a stylized illustration (based on data from one subject) of how RT-based
updating would work. The inverted-U’s are iso-probability contours showing possible relations
between  U(k) and response time t. The thicker curves are those which are more likely (as
inferred from the smoothed data). The actual RT level in one trial is shown by a horizontal line
cutting across the figure.
A theory Ta which is accurate–in the sense that the actual choice has a positive utility
di↵erential according to the theory– predicts a fast RT is likely; the intersection of the theory’s
 U(Ta) value and the observed RT lies on the isoquant with predicted RT probability of .10.
Another theory Ti is inaccurate, since it assigns a small negative utility di↵erential to the ob-
served choice. Theory Ti’s utility di↵erential intersects an RT isoquant with probability of only
.05. (Intuitively, Ti predicts that since the  U(Ti) is negative and close to the RT peaks, the
7
Figure 5.1: Response times (in milliseconds) in choosing between two delayed rewards in Risky Choice
experiment. The x-axis is a measure of differential subjective value.
the isoquant with predicted RT probability of .10. Another theory Hi is inaccurate, since it assigns a small
negative utility differential to the observed choice. Theory Hi’s utility differential intersects an RT isoquant
with probability of only .05. Intuitively, Hi predicts that since the ∆U(Ti) is negative and close to the RT
peaks, the RT should be slow, not fast. The relative RT probabilities of .10 and .05 inferred from the heories
∆U(k) values means that the m re accurate theory Ha will have higher likelihood at the expense of the
inaccurate theory Hi.
Including RT information could be used in different ways. As illustrated above, it could be used after
all choices are made (using terminal values of p(k|histo y)) to sharpen all the terminal estimates of model
likelihood. RT information could also used for “online” updating after each trial, which requires recomputing
the empirical f(t|a) function after each choice-RT observation.
Intuitively, including RTs will generally “double count” a models weaknesses, and more rapidly eliminate
models that fit both choices and RTs poorly. However, if there are thoughtless quick mistakes (i.e. resulting
in low RT) then the method will actua ly compensate for them. A theory that predicts the wrong choice
(∆U(k) < 0) but has a fast RT will also have a predicted RT which is fast. Therefore, the fast RT will forgive
the theory, when compared to theories that predict indifference ∆U(t, i) ≈ 0 and hence predict a fast choice.
RTs typically fall sharply over trials (in a classic power-law learning curve), as we see in Chapter 1. The
average RTs were 15, 7 and 3 seconds on trials 2, 10 and 50. Since the first few trials are the ones in which
BROAD approaches add the most information, it will be important to adjust for these learning curve effects.
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Skin Conductance Response Skin Conductance Response (SCR) measures are an index of a level of
arousal elicited by aversive emotions such as anxiety and fear (Figner and Murphy (2010)). Kang et al.
(2012) empirically investigates temporal anxiety in economics decisions using two variants of a “clock game”
where maximizing payoffs depend on strategically timing selling decisions. Temporal anxiety would cause
participants in a dynamic version of the game to sell too early and not realize potential exponentially greater
gains; the behavioural data does support the fact that subjects sell earlier in the dynamic version than in the
static game. Direct measurement of SCR supported this interpretation. Measuring SCRs at the time of selling
shows stronger anxiety in the dynamic game in general, and subjects who show higher anxiety (as measured
by SCR) also sell relatively earlier.
Similar to RTs, SCR measurements can also be incorporated into BROAD to more rapidly eliminate
models that fit choices and SCR measurements poorly. A likelihood function can map choice alternatives to
differences in SCRs: we conjecture that choosing between option that are similar in utility leads to higher
anxiety, and SCRs.
Eye-tracking Recently, eye-tracking has been employed to assess subjects thinking processes in various
decision environments: to determine how subjects detect truth-telling or deception in sender-receiver games
(Wang et al. (2010a)). how consumers evaluate comparatively a huge number of commodities, as in a
supermarket setting (Reutskaja et al. (2011)); and the relationship between visual attention (as measured
by eye-fixations) and valuation of commodities in choice tasks (Krajbich et al. (2010)). Hu et al. (2013)
use eye-movement measurements, as auxiliary measures of subjects’ beliefs, and aid in identification and
estimation.
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Increasingly a number of Neuroeconomic studies have involved
Function Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data for model comparison. Typically, there are potential
number models that explain a behavioural phenomenon with similar accuracy, especially in simple tasks.
Prevost et al. (2013) found support for model-based over model-free learning in Pavlovian learning tasks using
fMRI data, and Symmonds et al. (2010) used fMRI data from a sequential choice task to support a sequential
updating strategy over a optimal predetermined strategy.
There are at least a couple of reasons why BROAD methods are particularly suitable for fMRI studies.
Scanner time is an expensive resource and subjects can experience discomfort, hence tasks cannot be very long.
To allow for the BOLD signal to stabilize, several seconds of lag is included which gives time to compute new
questions. BROAD methods are particularly suitable for studying complex tasks in fMRI, such as decision
making in financial bubbles (De Martino et al. (2013)), where subjects can be paired with different groups or
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shown different markets based on their previous responses.
5.1.2 Applications of BROAD
In many areas of empirical behavioral economics, one or more functional forms have been developed which
appear to fit choice data comparably well. Controversies about which theories are most accurate typically persist
since different people use different methods, goodness-of-fit criteria, and experimental stimuli. Application of
the BROAD technique could sharpen these comparisons.
Social Preferences Mathematical models of social preference have been widely used to explore sociality of
different species, gene and hormone influences, and underlying neural circuitry (Fehr and Camerer (2007)).
An approach pioneered in psychology and economics (Bazerman et al. (1995)), is to model preferences over
social outcomes as a weighted sum of an agents own outcome xi, the outcomes of N − 1 others xk and some
comparative function of xi and xk. “Inequality-averse” preferences reflect a distaste for envy (when i gets
less than k) and guilt (when i gets more than k). The weights α = β = 0 correspond to pure self-interest. A
similar form is due to Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) where is utility is maximized at an equal share si = 1/N .
A different “Rawlsitarian theory” combines self-interest with desires to help the worst-off person and to do the
best for society as a whole (Charness and Rabin (2002)).
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) introduced a useful three-player paradigm to compare some of these
theories. A generalization of that paradigm would utilize BROAD to find sets of three-payoff vectors which
discriminate among theories best. Importantly, it has been speculated (Fehr et al. (2006)) that there are
interpersonal differences in the emphasis placed on efficiency (the weight wt in the Rawlsitarian approach)
compared to inequality (α, β in Fehr-Schmidt and equal share preference in ERC). If so, a BROAD procedure
designed to customize the choices made for each subject will have an advantage in detecting those individual
differences rapidly and precisely.
Behavioural Game Theory Several solution concepts have been developed to predict patterns of behaviour
in noncooperative games, including best-response and quantal-response equilibrium analyses, and level-k
reasoning and cognitive hierarchy (Camerer et al. (2004)). Finding normal or extensive form games on which
theories make very different predictions is a difficult task since the space of possible games is very large.
Different theories of learning in games have been developed, such as reinforcement, fictitous play, and
hybrids like experience-weighted attaction learning (Camerer (2003)). BROAD can be applied to adaptively
find games to distinguish solution concepts as well as different learning trajectories predicted by the theories.
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Framing and Context Dependence The framing effect has been shown to be one of the most persistent
biases of decision-making (Kahneman et al. (1982)). The framing of a task, and its context, affects the
perception of the riskiness of choices (Kuhberger (1998) reports a meta-analysis), and the subjective probability
that is assigned to outcomes (Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001)). Framing of the task also affects time perception.
BROAD methods can be applied to compare theories in the relevant frame, or with the appropriate group of
subjects in the field. Theories should also be compared in multiple frames or contexts to ensure the robustness
of the results. By economizing the number of questions or tests required, BROAD can be used to test multiple
frames in one, or just a few, experimental sessions.
5.1.3 Field experiments of Prospect Theory
The gold standard for inferring causal effects is controlled experiments. To test the causal effect of reference
dependence and loss aversion on consumer behaviour, we would have to randomize the discounting periods
and discount amounts for promotions of items and its substitute. In the case of the eCommerce retailer that
we have studied, it is infeasbile to get the businesses’ cooperation, since randomizing discounts could lead to
losses or loss in consumer’s confidence. The feasible alternative is to implement the pricing of an item and its
substitute in order to maximize overall profits for both products, according to the prescriptions of our model.
But now we randomly pick the pairs of items (treatment group) that implement this strategy, and use existing
pricing criteria on the rest (control group). The observed change in demand between the two groups would test
for the effectiveness of the strategy and strength of the causal effects.
Validating the effects in both lab and field studies addresses several issues of generalizability and control.
An excellent recent example is Sonnemann et al. (2013), where evidence for partition dependence (which
could lead to the sum of probabilities of outcomes exceeding 1) is obtained from prediction markets in the lab,
153 field studies of prediction markets and long-shot bets on horse races. Adaptive experimental design and
the discrete choice framework provides the tools to make it easier on researchers to test behavioural theories
and effects in different settings.
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